Spurred by a perceived growing ballistic missile threat from within the Asia-Pacific region and requests from the United States to support research and development on components of a missile defense system, the Japanese government decided in late 1998 and early 1999 to move forward with joint research and development with the United States on ballistic missile defense (BMD). But the decisions taken thus far commit Japan only to limited participation with the U.S. government on collaborative research and prototype production of theater missile defense (TMD) components. To date, Japan has undertaken no effort to develop or acquire a dedicated BMD system, nor has it assessed the larger political and strategic implications of a Japanese BMD system in any thorough or systematic manner. More important, no consensus has yet emerged in favor of the development or deployment of a full-fledged BMD system in Japan. Finally, Japan and the United States have not clarified: (1) how essential it is for Japan to participate in a more extensive program of joint research and development; (2) the extent of system interoperability that is desirable and achievable; or (3) the impact of a decision to deploy on the strategic environment in Asia.
Colonel Patrick M. O'Donogue (U.S. Army War College class of 2000) considers a topic of key importance to U.S. national security. Perhaps no security matter (with the exception of National Missile Defense) is as contentious globally as Theater Missile Defense (TMD). The question of U.S. assistance to Japan to develop and deploy a TMD is particularly complex and controversial.
Spurred by a perceived growing ballistic missile threat from withinthe Asia-Pacific region and requests from the United States to supportresearch and development on components of a missile defense system, the Japanese government decided in late 1998 and early 1999 to move forward with joint research and development with the United States on ballistic missile defense (BMD). This book explores both the benefits and potential problems of deploying a BMD system in Japan. It examines the main policies and actions undertaken thus far by Japan in the area of BMD, discusses several future milestones and likely next steps, and identifies the major Japanese individuals and organizations influencing future decisions on BMD. It also assesses how such issues as alliance maintenance, cost, feasibility, commercial incentives, and Chinese behavior are addressed by key Japanese players. It finds that, to date, Japan has undertaken no effort to develop or acquire a dedicated BMD system nor has it assessed in any thorough or systematic manner the larger political and strategic implications of a BMD system. More importantly, no consensus has yet emerged in favor of the development or deployment of a full-fledged BMD system in Japan. The book concludes that Japan could gradually acquire many of the elements of a BMD system while avoiding an explicit, formal deployment decision. The development or deployment of a complete BMD system with the United States, however, will likely pose many challenges to the U.S.-Japan alliance.
As East Asia is entering the 21st Century, Japan, in reassessing its security environment and thus its strategic calculus, is on the verge of deploying latest jointly-researched theater missile defenses (TMD) to counter the threat of ballistic and cruise missiles. In parallel, the People's Republic of China is constantly modernizing its ballistic missile forces and is gearing up for a possible contingency with its self-proclaimed "high-tech adversaries". This work shows what drives Japan to deploy theater missile defenses and how the People's Republic of China is poised to be reacting to it.
The issue of missile defense cooperation with Japan intersects with several issues of direct concern to Congress, ranging from support for developing a capability to protect U.S. regional forces, Asia-Pacific allies, and Taiwan, from Chinese short- and medium-range missiles, to countering a possible future threat to U.S. territory from long-range missiles developed by North Korea. Japan's current participation in the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program dates from August 1999, when the Japanese government agreed to conduct cooperative research on four components of the interceptor missile being developed for the then U.S. Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) anti-missile systema sea-based "upper tier" (exo-atmospheric) capability against short- and medium-range missiles up to 3,500 kilometers. In the spring of 2001, the Administration changed the context of the cooperative research effort when it reorganized and redirected the U.S. missile defense program to emphasize the employment of specific technologies across the entire spectrum of missile defense challenges, but especially to gain a limited, near-term capability to defeat missile attacks on U.S. territory by "rogue" states. The Pentagon redesignated the NTW program as the Sea-Based Midcourse System, with a goal of developing a capability for attacking missiles of all ranges in the initial or middle phases of ...
