U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that improving U.S. capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations is critical to national security. To help craft a way ahead, the authors provide an overview of the requirements posed by stabilization and reconstruction operations and recommend ways to improve U.S. capacity to meet these needs.
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In 2004-2006, the U.S. government acted to revise the way that the planning and implementation of Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations are conducted. The primary emphasis of the changes was on ensuring a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and on mobilizing and involving all available U.S. government assets in the effort. The proximate reason for the policy shift stems from the exposing of gaps in the U.S. ability to administer Afghanistan and Iraq after the U.S.-led ousters of the Taliban and Ba'athist regimes. But the effort to create U.S. government capabilities to conduct SSTR operations in a more unified and coherent fashion rests on the deeper conviction that, as part of the U.S. strategy to deal with transnational terrorist groups, the United States must have the capabilities to increase the governance capacities of weak states, reduce the drivers of and catalysts to conflict, and assist in peacebuilding at all stages of pre- or post-conflict transformation. According to the Joint Operating Concept for Military Support to SSTR operations, these operations are civilian-led and conducted and coordinated with the involvement of all the available resources of the U.S. government (military and civilian), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international partners. Although military assets are an essential component of many SSTR operations, specific military goals and objectives are only a portion of the larger SSTR operation.
Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were characterized by the rapid defeat of enemy military forces, by relatively small deployments of American forces, and by a very limited destruction of the critical civilian infrastructure. This success can be credited in large part to the ongoing transformation of the U.S. military evident in its effective use of information superiority, precision strike, and rapid maneuver on the battlefield. The Armed Forces were not nearly as well prepared to respond promptly to the lawlessness, destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and attacks on coalition forces that followed hard on the defeat of the Iraqi military. This has set back plans to restore essential services and to pass the reins to a representative Iraqi government. Moreover, the failure to establish security concurrently with the defeat of the Iraqi military may well have emboldened those who oppose the United States, United Kingdom, and even United Nations presence. It is precisely the success of the U.S. military in transforming its forces to execute rapid decisive operations that makes it imperative to transform how it prepares for and executes stabilization and reconstruction (S AND R) operations. The very rapid defeat of the enemy military means the United States must be ready to field the resources needed to secure stability and begin the reconstruction process promptly-ideally concurrently-with the end of major combat. This can only be done if planning for the stabilization and reconstruction operations is integrated into planning for the conflict from the beginning and if the right skills are in theater to begin operations concurrently with the surrender or collapse of the enemy military.
In a project entitled "Integrating the Interagency in Planning for Army Stability Operations," RAND Arroyo Center examined the question of how the Army can help make key civilian agencies more capable partners in the planning and execution of stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. The authors identify the primary and secondary civilian agencies that should be involved in strategic-level planning and implementation of SSTR operations. Then, relying on available information on Provincial Reconstruction Teams and using a variety of federal databases, the authors identify the skill sets needed for the envisioned Field Advance Civilian Teams and where these skills reside in the federal government. The authors then assess the capacity of the main civilian agencies to participate in SSTR operations and analyze the recurring structural problems that have plagued their attempts to do so. The authors suggest a series of options that are worth considering in order to improve the current situation. Even without much action at the national level, the Army can still improve the situation by improving Army Civil Affairs and by executing a well-thought-out strategy of liaison officers assigned to the civilian agencies most important for SSTR operations.
U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that improving U.S. capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations is critical to national security. The authors recommend building civilian rather than military capacity, realigning and reforming existing agencies, and funding promising programs. They also suggest improvements to deployable police capacity, crisis-management processes, and guidance and funding.
All efforts presently underway in the United States Government (USG) to plan, organize, and resource for future stabilization and reconstruction operations are handicapped by the absence of a grand strategy. The Department of State and the Department of Defense, in coordination with several other departments and agencies of the USG, several more intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and allies and friends, are ambitiously attempting to build new capacities and institutionalize new processes that will better enable the USG and its like-minded partners to conduct political interventions into fragile, failing, failed, and post-conflict states in order to rebuild those states' institutions of civil governance. All of these efforts are handicapped by the absence of a grand strategy that links them with - and links together - the array of adjacent USG plans to, among other things, align diplomacy and development assistance, secure and defend the U.S. homeland, combat terrorism, cooperate with theater security partners, counter the proliferation of weapons mass destruction, and conduct major combat operations to win decisively and achieve enduring results. Not only should the USG plans be linked, but also the participation with the USG in these and similar operations of allies & partners and intergovernmental & nongovernmental organizations needs to be addressed with sufficient specificity to guide investment in U.S. capacity as a measurable subset of global capacity. Absent grand strategy, which presumably accomplishes the above and more, planning and resourcing for stabilization and reconstruction operations amounts to pre-planning responses to anticipated crises on a case-by-case basis.
Today, the U.S. Army is decisively engaged in both fighting an unfamiliar type of war and transforming itself to meet the challenges of future warfare. But what are those challenges? What capabilities does U.S. strategy demand of its military instrument? Where are the major capability gaps, and how should they inform Army Transformation to ensure the future expeditionary Army has the right campaign qualities? This paper argues that the major capability gap in today's force - and vital for future campaigns - is the ability to conduct stabilization. It begins with exploring the changes in U.S. strategy that are the impetus behind the need for greater capacity to conduct post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Then, it analyzes the emerging role of the Army in post-conflict operations in the context of modern combat to more fully understand the specific requirements of stabilization. The paper then develops an operational concept - progressive stabilization - that complements the Army's concept of rapid decisive operations while improving its ability to contribute to long-term conflict resolution. It outlines three key force attributes an expeditionary force structure must have to provide the requisite mix of combat and stabilization capabilities. Finally, this paper builds on those attributes to suggest three areas where Army leaders must make near-term adjustments in the Modular Force to ensure the nation has a truly expeditionary force with the campaign capacity for both rapid decisive operations and stabilization.
