Incentives and Political Economy

Incentives and Political Economy

Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2000-03-30

Total Pages: 270

ISBN-13: 0198294247

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Mainstream economics has recognized only recently the necessity to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. Incentives and Political Economy uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments.The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed.The second part of the book recognises the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves discretion to the politicans selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic policies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitutionweighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas.The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterise the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institution in which group behavior is important.


Incentives to Pander

Incentives to Pander

Author: Nathan M. Jensen

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2018-03-15

Total Pages: 271

ISBN-13: 1108311423

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Policies targeting individual companies for economic development incentives, such as tax holidays and abatements, are generally seen as inefficient, economically costly, and distortionary. Despite this evidence, politicians still choose to use these policies to claim credit for attracting investment. Thus, while fiscal incentives are economically inefficient, they pose an effective pandering strategy for politicians. Using original surveys of voters in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as data on incentive use by politicians in the US, Vietnam and Russia, this book provides compelling evidence for the use of fiscal incentives for political gain and shows how such pandering appears to be associated with growing economic inequality. As national and subnational governments surrender valuable tax revenue to attract businesses in the vain hope of long-term economic growth, they are left with fiscal shortfalls that have been filled through regressive sales taxes, police fines and penalties, and cuts to public education.


Knowledge and Incentives in Policy

Knowledge and Incentives in Policy

Author: Stefanie Haeffele

Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield

Published: 2018-06-04

Total Pages: 302

ISBN-13: 1786603993

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This book, authored by public policy practitioners and researchers, tackle such pressing issues as public education, the process for approving medical devices, tax policy, and land use regulation.


Incentives

Incentives

Author: Donald E. Campbell

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2018-02-22

Total Pages: 699

ISBN-13: 1107035244

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This book examines incentives at work to see how and how well coordination is achieved by motivating individual decision makers.


Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor

Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor

Author: Philip Keefer

Publisher: World Bank Publications

Published: 2003

Total Pages: 36

ISBN-13: 0031210104

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Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets, that are greater in some countries than in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization on political incentives. They argue that the effects of these imperfections are large, but that their implications are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods, and reducing poverty.


The Moral Economy

The Moral Economy

Author: Samuel Bowles

Publisher: Yale University Press

Published: 2016-05-28

Total Pages: 283

ISBN-13: 0300221088

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Should the idea of economic man—the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus—determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding “no.” Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may “crowd out” ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.


Making Sense of Incentives

Making Sense of Incentives

Author: Timothy J. Bartik

Publisher: W.E. Upjohn Institute

Published: 2019-10-15

Total Pages: 180

ISBN-13: 0880996684

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Bartik provides a clear and concise overview of how state and local governments employ economic development incentives in order to lure companies to set up shop—and provide new jobs—in needy local labor markets. He shows that many such incentive offers are wasteful and he provides guidance, based on decades of research, on how to improve these programs.


Incentives and Institutions

Incentives and Institutions

Author: Serguey Braguinsky

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2021-02-09

Total Pages: 295

ISBN-13: 0691225362

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Here, for the first time, two of Russia's leading economists provide an authoritative analysis of the transition to a democratic market economy that has taken place in Russia since 1990. Serguey Braguinsky, a Russian economist with extensive international experience, and Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the liberal "Yabloko" party and a major public figure in Russia, focus on the institutions that are critical to a successful transition and the economic incentives needed to make these institutions work. Finally, they discuss in detail the specific components of the economic processes that are necessary for economic transition in general and they draw lessons that can be applied to other nations dealing with similar transitions. In 1989, Grigory Yavlinsky became a member of the Commission for Economic Reform and wrote the groundbreaking "500 Day Plan," which outlined the first program of transition to a market economy. Two years later, he co-wrote the program of strategic cooperation between the Soviet government and the West (known as the "Grand Bargain"). Here he and Serguey Braguinsky examine what went wrong with the Russian plan--and what is needed to put the economy back on the road to becoming a fully functioning market economy. The first section of the book presents a new interpretation of the political economy of the socialist state and the incentives and institutions that underpin it, with an emphasis on the present Russian situation. The second part deals with the political economy of "spontaneous transition" and the inefficiencies inherent in economies that lack the organizations and institutions that inhere in established Western democratic economies. In the final section, the authors present a program of actions to put the economic transition in Russia back on track, based on their assessment of the actual current state of both the economy and the government. Their approach is unique in emphasizing organizational evolution at the microeconomic level instead of stressing macroeconomic issues such as money and inflation that are at the heart of most arguments. This is a thoughtful and thought-provoking book and one that will be widely discussed and debated.


Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital

Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital

Author: K. Thomas

Publisher: Springer

Published: 2010-11-24

Total Pages: 217

ISBN-13: 0230302394

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This is a global study of government subsidies to attract investment. The book shows how corporations use site selection as rent extraction, with developing countries investing more than developed ones. It demonstrates that incentive use is rarely a good policy, especially for countries without adequate education and infrastructure.


The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation

The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation

Author: Carmine Guerriero

Publisher:

Published: 2016

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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The determinants of incentive regulation are an important issue in economics. More powerful rules relax allocative distortions at the cost of lower rent extraction. Hence, they should be found where the reformer is more concerned with stimulating investments by granting higher expected profits, and where rent extraction is less necessary since the extent of information asymmetries is more limited. This prediction is consistent with U.S. power market data. During the 1990s, performance based contracts were signed by firms operating in states where generation costs were historically higher than those characterizing neighboring markets and the regulator had stronger incentives to exert information-gathering effort because elected instead of being appointed.