Five specialists examine the historical relationship of culture and conflict in various regional societies. The authors use Adda B. Bozeman's theories on conflict and culture as the basis for their analyses of the causes, nature, and conduct of war and conflict in the Soviet Union, the Middle East, Sinic Asia (China, Japan, and Vietnam), Latin America, and Africa. Drs. Blank, Lawrence Grinter, Karl P. Magyar, Lewis B. Ware, and Bynum E. Weathers conclude that non-Western cultures and societies do not reject war but look at violence and conflict as a normal and legitimate aspect of sociopolitical behavior.
This study of the final stage of British colonial involvement in South East Asia begins with the arrival of British troops in Indonesia as liberators in 1945-6 and culminates with the 1963-6 period of confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia.
Australia's engagement with Asia from 1944 until the late 1960s was based on a sense of responsibility to the United Kingdom and its Southeast Asian colonies as they navigated a turbulent independence into the British Commonwealth. The circumstances of the early Cold War decades also provided for a mutual sense of solidarity with the non-communist states of East Asia, with which Australia mostly enjoyed close relationships. From 1967 into the early 1970s, however, Commonwealth Responsibility and Cold War Solidarity demonstrates that the framework for this deep Australian engagement with its region was progressively eroded by a series of compounding, external factors: the 1967 formation of ASEAN and its consolidation by the mid-1970s as the premier regional organisation surpassing the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC); Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez; Washington's de-escalation and gradual withdrawal from Vietnam after March 1968; the 1969 Nixon doctrine that America's Asia-Pacific allies must take up more of the burden of providing for their own security; and US rapprochement with China in 1972. The book shows that these profound changes marked the start of Australia's political distancing from the region during the 1970s despite the intentions, efforts and policies of governments from Whitlam onwards to foster deeper engagement. By 1974, Australia had been pushed to the margins of the region, with its engagement premised on a broadening but shallower transactional basis.
Brunei has long been associated with massive oil resources and the stability that its wealth can guarantee. But little is known of the revolt of 1962 that might have changed the fortunes of the sultanate and the fate of Southeast Asia. In theory, Brunei is a constitutional sultanate, but in practice it is an absolute monarchy. Since the 1962 rebellion, a state of emergency has been in force and the Sultan has ruled by decree. It is a small state in a region dominated by the superpower of China and its size is a significant factor in determining the country's policy towards defence and security - territorially, politically and economically.This is the first comprehensive history of the Brunei Rebellion, which was the trigger for the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation of the 1960s and of critical importance in understanding the history of the region. Harun Abdul Majid explores the turmoil throughout Southeast Asia that was the backdrop to the rebellion and analyses how Brunei not only survived but actually emerged from this turbulent period as a stronger and more coherent political state. Among other issues, he asks: how did events affect the position of the Sultan and the people of Brunei? How did the relationship with the United Kingdom evolve? And what happened next?The revolt of 1962 was a small, armed uprising in support of a Borneo Federation consisting of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo. It opposed the Malaysian Federation, which was seen as a buttress of British and Western imperial interest. In a period of great tension between the West and the Communist world, China viewed the rebellion as a national liberation war and it was quickly suppressed by the British Emergency Force. But although the rebellion itself was short-lived, the consequences for the region's international relations within Asia and with the West - especially given Brunei's emergence as a significant oilproducer - were far-reaching.
One of the most vexing issues that has faced the international community since the end of the Cold War has been the use of force by the United Nations peacekeeping forces. UN intervention in civil wars, as in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda, has thrown into stark relief the difficulty of peacekeepers operating in situations where consent to their presence and activities is fragile or incomplete and where there is little peace to keep. Complex questions arise in these circumstances. When and how should peacekeepers use force to protect themselves, to protect their mission, or, most troublingly, to ensure compliance by recalcitrant parties with peace accords? Is a peace enforcement role for peacekeepers possible or is this simply war by another name? Is there a grey zone between peacekeeping and peace enforcement? Trevor Findlay reveals the history of the use of force by UN peacekeepers from Sinai in the 1950s to Haiti in the 1990s. He untangles the arguments about the use of force in peace operations and sets these within the broader context of military doctrine and practice. Drawing on these insights the author examines proposals for future conduct of UN operations, including the formulation of UN peacekeeping doctrine and the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force.
In 1955, a conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia that was attended by representatives from twenty-nine nations. Against the backdrop of crumbling European empires, Asian and African leaders forged new alliances and established anti-imperial principles for a new world order. The conference came to capture popular imaginations across the Global South and, as counterpoint to the dominant world order, it became both an act of collective imagination and a practical political project for decolonization that inspired a range of social movements, diplomatic efforts, institutional experiments and heterodox visions of the history and future of the world. In this book, leading international scholars explore what the spirit of Bandung has meant to people across the world over the past decades and what it means today. It analyzes Bandung's complicated and pivotal impact on global history, international law and, most of all, justice struggles after the end of formal colonialism.
The Commonwealth is working for the UK however if the organisation is to reach its potential and influence events, the Commonwealth Secretariat needs to "sharpen, strengthen and promote its diplomatic performance". Recently the Commonwealth has appeared less active and less publicly visible. The Government does not appear to have a clear and co-ordinated strategy for its relations with the Commonwealth. The moral authority of the Commonwealth has "too often been undermined by the repressive actions of member governments". The Committee is "disturbed to note the ineffectiveness of the mechanisms for upholding the Commonwealth's values", and expresses support for the Eminent Persons Group's proposal for a Commonwealth Charter. The Committee also says that it is not convinced that member states are making the most of the economic and trading opportunities offered by the Commonwealth. The report welcomes the fact that the Commonwealth continues to attract interest from potential new members, and the report says that there are advantages in greater diversity and an extended global reach for the Commonwealth however the application process should be rigorous. There is also concern at the continuing evidence of serious human rights abuses in Sri Lanka and the Committee urges the Prime Minister to state publicly his unwillingness to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Colombo meeting unless he receives "convincing and independently-verified evidence of substantial and sustainable improvements in human and political rights in Sri Lanka."
