Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the federal government adopted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), which requires insurers to make terrorism coverage available to commercial policyholders. In exchange, the federal government will reimburse insurers for a portion of insured losses above a particular threshold. This paper frames the central issues in the debate over whether to extend, modify, or end TRIA, and explores the role of disaster insurance within a system for managing risks created by the possibility of terrorist attacks and compensating losses caused by those attacks.
The threat of terrorism poses a challenge for the U.S. insurance system: How can the system best insure against potential losses and compensate victims of attacks? Following the 9/11 attacks, the federal government adopted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), which requires insurers to make terrorism coverage available to commercial policyholders. In return, TRIA guarantees that the public (i.e., the government) will reimburse insurers for 90 percent of losses from terrorism above certain thresholds. TRIA was intended to bolster the insurance industry against catastrophic payouts while the industry developed strategies and mechanisms to cope with the threat of terrorism. TRIA expires on December 31, 2005, but insurance policies (which typically last one year) will soon begin to be written that will expire after TRIA does. This paper has a dual purpose: to help frame the central issues that should be considered in the debate over whether to extend, modify, or end TRIA, and to explore the broader issue of the appropriate role of disaster insurance within a system for managing risks created by the possibility of terrorist attacks and compensating losses caused by terrorist attacks. The paper also discusses options that policymakers might consider in addressing these issues and goals against which various options can be evaluated. Although this paper focuses on insurance, it is important to note that insurance is only one part of an overall system for managing risks created by the possibility of terrorist attacks and compensating losses caused by terrorist attacks. Direct government compensation, the tort system, and charities can also play a role in this system.
What are the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act's effects on the market for terrorism insurance? What would be the effect of enhancing provisions for nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) attacks? The authors conclude that the program yields positive outcomes in a number of dimensions for conventional attacks and identify specific reforms that can improve results for NBCR attacks.
This book presents OECD policy conclusions and leading academic analysis on the financial management of terrorism risk nearly four years after the World Trade Centre attacks.
These conference proceedings present academic analysis, country reports, and financial/insurance company assessments on how to handle losses caused by large-scale catastrophes including terrorism and atmospheric perils.
Terrorist threat at shopping centers is a prominent concern, with over 60 terrorist attacks against shopping centers in 21 countries since 1998. Shopping center operators are starting to explore and implement increased security efforts specifically designed to combat terrorism. This report offers qualitative and quantitative modeling approaches to help these operators evaluate security options for effectiveness at reducing terrorism risk.
The pending expiration of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002 is the impetus for this assessment of how TRIA redistributes terrorism losses. The authors find that the role of taxpayers is expected to be minimal in all but very rare cases and that, even with TRIA in place, a high fraction of losses would go uninsured in each of the attack scenarios examined.
Corporate Strategies under International Terrorism and Adversity raises key issues facing international business and management in an era of global uncertainty.