This document describes the Japanese field artillery during World War Two. It addresses the following topics: organization (division and heavy artillery, and observation regiments); basic doctrine (relation of artillery to infantry, forward emplacement, trends- increase of fire power); applied tactics (offensive, defensive, characteristics of Japanese artillery fire); equipment (construction of, summary estimate of, and description of Japanese field artillery); and operational details of Japanese artillery (disassembly and operation of the Model 94 75-mm mountain gun, and recoil and counter-recoil systems).
Although it was the largest and final battle of the Pacific War, the Battle for Okinawa has long been overshadowed by other dramatic events in 1945. The books that have been written about it emphasize the role of infantrymen, armor, and U.S. Marines. This work takes a fresh perspective and focuses on the vital role played by the U.S. Army's forward artillery observers-the eyes and ears of American artillery who were among the least recognized heroes of the war. According to Rodney Earl Walton, U.S. artillerymen matched Japanese gunners in intensity and surpassed them in effectiveness because their forward observers were able to provide a much shorter response time to requests for artillery support. Divided into teams consisting of four or five men led by an artillery lieutenant, these observers would spend three days on the front lines directing artillery against enemy positions, return to their artillery battery for three days, and then rotate up to the line of battle again. While trying to maximize the damage inflicted on the enemy, the men had to deal with the ever-present possibility of firing on their own forces. The ability to shift artillery fire throughout the battlefield was a new development in World War II, and its evolution is fully examined in the book. Walton, the son of one of the forward observers on Okinawa, spent more than twenty years investigating what happened to his father and other artillerymen during the conflict. Interviews with the artillerymen and the infantrymen they supported are central to his story, which is filled with gripping and sometimes humorous accounts of what happened. The work stands as a stirring tribute from the "baby boom generation" to the "greatest generation.
Mod slutningen af Stillehavskrigen planlagde den amerikanske hær en invasion af Japan i form af operationerne Olympic på øen Kyushu og Coronet i nærheden af Tokyo. For at vildlede japanerne gennemførtes to skinoperationer, Pastel og Coronet Deception. Forfatteren gennemgår forberedelser til, indhold og konsekvenser af skinoperationerne og analyserer ligeledes japanernes reaktioner undervejs.
The Japanese Army used tanks to great effect in the build-up to World War II. Inspired by European designs, in the 1920s and 1930s an innovative Japanese tank program facilitated their campaigns in China prior to the Pacific War. During the ensuing war against the Allies tanks were deployed imaginatively in jungle terrain previously thought impassable by such vehicles, being integral in Malaya and the capture of Singapore. Steven J Zaloga uses detailed and colorful artwork and photographs to explore these designs, explaining their neglect in favor of the naval priorities that left Japanese tanks outmoded by Western designs.
Lord Hideyoshi, the regent of Japan at the time, took the first step toward the control of firearms. It was a very small step, and it was not taken simply to protect feudal lords from being shot at by peasants but to get all weapons out of the hands of civilians. He said nothing about arms control. Instead, he announced that he was going to build a statue of Buddha that would make all existing statues look like midgets. It would be so enormous (the figure was about twice the scale of the Statue of Liberty), that many tons of iron would be needed just for the braces and bolts. Still more was required to erect the accompanying temple, which was to cover a piece of ground something over an eighth of a mile square. All farmers, ji-samurai, and monks were invited to contribute their swords and guns to the cause. They were, in fact, required to. -- from publisher description.
During his time as a POW, Frank "Foo" Fujita kept a diary of daily happenings, embellished with drawings of life in the camp. He secreted the diary in the walls of his barracks, as the practice was forbidden. That diary forms the basis of these memoirs. Fujita's memoirs are also unique in that he was one of the fewer than nine hundred Americans taken prisoner on the island of Java. The bulk of American POWs in Japanese hands surrendered in the Philippines, and most of the published POW memoirs reflect their experience. Fujita's account of the defense of Java and of the fate of the "Lost Battalion" of Texas artillerymen serves to distinguish this memoir from others. At one point while a POW in Japan, Fujita was forced to be part of the Japanese radio group broadcasting propaganda. After the war, he testified at some of the war crime trials in San Francisco, and the diary on which this book is based was used as evidence in those trials.
In this provocative history, James B. Wood challenges the received wisdom that Japan's defeat in the Pacific was historically inevitable. He argues instead that it was only when the Japanese military prematurely abandoned its original sound strategic plan—to secure the resources Japan needed and establish a viable defensible perimeter for the Empire—that the Allies were able to regain the initiative and lock Japanese forces into a war of attrition they were not prepared to fight. The book persuasively shows how the Japanese army and navy had both the opportunity and the capability to have fought a different and more successful war in the Pacific that could have influenced the course and outcome of World War II. It is therefore a study both of Japanese defeat and of what was needed to achieve a potential Japanese victory, or at the very least, to avoid total ruin. Wood's argument does not depend on signal individual historical events or dramatic accidents. Instead it examines how familiar events could have b
Before World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) developed an offensive tactical doctrine designed to allow its infantry forces to fight successfully against a superior foe, the Soviet Union. A battle test of that doctrine's effectiveness occurred from June trough August 1939 along the Outer Mongolian-Manchurian border. This essay follows the daily combat operations of the IJA's 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, for a two-month period. During that time, the 2/28th Infantry was in constant contact with Soviet combined arms forces. In July the battalion participated in offensive operations against Soviet units commanded by General Georgi K. Zhukov. When Japanese tactical doctrine failed against a Soviet combined arms force, the Japanese went on the defensive. Japanese officers, however, regarded defensive doctrine as transitional in nature and adopted it only to gain time to prepare for a counterattack. Defensive doctrine that terrain be held until the resumption of offensive operations that would destroy the enemy. A lack of flexibility doomed the Japanese defensive effort. General Zhukov secretly marshalled his forces and in mid-August used his armor columns to spearhead a double envelopment of the static Japanese units in a position defense. The Soviets encircled the Japanese units, including the 2/28th Infantry, and the Japanese survivors had to fight their way back to friendly lines. The 2/28th Infantry's War Diary provides a vivid day-by-day account of its combat operations. This in turn allows the examination of how the Japanese applied their tactical doctrine on the battlefield. The Japanese tried to use and aggressive tactical doctrine tocompensate for materiel and equipment deficiencies in their army. Such an approach was successful as long as the Japanese could conduct bold offensive operations. When they were forced to adopt a defensive posture, however, discrepancies between tactical doctrine and battlefield reality became apparent. These problems, applicable to any army, highlight fundamental difficulties of force structure, preconceptions of potential enemy capabilities, and the role of doctrine in a combat environment. An examination of small unit tactics is particularly useful to illustrate the dynamics of doctrine as expressed on the battlefield.
