Kirstie McClure offers a major reinterpretation of John Locke's thought that is important not only for the light it sheds on Locke, but also for the questions it raises about liberalism and rights-based theories of politics. Sensitive to the range of interpretative and political issues that Locke's work raises, McClure's analysis is impressive for its balance and subtlety, and for her command of the enormous literature on Locke. Between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, between Two Tracts on Government of 1660 and Two Treatises on Government of 1690, Locke subjected the idea of civil power to increasing scrutiny. In one generation, he moved from supporting order for its own sake to defending resistance, and ended with a profoundly modern epistemology. McClure suggests that Locke's concepts of government by consent, equality, rights, and the rule of law were embedded in his theistic cosmology. While Locke may well have been a constitutionalist, his theoretical concerns were far broader than any legal or constitutional interpretation of his work might suggest. To make this claim, she explains, is to deny neither the significance of "rights" nor the importance of institutions and consent in Locke's theoretical production. Rather, it is to insist that such themes are merely parts of a more comprehensive theoretical project, the focus of which, bluntly stated in the Second Treatise, was "to understand Political Power right."
This book attempts to establish how courts of general jurisdiction differ from specialized human rights courts in their approach to the implementation and development of international human rights. Why do courts of general jurisdiction face particular problems in relation to the application of international human rights law and why, in other cases, are they better placed than specialized human rights courts to act as guardians of international human rights? At the international level, this volume focusses on the International Court of Justice and courts of regional economic integration organizations in Europe, Latin America and Africa. With regard to the judicial implementation of international human rights and human rights decisions at the domestic level, the contributions analyze the requirements set by human rights treaties and offer a series of country studies on the practice of domestic courts in Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia. This book follows up on research undertaken by the International Human Rights Law Committee of the International Law Association. It includes the final Committee report as well as contributions by committee members and external experts.
For two centuries, federal judges exercised wide discretion in criminal sentencing. In 1987 a complex bureaucratic apparatus termed Sentencing "Guidelines" was imposed on federal courts. FEAR OF JUDGING is the first full-scale history, analysis, and critique of the new sentencing regime, arguing that it sacrifices comprehensibility and common sense.
While millions of Americans fought the Nazis, liberty was under attack at home with the persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses who were intimidated and even imprisoned for refusing to salute the flag or serve in the armed forces. This study explores their defence of their First Amendment rights.
Focusing on the behavioral aspects of disagreement within a panel and between the levels of the federal judicial hierarchy, the authors reveal the impact of individual attitudes or preferences on judicial decision-making, and hence on political divisions in the broader society.
Social scientists have convincingly documented soaring levels of political, legal, economic, and social inequality in the United States. Missing from this picture of rampant inequality, however, is any attention to the significant role of state law and courts in establishing policies that either ameliorate or exacerbate inequality. In Judging Inequality, political scientists James L. Gibson and Michael J. Nelson demonstrate the influential role of the fifty state supreme courts in shaping the widespread inequalities that define America today, focusing on court-made public policy on issues ranging from educational equity and adequacy to LGBT rights to access to justice to worker’s rights. Drawing on an analysis of an original database of nearly 6,000 decisions made by over 900 judges on 50 state supreme courts over a quarter century, Judging Inequality documents two ways that state high courts have crafted policies relevant to inequality: through substantive policy decisions that fail to advance equality and by rulings favoring more privileged litigants (typically known as “upperdogs”). The authors discover that whether court-sanctioned policies lead to greater or lesser inequality depends on the ideologies of the justices serving on these high benches, the policy preferences of their constituents (the people of their state), and the institutional structures that determine who becomes a judge as well as who decides whether those individuals remain in office. Gibson and Nelson decisively reject the conventional theory that state supreme courts tend to protect underdog litigants from the wrath of majorities. Instead, the authors demonstrate that the ideological compositions of state supreme courts most often mirror the dominant political coalition in their state at a given point in time. As a result, state supreme courts are unlikely to stand as an independent force against the rise of inequality in the United States, instead making decisions compatible with the preferences of political elites already in power. At least at the state high court level, the myth of judicial independence truly is a myth. Judging Inequality offers a comprehensive examination of the powerful role that state supreme courts play in shaping public policies pertinent to inequality. This volume is a landmark contribution to scholarly work on the intersection of American jurisprudence and inequality, one that essentially rewrites the “conventional wisdom” on the role of courts in America’s democracy.
In an ideal world, the laws of Congress--known as federal statutes--would always be clearly worded and easily understood by the judges tasked with interpreting them. But many laws feature ambiguous or even contradictory wording. How, then, should judges divine their meaning? Should they stick only to the text? To what degree, if any, should they consult aids beyond the statutes themselves? Are the purposes of lawmakers in writing law relevant? Some judges, such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, believe courts should look to the language of the statute and virtually nothing else. Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit respectfully disagrees. In Judging Statutes, Katzmann, who is a trained political scientist as well as a judge, argues that our constitutional system charges Congress with enacting laws; therefore, how Congress makes its purposes known through both the laws themselves and reliable accompanying materials should be respected. He looks at how the American government works, including how laws come to be and how various agencies construe legislation. He then explains the judicial process of interpreting and applying these laws through the demonstration of two interpretative approaches, purposivism (focusing on the purpose of a law) and textualism (focusing solely on the text of the written law). Katzmann draws from his experience to show how this process plays out in the real world, and concludes with some suggestions to promote understanding between the courts and Congress. When courts interpret the laws of Congress, they should be mindful of how Congress actually functions, how lawmakers signal the meaning of statutes, and what those legislators expect of courts construing their laws. The legislative record behind a law is in truth part of its foundation, and therefore merits consideration.
