The first introduction to writing about intelligence and intelligence services. Secrecy has never stopped people from writing about intelligence. From memoirs and academic texts to conspiracy-laden exposes and spy novels, writing on intelligence abounds. Now, this new account uncovers intelligence historiography's hugely important role in shaping popular understandings and the social memory of intelligence. In this first introduction to these official and unofficial histories, a range of leading contributors narrate and interpret the development of intelligence studies as a discipline. Each chapter showcases new archival material, looking at a particular book or series of books and considering issues of production, censorship, representation and reception.
This book demonstrates that propoganda was a primary concern of the postwar governments of Clement Atlee and Winston Churchill and traces the implementation of Britain's propoganda policy at all levels.
This book investigates everyday practices of intelligence cooperation in anti-terrorism matters, with a specific focus on the relationship between Europe and Britain. The volume examines the effective involvement of British anti-terrorism efforts in European cooperation arrangements, which until now have been overshadowed by the UK-US ‘special relationship’ and by political debates that overstate the divide between Britain and continental Europe. In arguing that British intelligence has always had a European dimension, it provides a distinct perspective to the study of intelligence cooperation and the role of British intelligence therein. Mobilizing a ‘field theory’ approach, the book provides an original contribution to the understanding of intelligence cooperation by investigating everyday bureaucratic practices of ‘ground-level’ security professionals and police forces, embedded in a European ‘field’ structured around the exchange of anti-terror intelligence. It also accounts for the drivers behind cooperation by using ‘field analysis,’ which explains the trajectory and positioning of actors according to their ‘capitals’ rather than necessities dictated by threats or state decisions. This book will be of much interest to students of Security Studies, International Political Sociology, Intelligence Studies, and International Relations in general.
The methods developed by British intelligence in the early twentieth century continue to resonate today. Much like now, the intelligence activity of the British in the pre-Second World War era focused on immediate threats posed by subversive, clandestine networks against a backdrop of shifting great power politics. Even though the First World War had ended, the battle against Britain's enemies continued unabated during the period of the 1920s and 1930s. Buffeted by political interference and often fighting for their very survival, Britain's intelligence services turned to fight a new, clandestine war against rising powers Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. Using recently declassified files of the British Security Service (MI5), The Secret War Between the Wars details the operations and tradecraft of British intelligence to thwart Communist revolutionaries, Soviet agents, and Nazi sympathizers during the interwar period. This new study charts the development of British intelligence methods and policies in the early twentieth century and illuminates the fraught path of intelligence leading to the Second World War. An analysis of Britain's most riveting interwar espionage cases tells the story of Britain's transition between peace and war. The methods developed by British intelligence in the early twentieth century continue to resonate today. Much like now, the intelligence activity of the British in the pre-Second World War era focused on immediate threats posed by subversive, clandestine networks against a backdrop of shifting great power politics. As Western countries continue to face the challenge of terrorism, and in an era of geopolitical change heralded by the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia, a return to the past may provide context for a better understanding of the future. Kevin Quinlan received his PhD in History from the University of Cambridge. He works in Washington, DC.
This book critiques the reliance of Western intelligence agencies on the use of a method for intelligence analysis developed by the CIA in the 1990s, the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH).
This book is the first in-depth history of Britain's decision to invade Iraq since the Chilcot Inquiry released its report. The volume controversially argues that it was a blunder, or a careless failure of judgement.
Philip H. J. Davies is one of a growing number of British academic scholars of intelligence, but the only academic to approach the subject in terms of political science rather than history. He wrote his PhD at the University of Reading on the topic 'Organisational Development of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1979', and has published extensively on intelligence and defence issues. After completing his PhD he taught for a year and a half on the University of London external degree programme in Singapore before returning to the UK to lecture at the University of Reading for two years. He was formerly Associate Professor of International and Security Studies at the University of Malaya in Malaysia where he not only conducted his research but provided a range of training and consultancy services to the Malaysian intelligence and foreign services. He is now based at Brunel University, UK
With practical experience both of field work and of the intelligence bureaucracy at home and abroad, Stewart examines successes and failures via case studies, considers the limitations and usefulness of the intelligence product, and warns against the tendency to abuse or ignore it when its conclusions do not fit with preconceived ideas.
A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations. In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge. Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.