The issue of missile defense cooperation with Japan intersects with several issues of direct concern to Congress, ranging from support for developing a capability to protect U.S. regional forces, Asia-Pacific allies, and Taiwan, from Chinese short- and medium-range missiles, to countering a possible future threat to U.S. territory from long-range missiles developed by North Korea. Japan's current participation in the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program dates from August 1999, when the Japanese government agreed to conduct cooperative research on four components of the interceptor missile being developed for the then U.S. Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) anti-missile system a sea-based "upper tier" (exo-atmospheric) capability against short- and medium-range missiles up to 3,500 kilometers. In the spring of 2001, the Administration changed the context of the cooperative research effort when it reorganized and redirected the U.S. missile defense program to emphasize the employment of specific technologies across the entire spectrum of missile defense challenges, but especially to gain a limited, near-term capability to defeat missile attacks on U.S. territory by "rogue" states. The Pentagon redesignated the NTW program as the Sea-Based Midcourse System, with a goal of developing a capability for attacking missiles of all ranges in the initial or middle phases of their flight path. This change added to an already complex list of Japanese policy concerns, by putting Japan in the position of possibly cooperating in the development of technology that could become part of an American national missile defense capability a step that many Japanese see as transgressing a constitutional ban on "collective defense." Thus far, the Administration's program change has not deterred Japan from cooperative research on missile defense, but the policy shift has unsettled Japanese leaders and created additional political obstacles to bilateral BMD cooperation. The new U.S. approach has been criticized in the Japanese press and the Diet (parliament), both because of the potential violation of the implied ban on "collective defense" contained in Article 9 of Japan's U.S.-imposed "Peace Constitution," and also because the Bush initiative requires the United States to withdraw from the U.S.Russian Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which Tokyo has long regarded as an important element of strategic stability. An integrated U.S.-Japan BMD capability aimed at protecting third countries would raise the same constitutional issues. Japan has not made a decision regarding the acquisition of a missile defense capability. Japanese policymakers and defense firms generally are enthusiastic about missile defense cooperation, but the political parties, the media, and the general public are split over the issue. Proponents view BMD cooperation as a means to counter a perceived North Korean missile threat, and perhaps a Chinese threat as well. Other Japanese are fearful of aggravating relations with China or triggering an Asian missile race. Even groups in Japan favoring BMD cooperation are concerned about the large costs associated with the still-unproven technology. The popular Koizumi administration seems inclined to finesse the constitutional issue, if possible. Japan's future stance will likely depend on regional developments and how the issue plays out in the currently unstable political environment.
Colonel Patrick M. O'Donogue (U.S. Army War College class of 2000) considers a topic of key importance to U.S. national security. Perhaps no security matter (with the exception of National Missile Defense) is as contentious globally as Theater Missile Defense (TMD). The question of U.S. assistance to Japan to develop and deploy a TMD is particularly complex and controversial.
In Defense of Japan provides the first complete, up-to-date, English-language account of the history, politics, and policy of Japan's strategic space development. The dual-use nature of space technologies, meaning that they cut across both market and military applications, has had two important consequences for Japan. First, Japan has developed space technologies for the market in its civilian space program that have yet to be commercially competitive. Second, faced with rising geopolitical uncertainties and in the interest of their own economics, the makers of such technologies have been critical players in the shift from the market to the military in Japan's space capabilities and policy. This book shows how the sum total of market-to-military moves across space launch vehicles, satellites and spacecraft, and emerging related technologies, already mark Japan as an advanced military space power.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The proposed FY 2010 defense budget requests $1,859.5 million for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. The issue for Congress discussed in this report is: What should be the role of sea-based systems in U.S. ballistic missile defense, and are DoD¿s programs for sea-based BMD capabilities appropriately structured and funded? Potential issues for Congress re: sea-based BMD systems include the number of SM-3 interceptors planned for procurement, whether development of a far-term sea-based terminal defense BMD capability should be accelerated, technical risk in the Aegis BMD program, the number of Aegis BMD ships, and the role of Aegis BMD in European missile defense. Illustrations.
