GAO's Forensic Audits and Special Investigations team (FSI), which was created in 2005 as an interdisciplinary team consisting of investigators, auditors, and analysts, conducts covert tests at the request of the Congress to identify vulnerabilities and internal control weaknesses at executive branch agencies. These vulnerabilities and internal control weaknesses include those that could compromise homeland security, affect public safety, or have a financial impact on taxpayer's dollars. FSI conducts covert tests as "red team" operations, meaning that FSI does not notify agencies in advance about the testing. Recently, concerns have arisen as to whether top management at the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) were negatively impacting the results of red team operations by leaking information to security screeners at the nation's airports in advance of covert testing operations.
GAO's Forensic Audits and Special Investigations team (FSI), which was created in 2005 as an interdisciplinary team consisting of investigators, auditors, and analysts, conducts covert tests at the request of the Congress to identify vulnerabilities and internal control weaknesses at executive branch agencies. These vulnerabilities and internal control weaknesses include those that could compromise homeland security, affect public safety, or have a financial impact on taxpayer's dollars. FSI conducts covert tests as "red team" operations, meaning that FSI does not notify agencies in advance about the testing. Recently, concerns have arisen as to whether top management at the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) were negatively impacting the results of red team operations by leaking information to security screeners at the nation's airports in advance of covert testing operations.
High stakes tests are the gatekeepers to many educational and professional goals. As such, the incentive to cheat is high. This Handbook is the first to offer insights from experts within the testing community, psychometricians, and policymakers to identify and develop best practice guidelines for the design of test security systems for a variety of testing genres. Until now this information was scattered and often resided inside testing companies. As a result, rather than being able to learn from each other’s experiences, each testing entity was left to re-create their own test security wheel. As a whole the book provides invaluable insight into the prevalence of cheating and “best practices” for designing security plans, training personnel, and detecting and investigating misconduct, to help develop more secure testing systems and reduce the likelihood of future security breaches. Actual case studies from a variety of settings bring to life how security systems really work. Examples from both domestic and international programs are provided. Highlights of coverage include: • Best practices for designing secure tests • Analysis of security vulnerabilities for all genres of testing • Practical cheating prevention and detection strategies • Lessons learned in actual security violations in high profile testing programs. Part I focuses on how tests are delivered for paper-and-pencil, technology-based, and classroom testing and writing assessment. Each chapter addresses the prevalence of the problem and threats to security, prevention, and detection. Part II addresses issues essential to maintaining a secure testing program such as planning and monitoring, physical security, the detection of group-based cheating, investigating misconduct, and communicating about security-related issues. Part III examines actual examples of cheating-- how the cheating was done, how it was detected, and the lessons learned. Part III provides insight into security issues within each of the Association of Test Publishers’ four divisions: certification/licensure, clinical, educational, and industrial/organizational testing. Part III’s conclusion revisits the issues addressed in the case studies and identifies common themes. Intended for organizations, professionals, educators, policy makers, researchers, and advanced students that design, develop, or use high stakes tests, this book is also ideal for graduate level courses on test development, educational measurement, or educational policy.
From Jan. 2003 to Sept. 2007, there was testimony on 3 occasions to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to enter the country. The first 2 testimonies focused on covert testing at ports of entry -- the air, sea, and land locations where international travelers can legally enter the U.S. The 3rd testimony focused on limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry. This report discusses the results of testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of the work was focused on land ports of entry. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas that were assessed were defined as locations where the gov¿t. does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day. Illustrations.
Transportation Security: TSA Has Developed a Risk-Based Covert Testing Program, but Could Better Mitigate Aviation Security Vulnerabilities Identified Through Covert Tests
"An extensive collection of significant documents covering all major and minor issues and events regarding terrorism. Government reports, executive orders, speeches, court proceedings, and position papers are presented in full text reprint." (Oceana Website)
