Countering Cyber Sabotage: Introducing Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) introduces a new methodology to help critical infrastructure owners, operators and their security practitioners make demonstrable improvements in securing their most important functions and processes. Current best practice approaches to cyber defense struggle to stop targeted attackers from creating potentially catastrophic results. From a national security perspective, it is not just the damage to the military, the economy, or essential critical infrastructure companies that is a concern. It is the cumulative, downstream effects from potential regional blackouts, military mission kills, transportation stoppages, water delivery or treatment issues, and so on. CCE is a validation that engineering first principles can be applied to the most important cybersecurity challenges and in so doing, protect organizations in ways current approaches do not. The most pressing threat is cyber-enabled sabotage, and CCE begins with the assumption that well-resourced, adaptive adversaries are already in and have been for some time, undetected and perhaps undetectable. Chapter 1 recaps the current and near-future states of digital technologies in critical infrastructure and the implications of our near-total dependence on them. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the origins of the methodology and set the stage for the more in-depth examination that follows. Chapter 4 describes how to prepare for an engagement, and chapters 5-8 address each of the four phases. The CCE phase chapters take the reader on a more granular walkthrough of the methodology with examples from the field, phase objectives, and the steps to take in each phase. Concluding chapter 9 covers training options and looks towards a future where these concepts are scaled more broadly.
The electric power delivery system that carries electricity from large central generators to customers could be severely damaged by a small number of well-informed attackers. The system is inherently vulnerable because transmission lines may span hundreds of miles, and many key facilities are unguarded. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the fact that the power grid, most of which was originally designed to meet the needs of individual vertically integrated utilities, is being used to move power between regions to support the needs of competitive markets for power generation. Primarily because of ambiguities introduced as a result of recent restricting the of the industry and cost pressures from consumers and regulators, investment to strengthen and upgrade the grid has lagged, with the result that many parts of the bulk high-voltage system are heavily stressed. Electric systems are not designed to withstand or quickly recover from damage inflicted simultaneously on multiple components. Such an attack could be carried out by knowledgeable attackers with little risk of detection or interdiction. Further well-planned and coordinated attacks by terrorists could leave the electric power system in a large region of the country at least partially disabled for a very long time. Although there are many examples of terrorist and military attacks on power systems elsewhere in the world, at the time of this study international terrorists have shown limited interest in attacking the U.S. power grid. However, that should not be a basis for complacency. Because all parts of the economy, as well as human health and welfare, depend on electricity, the results could be devastating. Terrorism and the Electric Power Delivery System focuses on measures that could make the power delivery system less vulnerable to attacks, restore power faster after an attack, and make critical services less vulnerable while the delivery of conventional electric power has been disrupted.
Americans' safety, productivity, comfort, and convenience depend on the reliable supply of electric power. The electric power system is a complex "cyber-physical" system composed of a network of millions of components spread out across the continent. These components are owned, operated, and regulated by thousands of different entities. Power system operators work hard to assure safe and reliable service, but large outages occasionally happen. Given the nature of the system, there is simply no way that outages can be completely avoided, no matter how much time and money is devoted to such an effort. The system's reliability and resilience can be improved but never made perfect. Thus, system owners, operators, and regulators must prioritize their investments based on potential benefits. Enhancing the Resilience of the Nation's Electricity System focuses on identifying, developing, and implementing strategies to increase the power system's resilience in the face of events that can cause large-area, long-duration outages: blackouts that extend over multiple service areas and last several days or longer. Resilience is not just about lessening the likelihood that these outages will occur. It is also about limiting the scope and impact of outages when they do occur, restoring power rapidly afterwards, and learning from these experiences to better deal with events in the future.
The Smart Grid security ecosystem is complex and multi-disciplinary, and relatively under-researched compared to the traditional information and network security disciplines. While the Smart Grid has provided increased efficiencies in monitoring power usage, directing power supplies to serve peak power needs and improving efficiency of power delivery, the Smart Grid has also opened the way for information security breaches and other types of security breaches. Potential threats range from meter manipulation to directed, high-impact attacks on critical infrastructure that could bring down regional or national power grids. It is essential that security measures are put in place to ensure that the Smart Grid does not succumb to these threats and to safeguard this critical infrastructure at all times. Dr. Florian Skopik is one of the leading researchers in Smart Grid security, having organized and led research consortia and panel discussions in this field. Smart Grid Security will provide the first truly holistic view of leading edge Smart Grid security research. This book does not focus on vendor-specific solutions, instead providing a complete presentation of forward-looking research in all areas of Smart Grid security. The book will enable practitioners to learn about upcoming trends, scientists to share new directions in research, and government and industry decision-makers to prepare for major strategic decisions regarding implementation of Smart Grid technology. - Presents the most current and leading edge research on Smart Grid security from a holistic standpoint, featuring a panel of top experts in the field. - Includes coverage of risk management, operational security, and secure development of the Smart Grid. - Covers key technical topics, including threat types and attack vectors, threat case studies, smart metering, smart home, e- mobility, smart buildings, DERs, demand response management, distribution grid operators, transmission grid operators, virtual power plants, resilient architectures, communications protocols and encryption, as well as physical security.
The information infrastructure--comprising computers, embedded devices, networks and software systems--is vital to operations in every sector. Global business and industry, governments, and society itself, cannot function effectively if major components of the critical information infrastructure are degraded, disabled or destroyed. This book contains a selection of 27 edited papers from the First Annual IFIP WG 11.10 International Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection.
Electric power is a critical infrastructure that is vital to the U.S. economy and national security. Today, the nation's electric power infrastructure is threatened by malicious attacks, accidents, and failures, as well as disruptive natural events. As the electric grid evolves and becomes increasingly interdependent with other critical infrastructures, the nation is challenged to defend against these threats and to advance grid capabilities with reliable defenses. On November 1, 2019, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine convened a workshop to gather diverse perspectives on current and future threats to the electric power system, activities that the subsector is pursuing to defend itself, and how this work may evolve over the coming decades. This publications summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop.
Over the course of a decade, a stream of credible scientific reports from various government agencies, congressionally-mandated commissions and federal research organizations have warned of the grave vulnerability of our nation's most important asset: the electric power grid. For millions of us, life in 21st Century America would be all but impossible without access to electricity. As this compendium of the government's own studies makes clear, the protracted unavailability of the power required for all of our critical infrastructures poses a truly existential threat to our country and its people-unless we take practical and relatively low-cost steps to prevent it.
This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. This book summarizes work being pursued in the context of the CIPRNet (Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Resilience Research Network) research project, co-funded by the European Union under the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). The project is intended to provide concrete and on-going support to the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) research communities, enhancing their preparedness for CI-related emergencies, while also providing expertise and technologies for other stakeholders to promote their understanding and mitigation of the consequences of CI disruptions, leading to enhanced resilience. The book collects the tutorial material developed by the authors for several courses on the modelling, simulation and analysis of CIs, representing extensive and integrated CIP expertise. It will help CI stakeholders, CI operators and civil protection authorities understand the complex system of CIs, and help them adapt to these changes and threats in order to be as prepared as possible for mitigating emergencies and crises affecting or arising from CIs.
This book on smart grid security is meant for a broad audience from managers to technical experts. It highlights security challenges that are faced in the smart grid as we widely deploy it across the landscape. It starts with a brief overview of the smart grid and then discusses some of the reported attacks on the grid. It covers network threats, cyber physical threats, smart metering threats, as well as privacy issues in the smart grid. Along with the threats the book discusses the means to improve smart grid security and the standards that are emerging in the field. The second part of the book discusses the legal issues in smart grid implementations, particularly from a privacy (EU data protection) point of view.