This Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) Intelligence Guide for First Responders is designed to assist state, local, tribal law enforcement, firefighting, homeland security, and appropriate private sector personnel in accessing and understanding Federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction intelligence reporting. Most of the information contained in this guide was compiled, derived, and adapted from existing Intelligence Community and open source references. The ITACG consists of state, local, and tribal first responders and federal intelligence analysts from the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, working at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to enhance the sharing of federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction information with state, local, and tribal consumers of intelligence.
This intelligence guide was prepared in response to requests from law enforcement executives for guidance in intelligence functions in a post-September 11 world. It will help law enforcement agencies develop or enhance their intelligence capacity and enable them to fight terrorism and other crimes while preserving community policing relationships. The world of law enforcement intelligence has changed dramatically since September 11, 2001. State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have been tasked with a variety of new responsibilities; intelligence is just one. In addition, the intelligence discipline has evolved significantly in recent years. As these various trends have merged, increasing numbers of American law enforcement agencies have begun to explore, and sometimes embrace, the intelligence function. This guide is intended to help them in this process. The guide is directed primarily toward state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies of all sizes that need to develop or reinvigorate their intelligence function. Rather than being a manual to teach a person how to be an intelligence analyst, it is directed toward that manager, supervisor, or officer who is assigned to create an intelligence function. It is intended to provide ideas, definitions, concepts, policies, and resources. It is a primera place to start on a new managerial journey. Every law enforcement agency in the United States, regardless of agency size, must have the capacity to understand the implications of information collection, analysis, and intelligence sharing. Each agency must have an organized mechanism to receive and manage intelligence as well as a mechanism to report and share critical information with other law enforcement agencies. In addition, it is essential that law enforcement agencies develop lines of communication and information-sharing protocols with the private sector, particularly those related to the critical infrastructure, as well as with those private entities that are potential targets of terrorists and criminal enterprises. Not every agency has the staff or resources to create a formal intelligence unit, nor is it necessary in smaller agencies. This document will provide common language and processes to develop and employ an intelligence capacity in SLTLE agencies across the United States as well as articulate a uniform understanding of concepts, issues, and terminology for law enforcement intelligence (LEI). While terrorism issues are currently most pervasive in the current discussion of LEI, the principles of intelligence discussed in this document apply beyond terrorism and include organized crime and entrepreneurial crime of all forms. Drug trafficking and the associated crime of money laundering, for example, continue to be a significant challenge for law enforcement. Transnational computer crime, particularly Internet fraud, identity theft cartels, and global black marketeering of stolen and counterfeit goods, are entrepreneurial crime problems that are increasingly being relegated to SLTLE agencies to investigate simply because of the volume of criminal incidents. Similarly, local law enforcement is being increasingly drawn into human trafficking and illegal immigration enterprises and the often associated crimes related to counterfeiting of official documents, such as passports, visas, driver's licenses, Social Security cards, and credit cards. All require an intelligence capacity for SLTLE, as does the continuation of historical organized crime activities such as auto theft, cargo theft, and virtually any other scheme that can produce profit for an organized criminal entity. To be effective, the law enforcement community must interpret intelligence-related language in a consistent manner. In addition, common standards, policies, and practices will help expedite intelligence sharing while at the same time protecting the privacy of citizens and preserving hard-won community policing relationships.~
Information is a crucial tool in securing the nation's borders against crimes and potential terrorist threats, with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the FBI, having key information sharing roles. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) local and tribal officials in border communities received useful information from their federal partners, (2) federal agencies supported state fusion centers'-where states collaborate with federal agencies to improve information sharing-efforts to develop border intelligence products, and (3) local and tribal agencies were aware of the suspicious activities they are to report. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed relevant laws, directives, policies, and procedures; contacted a nongeneralizable sample of 20 agencies in border communities and five fusion centers (based on geographic location and size); and interviewed DHS and FBI officials.
Information sharing among federal, state, and local officials is crucial for preventing acts of terrorism on U.S. soil. The Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS), through its Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), has lead federal responsibility for such information sharing. This report assessed: (1) actions I&A has taken to enhance the usefulness of intelligence products it provides to state and local partners; (2) other services I&A provides to these partners; and (3) to what extent I&A has defined how it intends to share information with these partners. To conduct this work, the auditor contacted a non-generalizable sample of 10 fusion centers ¿ where states collaborate with federal agencies to improve information sharing. Illus. A print on demand report.
FEMA has the statutory authority to deliver numerous disaster and non-disaster financial assistance programs in support of its mission, and that of the Department of Homeland Security, largely through grants and cooperative agreements. These programs account for a significant amount of the federal funds for which FEMA is accountable. FEMA officials are responsible and accountable for the proper administration of these funds pursuant to federal laws and regulations, Office of Management and Budget circulars, and federal appropriations law principles.
This paper, the Domestic Approach to National Intelligence, describes certain key roles and relationships that characterize efforts by members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and federal, state, local, tribal and territorial (FSLTT) government organizations to engage with one another to carry out the shared mission of protecting the homeland. These partners work with one another, and through established channels with the private sector (e.g., critical infrastructure owners and operators), as part of a complex web of relationships. Each partner, regardless of level, plays an important role in protecting the homeland with respect to warning, interdiction, prevention, mitigation, and response. The importance of partnerships and collaboration is emphasized in this paper, as is the IC's responsibility to the public to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Descriptions related to organizational responsibilities and/or authorities are provided by the respective agencies. The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence is consistent with the framework and recommendations outlined in the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council's (CICC) National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the strategies in support of the National Network of Fusion Centers, and information sharing and safeguarding standards outlined by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). By describing these roles and relationships in one place, this paper strives to foster an important national dialogue that will promote a better understanding of how the IC engages with key partners in this domestic enterprise and supports the holistic ideals articulated by the Director of National intelligence (DNI).