China is an increasingly influential emerging economy that is currently attracting the attention of academics, practitioners, and policy makers. This book is a collection of cutting edge research findings on issues relating to the experiences and challenges of China's capital market development.
By assessing a broad range of laws, regulations and codes, this book provides a valuable reference for understanding how much has been achieved in Chinese corporate governance and the main ambitions of future reform efforts.
Seminar paper from the year 2010 in the subject Law - Comparative Legal Systems, Comparative Law, grade: A+, Vanderbilt University (Law School), language: English, abstract: The "independent director" has become a centerpiece of modern corporate governance. However, the concept of "independence", and the ability of independent directors to fulfill their roles, remains deeply problematical. In the course of the discussion on the proper role of independent directors that unfolded in Europe and the United States during the 1980s and 1990s and peaked in the wake of the Enron scandal, rules on director independence have found their way to the corporate governance regimes of developing countries that turned their head to western economies. Particularly in China and India, independent directors have taken their place on company boards, earning mixed responses from the academic and business community. What is the current state of Indian and Chinese rules on director independence? What tensions do they address and create? And what can be done to optimize the achievement of their objectives? The goal of this article is to examine the status quo of director independence in the two countries, to put the regulations into their historic and political context, to summarize practical experiences with the new institution, and to point to possible future developments.
Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.
The nature of corporate governance is a key determinant of corporate performance and, therefore, of a country's overall economic power. This title examines key questions relating to corporate governance in China, exploring differences between private and state-owned companies.
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. - Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on - Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces - Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field's substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Using a large panel dataset of Chinese industrial firms, the authors examine the determinants of access to loans from formal financial intermediaries and extension of trade credit. Poorly performing state-owned enterprises were more likely to redistribute credit to firms with less privileged access to loans through trade credit, a pattern consistent with some of the extension of trade credit being involuntary. By contrast, profitable private domestic firms were more likely to extend trade credit than unprofitable ones. Trade credit likely provided a substitute for loans for these private firms' customers that were shut out of formal credit markets. As biases in lending became less severe, the amount of trade credit extended by private firms declined.