Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.
Intelligence Operations: Understanding Data, Tools, People, and Processes helps readers understand the various issues and considerations an intelligence professional must tackle when reviewing, planning, and managing intelligence operations, regardless of level or environment. The book opens by introducing the reader to the many defining concepts associated with intelligence, as well as the main subject of intelligence: the threat. Additional chapters examine the community of intelligence, revealing where intelligence is actually practiced, as well as what defines and characterizes intelligence operations. Readers learn about the four critical components to every intelligence operation--data, tools, people, and processes--and then explore the various operational and analytic processes involved in greater detail. Throughout, the text encourages discovery and discussion, urging readers to first understand the material, then break it down, adapt it, and apply it in a way that supports their particular operations or requirements. Unique in approach and designed to assist professionals at all levels, Intelligence Operations is an excellent resource for both academic courses in the subject and practical application by intelligence personnel. Erik Kleinsmith is Associate Vice President for Strategic Relations in Intelligence, National, Homeland and Cyber Security for American Military University. Culminating his military career as Chief of Intelligence for the U.S. Army's Land Information Warfare Activity, Erik pioneered the development of asymmetric threat analysis using data mining technology. In this capacity, he gained national prestige related to his involvement in the Able Danger program as the military lead of a team of analysts profiling and mapping Al Qaeda prior to 9/11. Erik continued his career in intelligence as a defense contractor, managing intelligence training with the U.S. Army for over a decade. His areas of expertise include intelligence, security-related training and analysis, counterintelligence, and information operations.
Establishes guidance on the provision of joint and national intelligence products, services, and support to military operations. Describes the org. of joint intelligence forces and the national Intelligence Community, intelligence responsibilities, command relationships, and national intelligence support mechanisms. Provides info. regarding the fundamentals of intelligence operations and the intelligence process, discusses how intelligence supports joint and multinational planning, and describes intelligence dissemination via the global info. grid. Provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders. Illustrations. A print on demand edition of a hard to find report.
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the Army's traditional methodology for finding and analyzing relevant information for its operations, is not effective for tackling the operational and intelligence challenges of urban operations. The authors suggest new ways to categorize the complex terrain, infrastructure, and populations of urban environments and incorporate this information into Army planning and decisionmaking processes.
It is said that deception among people in a civilized society is something to be loathed even though it seems to be part of human nature; but deception in war is a virtue. Properly designed and executed, stratagems reduce the horrific costs of war. This book is a comprehensive collection of classic articles on deception, hand-picked and expertly introduced by well-known experts on military deception. The purpose of this book is to set in motion a renaissance for using deception as an instrument of statecraft. The various sections are designed to cumulatively provide sufficient breadth and depth on the subject to satisfy both the novice as well as the expert. Packed with expert commentary, interesting background information, and original readings, this book provides the reader with sufficient knowledge to pursue General Eisenhower’s vision for the proper role of deception in support of the national interest.
Foreword by Brig. Gen. Mike Ennis, USMC In this book Jeffrey Moore profiles the history and select operations of America's first effective, all source, joint military intelligence agency. Known as JICPOA for Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, the agency's nearly two thousand specialists are credited with giving Admiral Nimitz the intelligence he needed to win the Pacific War. Moore explains how JICPOA evolved and reveals some new facts about the war as he assesses the impact of intelligence on eight amphibious campaigns in the islands of the Central Pacific. He also demonstrates timeless intelligence lessons, faulty versus effective intelligence techniques, and intelligence-operational planning integration--subjects that continue to be pertinent to today's military operations, including the war on terror. For this unprecedented look at the little-known but groundbreaking organization, Moore draws on interviews with key personnel and internal documents. He supports his analysis of JICPOA's strengths and weaknesses, its successes and failures, with more than forty maps, charts, and illustrations. With a foreword by the head of Marine Corps intelligence, the book makes an excellent addition to World War II history and professional collections. Intelligence experts and operations planners will find its lessons useful and insightful. Readers with an interest in real-life thrillers will find it a fascinating study of basic intelligence work.
