This book provides researchers and scholars with a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of earnings management theory and literature. While it raises new questions for future research, the book can be also helpful to other parties who rely on financial reporting in making decisions like regulators, policy makers, shareholders, investors, and gatekeepers e.g., auditors and analysts. The book summarizes the existing literature and provides insight into new areas of research such as the differences between earnings management, fraud, earnings quality, impression management, and expectation management; the trade-off between earnings management activities; the special measures of earnings management; and the classification of earnings management motives based on a comprehensive theoretical framework.
This book provides researchers and scholars with a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of earnings management theory and literature. While it raises new questions for future research, the book can be also helpful to other parties who rely on financial reporting in making decisions like regulators, policy makers, shareholders, investors, and gatekeepers e.g., auditors and analysts. The book summarizes the existing literature and provides insight into new areas of research such as the differences between earnings management, fraud, earnings quality, impression management, and expectation management; the trade-off between earnings management activities; the special measures of earnings management; and the classification of earnings management motives based on a comprehensive theoretical framework.
This book provides researchers and scholars with a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of earnings management theory and literature. While it raises new questions for future research, the book can be also helpful to other parties who rely on financial reporting in making decisions like regulators, policy makers, shareholders, investors, and gatekeepers e.g., auditors and analysts. The book summarizes the existing literature and provides insight into new areas of research such as the differences between earnings management, fraud, earnings quality, impression management, and expectation management; the trade-off between earnings management activities; the special measures of earnings management; and the classification of earnings management motives based on a comprehensive theoretical framework.
Earnings management is an issue that directly affects the overall integrity and quality of financial reporting and to date, many studies have been conducted in an attempt to gain an understanding of whether firms are engaging in earnings management, why they do so, what are the motives that drive managers' discretionary behaviour, what are the economic consequences and whether investors can see through this behaviour? In this book, Chapter One reviews the developments and the trends in the contemporary earnings management research and discuss several possible avenues for future research. Chapter Two provides an overview of the most recent studies on earnings management in relation to the financial crisis and the institutional environment and firm characteristics. Chapter Three provides a description of the nowadays most commonly used methods for measuring earnings management in accounting and finance literature. Chapter Four examines earnings management and corporate social responsibility as an entrenchment strategy.
This book is a study of earnings management, aimed at scholars and professionals in accounting, finance, economics, and law. The authors address research questions including: Why are earnings so important that firms feel compelled to manipulate them? What set of circumstances will induce earnings management? How will the interaction among management, boards of directors, investors, employees, suppliers, customers and regulators affect earnings management? How to design empirical research addressing earnings management? What are the limitations and strengths of current empirical models?
It is very crucial that companies manage their earnings appropriately. Improper earnings management in Corporate America led to scandals involving Enron, WorldCom etc. Here is a book that seeks to understand how companies manage their earnings, details of
Earnings Management, Conservatism, and Earnings Quality reviews and illustrates earnings management, conservatism, and their effects on earnings quality in an economic modeling framework. Both earnings management and conservative accounting introduce biases to financial reports. The fundamental issue addressed is what economic effects these biases have on earnings quality or financial reporting quality. Earnings Management, Conservatism, and Earnings Quality reviews analytical models of earnings management and conservatism and shows that both can have beneficial or detrimental economic effects, so a differentiated view is appropriate. Earnings management can provide additional information via the financial reporting communication channel, but it can also be used to misrepresent the firm's position. What the authors find is that similar to earnings management, conservatism can reduce the information content of financial reports if it suppresses relevant information, but it can be a desirable feature that improves economic efficiency. The approach to study earnings management, conservatism, and earnings quality is based on the information economics literature. A variety of analytical models are reviewed that capture the effects and subtle interactions of managers' incentives and rational expectations of users. The benefit of analytical models is to make precise these, often highly complex, strategic effects. They offer a rigorous explanation for the phenomena and show that sometimes conventional wisdom does not apply. The monograph is organized around a few basic model settings, which are presented in simple versions first and then in extensions to elicit the main insights most clearly. Chapter 2 presents the basic rational expectations equilibrium model with earnings management and rational inferences by the capital market. Chapter 3 is devoted to earnings quality and earnings quality metrics used in many studies. Chapter 4 studies conservatism in accounting. Finally, the authors examine the interaction between conservatism and earnings management. Each chapter ends with a section containing a summary of the main findings and conclusions.
Earnings Management, Conservatism, and Earnings Quality reviews and illustrates earnings management, conservatism, and their effects on earnings quality in an economic modeling framework. Both earnings management and conservative accounting introduce biases to financial reports. The fundamental issue addressed is what economic effects these biases have on earnings quality or financial reporting quality. Earnings Management, Conservatism, and Earnings Quality reviews analytical models of earnings management and conservatism and shows that both can have beneficial or detrimental economic effects, so a differentiated view is appropriate. Earnings management can provide additional information via the financial reporting communication channel, but it can also be used to misrepresent the firm's position. What the authors find is that similar to earnings management, conservatism can reduce the information content of financial reports if it suppresses relevant information, but it can be a desirable feature that improves economic efficiency. The approach to study earnings management, conservatism, and earnings quality is based on the information economics literature. A variety of analytical models are reviewed that capture the effects and subtle interactions of managers' incentives and rational expectations of users. The benefit of analytical models is to make precise these, often highly complex, strategic effects. They offer a rigorous explanation for the phenomena and show that sometimes conventional wisdom does not apply. The monograph is organized around a few basic model settings, which are presented in simple versions first and then in extensions to elicit the main insights most clearly. Chapter 2 presents the basic rational expectations equilibrium model with earnings management and rational inferences by the capital market. Chapter 3 is devoted to earnings quality and earnings quality metrics used in many studies. Chapter 4 studies conservatism in accounting. Finally, the authors examine the interaction between conservatism and earnings management. Each chapter ends with a section containing a summary of the main findings and conclusions.
Line-Item Analysis of Earnings Quality provides a comprehensive summary and analysis of the specific earnings quality issues pertaining to key line item components of the financial statements. After providing an overview of earnings quality and earnings management, Line-Item Analysis of Earnings Quality analyzes key line items from the financial statements. For each key line item, the authors: review accounting principles; discuss implications for earnings quality; evaluate the susceptibility of the item to manipulation; describe analyses and red flags which may inform on the item's quality. Line-Item Analysis of Earnings Quality will prove useful in conducting fundamental and contextual analyses through its analysis and evaluations.
Essay from the year 2017 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: A, University of Nairobi, language: English, abstract: This paper discusses the motives behind earnings management and explains some of the methods used by firms to manage their earnings. Earnings management has been defined differently by a number of scholars. It is important to note that there is a thin line between fraud and earnings management. Hamid, Hashim and Salleh citing the works of Brown, Perols and Lounge and Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew noted the difference in the definitions that are offered by the scholars. According to Perols and Lounge organizations will engage in fraud due to the constraints on earnings management. The research found out that the firms that had engaged in earnings management will be more likely to be involved in cases of fraud. Brown and Erickson et al noted that the difference between earnings management and fraud is that earnings management is usually within the scope of the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) while fraud is outside of the boundaries of GAAP. Earnings management has been defined as the manipulation of the financial statements and reports by the managers so that the firms can earn extra profit. It has also been defined as the action where the management of the organizations apply their own self-assessment in the communication of the financial information and transactions to modify the financial data for two main reasons: 1) influencing contractual businesses that solely rely on the financial information or 2) providing the stakeholders with a wrong impression about the financial position of the firm.
