General Jacob L. "Jake" Devers (1897–1979) was one of only two officers—the other was Omar C. Bradley—to command an army group during the decisive campaigns of 1944–1945 that liberated Europe and ended the war with Nazi Germany. After the war, Devers led the Army Ground Forces in the United States and eventually retired in 1949 after forty years of service. Despite incredible successes on the battlefield, General George C. Marshall's "dependable man" remains one of the most underrated and overlooked figures of his generation. In this definitive biography, James Scott Wheeler delivers a groundbreaking reassessment of the American commander whose contributions to victory in Europe are topped only by General Dwight D. Eisenhower's. Wheeler's exhaustively researched chronicle of Devers's life and career reveals a leader who demonstrated an extraordinary ability to cut through red tape and solve complex problems. Nevertheless, Eisenhower disliked Devers—a fact laid bare when he ordered Devers's Sixth Army Group to halt at the Rhine. After the war, Eisenhower's and Bradley's accounts of the generals' disagreements over strategy and tactics became received wisdom, to the detriment of Devers's reputation. An essential contribution to twentieth-century history, Jacob L. Devers provides a fresh and nuanced interpretation of the senior command during World War II and offers a new perspective on a highly accomplished soldier.
A “solid and informative” biography of one of the overlooked heroes of the Second World War (Wall Street Journal). Of the leaders of the American Army in World War II, Jacob Devers is undoubtedly the “forgotten four-star.” Plucked from relative obscurity in the Canal Zone, Devers was one of four generals selected by General of the Army George Marshall in 1941 to assist him in preparing the Army for war. He quickly became known in Army circles for his “can do” attitude and remarkable ability to cut through red tape. Among other duties, he was instrumental in transforming Ft. Bragg, then a small Army post, into a major training facility. As head of the armored force, Devers contributed to the development of a faster, more heavily armored tank, equipped with a higher velocity gun that could stand up to the more powerful German tanks, and helped to turn American armor into an effective fighting force. In spring 1943, Devers replaced Dwight Eisenhower as commander of the European Theater of Operations, then was given command of the 6th Army Group that invaded the south of France and fought its way through France and Germany to the Austrian border. In the European campaign to defeat Hitler, Eisenhower had three subordinate army group commanders: British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, Omar S. Bradley, and Jacob Devers. The first two are well-known; here the third receives the attention he properly deserves.
Decision at Strasbourg relates the remarkable and largely unknown story of Lt. General Jacob Devers' lost opportunity to launch a bold attack into the heart of Nazi Germany, which may have won the European war in late 1944, six months before Victory-over-Europe (V-E) Day in May 1945.
In the seventy years that have passed since the tank first appeared, antitank combat has presented one of the greatest challenges in land warfare. Dramatic improvements in tank technology and doctrine over the years have precipitated equally innovative developments in the antitank field. One cycle in this ongoing arms race occurred during the early years of World War II when the U.S. Army sought desperately to find an antidote to the vaunted German blitzkrieg. This Leavenworth Paper analyzes the origins of the tank destroyer concept, evaluates the doctrine and equipment with which tank destroyer units fought, and assesses the effectiveness of the tank destroyer in battle.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
In this autobiography, Omar N. Bradley (1893-1981) recounts his youth in Missouri, his years at the US Military Academy at West Point (he graduated in 1915 alongside Dwight D. Eisenhower), his assignments on the US-Mexico border and in Montana guarding copper mines during World War I, his tours teaching mathematics at West Point and in 1941, commanding of the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, his active duty during World War II in North Africa, Sicily, Normandy and eventually commanding 43 divisions and 1.3 million Americans in Europe, linking up with Soviet forces on the Elbe in April 1945, sealing the defeat of Nazi forces. Bradley provides vivid descriptions of key figures in the liberation of Europe, including Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, Churchill and Montgomery. Back in Washington, Bradley describes his years heading the Veterans Administration, his tenure as Army Chief of Staff and as first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff starting in 1949. After being promoted to the rank of General of the Army (five stars) in 1950, Bradley was the senior military commander when the Korean War started; he supported President Truman’s wartime policy of containment and was instrumental in persuading Truman to dismiss General MacArthur in 1951 after MacArthur resisted administration attempts to scale back the war’s strategic objectives. “The narrative deals skillfully with the planning and execution of campaigns that changed history... an unmatched panorama of 40 years of American military history... A great many writers have taken a crack at describing the 1944 Allied landings in Normandy [but] no overall description of that long, bitter battle on the American beaches, Utah and Omaha, is better than the one in this book.” — Drew Middleton,The New York Times “The most unassuming of the WW II military chiefs has (in recompense?) the last, stinging word... a vigorous, accomplished, exceptionally unconstrained narrative... Explosive yet likable.” — Kirkus Reviews “[A] surprisingly candid account from a man long reputed to be mild-mannered, discreet, and uncritical of the figures of his time... General Bradley has given us a very informative autobiography. Especially interesting are the sections on American military participation in the North African and Sicilian campaigns, and Eisenhower’s role there; the Normandy landings and subsequent breakout; the Battle of the Bulge; and President Truman’s removal of General MacArthur from command in Korea... He is very frank in his comments on Eisenhower’s weaknesses as Allied commander in North Africa and Sicily, and of Patton’s ill-advised behavior and remarks during that period and later. He is also harshly critical of Montgomery’s “prima donna”-like behavior and his continual efforts to push Eisenhower into giving him the supreme command of all Allied ground troops... With the loss of General Bradley, there are unlikely to be any more top-rank firsthand accounts of this period in US military history. Bradley’s book, therefore, may have the last word, but he hasn’t abused that privilege. He was too fair a man for that.” — Howard C. Thomas, The Christian Science Monitor “[A] superb book... a remarkably smooth-flowing account of the life of one of this country’s most distinguished military leaders... Bradley’s candid appraisals of his superiors, subordinates and peers, notably Patton, Montgomery, Eisenhower, Simpson and Hodges, make fascinating reading... this is a first-rate addition to the growing number of biographies of prominent World War II military personalities. Besides being eminently enjoyable reading for casual consumption, it is of significant value to the student of military history.” — Lieutenant Colonel William A. de Palo, Jr., Infantry Magazine
Discusses the Allied invasion of Normandy, with extensive details about the planning stage, called Operation Overlord, as well as the fighting on Utah and Omaha Beaches.
