China is an increasingly influential emerging economy that is currently attracting the attention of academics, practitioners, and policy makers. This book is a collection of cutting edge research findings on issues relating to the experiences and challenges of China's capital market development.
While Americans are generally aware of China's ambitions as a global economic and military superpower, few understand just how deeply and assertively that country has already sought to influence American society. As the authors of this volume write, it is time for a wake-up call. In documenting the extent of Beijing's expanding influence operations inside the United States, they aim to raise awareness of China's efforts to penetrate and sway a range of American institutions: state and local governments, academic institutions, think tanks, media, and businesses. And they highlight other aspects of the propagandistic “discourse war” waged by the Chinese government and Communist Party leaders that are less expected and more alarming, such as their view of Chinese Americans as members of a worldwide Chinese diaspora that owes undefined allegiance to the so-called Motherland.Featuring ideas and policy proposals from leading China specialists, China's Influence and American Interests argues that a successful future relationship requires a rebalancing toward greater transparency, reciprocity, and fairness. Throughout, the authors also strongly state the importance of avoiding casting aspersions on Chinese and on Chinese Americans, who constitute a vital portion of American society. But if the United States is to fare well in this increasingly adversarial relationship with China, Americans must have a far better sense of that country's ambitions and methods than they do now.
The nature of corporate governance is a key determinant of corporate performance and, therefore, of a country's overall economic power. This title examines key questions relating to corporate governance in China, exploring differences between private and state-owned companies.
Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. - Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on - Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces - Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field's substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
The rise of the independent director in Asia is an issue of global consequence that has been largely overlooked until recently. Less than two decades ago, independent directors were oddities in Asia's boardrooms. Today, they are ubiquitous. Independent Directors in Asia undertakes the first detailed analysis of this phenomenon. It provides in-depth historical, contextual and comparative perspectives on the law and practice of independent directors in seven core Asian jurisdictions (China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan) and Australia. These case studies reveal the varieties of independent directors in Asia, none of which conform to its original American concept. The authors develop a taxonomy of these varieties, which provides a powerful analytical tool for more accurately understanding and effectively researching independent directors in Asia. This new approach challenges foundational aspects of comparative corporate governance practice and suggests a new path for comparative corporate governance scholarship and reform.
This paper aims to shed some new light on the conditions needed to ensure the effectiveness of Boards of Directors of state owned enterprises with a focus on infrastructure sectors. In the case of developing countries, empirical studies have found evidence of positive links between the composition of the Board of Directors and financial performance. Yet the lack of solid theoretical foundations, and in some cases poor data availability, makes the conclusions of most studies weak. Several policy recommendations emerge from the review of the economic literature and evidence from case studies. First, the introduction of a sufficient number of independent directors emerges as an important corporate governance milestone. Empowering them to exercise effective monitoring of management, however, may prove to be a formidable challenge for of state owned enterprises. More attention to board procedures, particularly related to the Board selection and evaluation process, is essential, to produce the necessary insulation of Boards from government interference. Ensuring sufficient continuity of services to directors is particularly crucial to improve corporate governance. In addition, other factors that may reduce directors' ability to monitor corporate activities, such as the age profile and the number of Boards on which they sit, need to be handled more carefully.