Author: United States. Congress. House. Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China
The federal government is running huge budget deficits, spending too much, and heading toward a financial crisis. Federal spending soared under President George W. Bush, and the costs of programs for the elderly are set to balloon in coming years. Hurricane Katrina has made the federal budget situation even more desperate. In Downsizing the Federal Government Cato Institute budget expert Chris Edwards provides policymakers with solutions to the growing federal budget mess. Edwards identifies more than 100 federal programs that should be terminated, transferred to the states, or privatized in order to balance the budget and save hundreds of billions of dollars. Edwards proposes a balanced reform package of cuts to entitlements, domestic programs, and excess defense spending. He argues that these cuts would not only eliminate the deficit, but also strengthen the economy, enlarge personal freedom, and leave a positive fiscal legacy for the next generation. Downsizing the Federal Government discusses the systematic causes of wasteful spending, and it overflows with examples of federal programs that are obsolete and mismanaged. The book examines the budget process and shows how policymakers act contrary to the interests of average Americans by favoring special interests.
Joint Vision 2020 is the conceptual template for how we will channel the vitality of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.
This new IISS Strategic Dossier examines the recent development of Moscow’s armed forces and military capabilities. It analyses the aspirations underpinning Russia’s military reform programme and its successes as well as its failures. The book also provides insights into Russia’s operational use of its armed forces, including in the intervention in Syria, the goals and results of recent state armament programmes, and the trajectory of future developments. This full-colour volume includes more than 50 graphics, maps and charts and over 70 images, and contains chapters on: Russia's armed forces since the end of the Cold War Strategic forces Ground forces Naval forces Aerospace forces Russia’s approach to military decision-making and joint operations Economics and industry At a time when Russia’s relations with many of its neighbours are increasingly strained, and amid renewed concern about the risk of an armed clash, this dossier is essential reading for understanding the state,capabilities and future of Russia’s armed forces.
This report discusses and assesses the War Powers Resolution and its application since enactment in 1973, providing detailed background on various cases in which it was used, as well as cases in which issues of its applicability were raised. It will be revised biannually. In the post-Cold War world, Presidents have continued to commit U.S. Armed Forces into potential hostilities, sometimes without a specific authorization from Congress. Thus the War Powers Resolution and its purposes continue to be a potential subject of controversy. On June 7, 1995, the House defeated, by a vote of 217-201, an amendment to repeal the central features of the War Powers Resolution that have been deemed unconstitutional by every President since the law's enactment in 1973. In 1999, after the President committed U.S. military forces to action in Yugoslavia without congressional authorization, Representative Tom Campbell used expedited procedures under the Resolution to force a debate and votes on U.S. military action in Yugoslavia, and later sought, unsuccessfully, through a federal court suit to enforce presidential compliance with the terms of the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution P.L. 93-148 was passed over the veto of President Nixon on November 7, 1973, to provide procedures for Congress and the President to participate in decisions to send U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities. Section 4(a)(1) requires the President to report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. When such a report is submitted, or is required to be submitted, Section 5(b) requires that the use of forces must be terminated within 60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes such use or extends the time period. Section 3 requires that the "President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing" U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. From 1975 through March 2017, Presidents have submitted 168 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited Section 4(a)(1), which triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement, and in this case the military action was completed and U.S. armed forces had disengaged from the area of conflict when the report was made. The reports submitted by the President since enactment of the War Powers Resolution cover a range of military activities, from embassy evacuations to full-scale combat military operations, such as the Persian Gulf conflict, and the 2003 war with Iraq, the intervention in Kosovo, and the anti-terrorism actions in Afghanistan. In some instances, U.S. Armed Forces have been used in hostile situations without formal reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution. On one occasion, Congress exercised its authority to determine that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) became operative on August 29, 1983, through passage of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119). In 1991 and 2002, Congress authorized, by law, the use of military force against Iraq. In several instances none of the President, Congress, or the courts has been willing to initiate the procedures of or enforce the directives in the War Powers Resolution.
The author takes issue with the complacent belief that a happy mixture of deterrence, arms control and luck will enable humanity to cope adequately with weapons of mass destruction, arguing that the risks are ever more serious.
This report assesses domestic political support for internationalist foreign policy by analyzing the motivations of members of Congress on key foreign policy issues. It includes case studies on major foreign policy debates in recent years, including the use of force, foreign aid, trade policy and U.S.-Russia relations. It also develops a new series of archetypes for describing the foreign policy worldviews of members of the 115th Congress to replace the current stale and unsophisticated labels of internationalist, isolationist, hawk and dove. Report findings emphasize areas of bipartisan cooperation on foreign policy issues given member ideologies.
When Chiang Kai-shek arrived at Sian in the fall of 1936 and laid plans for launching his last campaign against the Red Army with an expectation of exterminating it in a month, he badly misjudged the mood of the Tungpei (Northeast) Army and more so its leader, Chang Hsueh-liang, better known as the Young Marshal. Refusing to fight the Communists, Chang with the loyal support of his officers staged a coup d’état by kidnapping Chiang Kai-shek for two weeks at Sian. Almost forty years after the melodrama was over, the Sian Incident still absorbs much attention from both Chinese and Western scholars as well as the reading public. The Sian Incident attempts to bring together whatever information has been thus far gleaned about the subject, and to cover all aspects and controversies involved in it. [1, xi, xii]