A thorough critique of theories of institutional change followed by the development of a new theory emphasising the role of distributional conflict in the emergence of social institutions.
State expansion caused the reorganization of social conflict, promoting intense polarization between radicals and conservatives, high levels of popular mobilization, and a shift in the preferences of the Ba'th from an accommodationist to a radically populist strategy for consolidating its system of rule."--BOOK JACKET.
Conflict and group boundaries; Hostility and tensions in conflict relationship; In-group conflict and group sctructure; Conflict with out-group and group sctructure; Ideology and conflict; Conflict calls forallies.
"Ralf Dahrendorf has written a compelling book which, no doubt, will stimulate considerable discussion. It is the brilliant contribution of a convinced liberal to the study of conflict within contemporary democratic society."--Saul Friedlander, University of California, Los Angeles "Ralf Dahrendorf has written a compelling book which, no doubt, will stimulate considerable discussion. It is the brilliant contribution of a convinced liberal to the study of conflict within contemporary democratic society."--Saul Friedlander, University of California, Los Angeles
International trade often inspires intense conflict between workers and their employers. In this book, Adam Dean studies the conditions under which labor and capital collaborate in support of the same trade policies. Dean argues that capital-labor agreement on trade policy depends on the presence of 'profit-sharing institutions'. He tests this theory through case studies from the United States, Britain, and Argentina in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries; they offer a revisionist history placing class conflict at the center of the political economy of trade. Analysis of data from more than one hundred countries from 1986 to 2002 demonstrates that the field's conventional wisdom systematically exaggerates the benefits that workers receive from trade policy reforms. From Conflict to Coalition boldly explains why labor is neither an automatic beneficiary nor an automatic ally of capital when it comes to trade policy and distributional conflict.
This book examines how ruling elites manage and manipulate their political opposition in the Middle East. In contrast to discussions of government-opposition relations that focus on how rulers either punish or co-opt opponents, this book focuses on the effect of institutional rules governing the opposition. It argues rules determining who is and is not allowed to participate in the formal political arena affect not only the relationships between opponents and the state, but also between various opposition groups. This affects the dynamics of opposition during prolonged economic crises. It also shapes the informal strategies that ruling elites use toward opponents. The argument is presented using a formal model of government-opposition relations. It is demonstrated in the cases of Egypt under Presidents Nasir, Sadat and Mubarek; Jordan under King Husayn; and Morocco under King Hasan II.
Allan Schmid’s innovative text, Conflict and Cooperation: Institutional and Behavioral Economics,investigates "the rules of the game," how institutions--both formal and informal--affect these rules, and how these rules are changed to serve competing interests. This text addresses both formal and informal institutions and the impact of alternative institutions, as well as institutional change and evolution. With its broad applications and numerous practice and discussion questions, this book will be appealing not only to students of economics, but also to those studying sociology, law, and political science. Addresses formal and informal institutions, the impact of alternative institutions, and institutional change and evolution. Presents a framework open to changing preferences, bounded rationality, and evolution. Explains how to form empirically testable hypotheses using experiments, case studies, and econometrics. Includes numerous practice and discussion questions.
Normative conflicts center on fundamental disagreements over issues of public morality and the identity of a society. In thinking about normative conflicts on a global scale, two principal questions arise. First, are there common characteristics of such conflicts worldwide? Second, which institutions polarize such conflicts and which can serve to mediate them? This pathbreaking book, edited by renowned sociologist Peter Berger, examines both questions through findings gained from a study of normative conflicts in eleven societies located in different parts of the world and at different levels of economic development. On both points, the findings have proved surprising. Although there are, of course, normative conflicts peculiar to individual societies, two features emerged as common to most of the societies examined: one concerns disputes over the place of religion in the state and in public life; the other is a clash of values between a cultural elite and the broad masses of the population. Often the two features coincide. For instance, in many countries the elite is the least religious group within the population, and therefore, resentments against the elite are often mobilized under religious banners. On the institutional question, the study started out with a bias toward the institutions of so-called “civil society” that is, the institutions that stand between the personal life of individuals and the vast mega-structures of a modern society. The finding is that the same institutions can either polarize or mediate normative conflicts. The conclusion suggests one must ask not just what sort of institutions one looks to for social cohesion, but what ideas and values inspire these institutions. Comprising reports from some of the leading scholars dealing with normative conflict, this book is an important contribution to understanding the cultural fault lines that threaten social cohesion.