The book of Judges is full of characters of ambivalent moral integrity and acts of dubious propriety, such as Jael's murder of Sisera and the sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter. And yet the terse narrative and the reticent narrator frequently leave the ethical character of these actions in doubt. In order to avoid reading contemporary worldviews and ethics into this ancient text, Mary L. Conway applies a blend of narrative and functional linguistic theories to her analysis of the stories of the six major judges in an effort to more accurately identify the unifying ideological stance of the book. Using an interdisciplinary approach that employs the concepts of narrative perspective alongside appraisal theory, Conway evaluates the judges within their historical context in order to determine whether their actions are normative or aberrant. The lexicogrammatical and ideational evidence produced by this methodology reveals contrasts and trajectories within and across the narratives that, Conway argues, give insight into the character and actions of the Israelites and YHWH and the relationship between the Israelite people and their God. In this trailblazing study, Conway models a new approach to biblical interpretation that lays bare the ethics of the book of Judges. This study will be of interest to biblical studies scholars, in particular Old Testament scholars, as well as seminary students and pastors.
Reprimand a class comic, restrain a bully, dismiss a student for brazen attire--and you may be facing a lawsuit, costly regardless of the result. This reality for today's teachers and administrators has made the issue of school discipline more difficult than ever before--and public education thus more precarious. This is the troubling message delivered in Judging School Discipline, a powerfully reasoned account of how decades of mostly well-intended litigation have eroded the moral authority of teachers and principals and degraded the quality of American education. Judging School Discipline casts a backward glance at the roots of this dilemma to show how a laudable concern for civil liberties forty years ago has resulted in oppressive abnegation of adult responsibility now. In a rigorous analysis enriched by vivid descriptions of individual cases, the book explores 1,200 cases in which a school's right to control students was contested. Richard Arum and his colleagues also examine several decades of data on schools to show striking and widespread relationships among court leanings, disciplinary practices, and student outcomes; they argue that the threat of lawsuits restrains teachers and administrators from taking control of disorderly and even dangerous situations in ways the public would support. Table of Contents: Preface 1. Questioning School Authority 2. Student Rights versus School Rules With Irenee R. Beattie 3. How Judges Rule With Irenee R. Beattie 4. From the Bench to the Paddle With Richard Pitt and Jennifer Thompson 5. School Discipline and Youth Socialization With Sandra Way 6. Restoring Moral Authority in American Schools Appendix: Tables Notes Index Reviews of this book: This interesting study casts a critical eye on the American legal system, which [Arum] sees as having undermined the ability of teachers and administrators to socialize teenagers...Arum, it must be pointed out, is adamantly opposed to such measures as zero tolerance, which, he insists, often results in unfair and excessive punishment. What he wisely calls for is not authoritarianism, but for school folks to regain a sense of moral authority so that they can act decisively in matters of school discipline without having to look over their shoulders. --David Ruenzel, Teacher Magazine Reviews of this book: Arum's book should be compulsory reading for the legal profession; they need to recognise the long-term effects of their judgments on the climate of schools and the way in which judgments in favour of individual rights can reduce the moral authority of schools in disciplining errant students. But the author is no copybook conservative, and he is as critical of the Right's get-tough, zero-tolerance authoritarianism as he is of what he eloquently describes as the 'marshmallow effect' of liberal reformers, pushing the rules to their limits and tolerating increased misconduct. --John Dunford, Times Educational Supplement [UK] Reviews of this book: [Arum] argues that discipline is often ineffective because schools' legitimacy and moral authority have been eroded. He holds the courts responsible, because they have challenged schools' legal and moral authority, supporting this claim by examining over 6,200 state and federal appellate court decisions from 1960 to 1992. In describing the structure of these decisions, Arum provides interesting insights into school disciplinary practices and the law. --P. M. Socoski, Choice Reviews of this book: Arum's careful analysis of school discipline becomes so focused and revealing that the ideological boundaries of the debate seem almost to have been suspended. The result is a rich and original book, bold, important, useful, and--as this combination of attributes might suggest--surprising...Many years in the making, Judging School Discipline weds historical, theoretical, and statistical research within the problem-solving stance of a teacher working to piece together solutions in the interest of his students. The result is a book that promises to shape research as well as practice through its demonstration that students are liberated, as well as oppressed, by school discipline. --Steven L. VanderStaay, Urban Education Reviews of this book: [Arum's] break with education-school dogma on student rights is powerful and goes far toward explaining why so many teachers dread their students--when they are not actually fighting them off. --Heather MacDonald, Wall Street Journal