'A cracking good read... I will recommend this book to anyone' - Professor Richard Holmes, CBE 'The Falklands, Yom Kippur, Tet and Pearl Harbor? Avoidable intelligence blunders or much worse? Altogether a compelling read from someone who knows the business' - Nigel West This book is a professional military-intelligence officer's - and controversial insider's - view of some of the greatest intelligence blunders of recent history. It includes the serious developments in government misuse of intelligence in the US-led coalition's 2003 war with Iraq, as well as failures of intelligence in Ukraine following Russia's invasion in February 2022. Colonel John Hughes-Wilson analyses not just the events that conspire to cause disaster, but why crucial intelligence is so often ignored, misunderstood or spun by politicians and seasoned generals alike. This book analyses: how Hitler's intelligence staff misled him in a bid to outfox their Nazi Party rivals; the bureaucratic bungling behind Pearl Harbor; how in-fighting within American intelligence ensured they were taken off guard by the Viet Cong's 1968 Tet Offensive; how overconfidence, political interference and deception facilitated Egypt and Syria's 1973 surprise attack on Israel; why a handful of marines and a London taxicab were all Britain had to defend the Falklands; the mistaken intelligence that allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power until the second Iraq War of 2003; the truth behind the US failure to run a terrorist warning system before the 9/11 WTC bombing; and how governments are increasingly pressurising intelligence agencies to 'spin' a party-political line.
This is an official work by the US Department of the Army Headquarters. It gives information on what Human Intelligence is and what role the department has in the US army. A reader learns the structure of Human Intelligence and gets an insight into their operations. Mainly, the book presents information about the planning and management of operations, their collection process, analytics, and tools.
This open access handbook is a major reference work in the field of Military Sciences. Its main purpose is to inform and enlighten those dealing with the military on the role and contributions of science in describing, understanding and explaining military life, knowledge and doings. The handbook provides a comprehensive thematic introduction to various sub-fields of Military Sciences. The handbook serves a broad audience in various capacities; academics studying the military and the broader defense and security sector, students at military and civilian schools preparing for service in the military, the government or other occupations with linkage to the military, professionals in the armed forces, decision makers in government, contractors who work alongside the military, NGOs whose work is influenced by military operations, journalists who write on matters concerning the sphere of the military or others with a particular interest towards the military as a phenomenon, organization or system of various kinds. About the Section EditorsLt. Col. Dr. Anders McD Sookermany, Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway (Section: Philosophy of Military Sciences)Lt. Col. Dr. Harald Høiback, Norwegian Armed Forces Museums, Oslo, Norway (Section: Military Operations) Dr. Niels Bo Poulsen, Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen, Denmark (Section: Military History)Prof. Dr. Patricia M. Shields, Texas State University, San Marcos, USA (Section: Military and Society)Dr. Carsten F. Rønnfeldt, Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway (Section: International Relations and the Military)Associate Professor David Last, Royal Military College of Canada, Canada (Section: Military Profession)Dr. Irina Goldenberg, Canadian Department of National Defence, Nepean, Canada (Section: Military Behavioural Sciences)Dr. Michael Holenweger, Military Academy at ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland (Section: Military Leadership)Prof. Dr. Martin Elbe, Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, Potsdam, Germany (Section: Military Leadership)Franz Kernic, MILAC at ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland (Section: Military Leadership)Joseph Soeters, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands (Section: Military Management, Economics and Logistics)Prof Margaret Kosal, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA (Section: Military Technology)Dr. Ben Zweibelson, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, USA (Section: Military Design)Ms. Aubrey Poe (Section: Military Design)
A masterly look at the value and limitations of intelligence in the conduct of war from the premier military historian of our time, John Keegan. Intelligence gathering is an immensely complicated and vulnerable endeavor. And it often fails. Until the invention of the telegraph and radio, information often traveled no faster than a horse could ride, yet intelligence helped defeat Napoleon. In the twentieth century, photo analysts didn’t recognize Germany’s V-2 rockets for what they were; on the other hand, intelligence helped lead to victory over the Japanese at Midway. In Intelligence in War, John Keegan illustrates that only when paired with force has military intelligence been an effective tool, as it may one day be in besting al-Qaeda.
