Conference paper comprising the text of the final act adopted at the conference on security and co-operation in europe, concerning peaceful international relations and international cooperation between the participating states (incl. European countries, the USA and Canada) - includes measures relating to disarmament, economic relations, defence manoeuvres, trade relations, scientific cooperation, etc. Conf helsinki 1973 jul 3. Conference held in Geneva 1973 September 18 to jul 21. Conf helsinki 1975 aug 1.
The definitive account of the historic diplomatic agreement that provided a blueprint for ending the Cold War The Helsinki Final Act was a watershed of the Cold War. Signed by thirty-five European and North American leaders at a summit in Finland in the summer of 1975, the document presented a vision for peace based on common principles and cooperation across the Iron Curtain. The Final Act is the first in-depth history of the diplomatic saga that produced this important agreement. This gripping book explains the Final Act's emergence from the parallel crises of the Soviet bloc and the West during the 1960s and the conflicting strategies that animated the negotiations. Drawing on research in eight countries and multiple languages, The Final Act shows how Helsinki provided a blueprint for ending the Cold War and building a new international order.
Human rights norms do matter. Those established by the Helsinki Final Act contributed directly to the demise of communism in the former East bloc, contends Daniel Thomas. This book counters those skeptics who doubt that such international norms substantially affect domestic political change, while explaining why, when, and how they matter most. Thomas argues that the Final Act, signed in 1975, transformed the agenda of East-West relations and provided a common platform around which opposition forces could mobilize. Without downplaying other factors, Thomas shows that the norms established at Helsinki undermined the viability of one-party Communist rule and thereby contributed significantly to the largely peaceful and democratic changes of 1989, as well as the end of the Cold War. Drawing on both governmental and nongovernmental sources, he offers a powerful Constructivist alternative to Realist theory's failure to anticipate or explain these crucial events. This study will fundamentally influence ongoing debates about the politics of international institutions, the socialization of states, the spread of democracy, and, not least, about the balance of factors that felled the Iron Curtain. It casts new light on Solidarity, Charter 77, and other democratic movements in Eastern Europe, the sources of Gorbachev's reforms, the evolution of the European Union, U.S. foreign policy, and East-West relations in the final decades of the Cold War. The Helsinki Effect will be essential reading for scholars and students of international relations, international law, European politics, human rights, and social movements.
From its inception, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provoked controversy. Today it is widely regarded as having contributed to the end of the Cold War. Bringing together new and innovative research on the CSCE, this volume explores questions key to understanding the Cold War: What role did diplomats play in shaping the 1975 Helsinki Final Act? How did that agreement and the CSCE more broadly shape societies in Europe and North America? And how did the CSCE and activists inspired by the Helsinki Final Act influence the end of the Cold War?
Two of the most pressing questions facing international historians today are how and why the Cold War ended. Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War explores how, in the aftermath of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, a transnational network of activists committed to human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe made the topic a central element in East-West diplomacy. As a result, human rights eventually became an important element of Cold War diplomacy and a central component of détente. Sarah B. Snyder demonstrates how this network influenced both Western and Eastern governments to pursue policies that fostered the rise of organized dissent in Eastern Europe, freedom of movement for East Germans and improved human rights practices in the Soviet Union - all factors in the end of the Cold War.
First published in 1981. The Council of the London Institute of World Affairs has carefully reconsidered the lessons to be drawn from the Institute's record in its first half-century and reshaped its plans of activities for the 1980s. As in an earlier "cold peace" era, the Council is united in its resolve not to be taken by surprise by any of the contingencies that, on a darkening world scene , must be anticipated in medium-range planning.
During the Cold War, the two global superpowers were able to come together to resolve many issues of transparency and common challenges, leading to a change in European and global security. The OSCE covered the area formerly occupied by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, championing the Helsinki Final Act, which became a key international instrument to encourage peace and security. Following the end of the Cold War, the OSCE became a key institution positioned between the European Union and NATO, focusing on furthering democracy, protecting human and minority rights, and encouraging military reform in a drastically dynamic region. David J. Galbreath sheds light on an institution that changed the face of global security during the Cold War and championed the rise of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet republics following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
After the heads of state and government of almost all European countries, the USA, and Canada signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki on August 1st, 1975, little was heard about the CSCE process. However, far away from the headline-grabbing meetings between the leading politicians of the USA and the USSR as well as the Geneva negotiations on disarmament, the Helsinki process proved to be an efficient framework for the East-West negotiations. The inconclusive Belgrade CSCE Meeting of 1977-1978 - after six months the delegations were only able to agree on a brief final document - was nevertheless a significant milestone for the CSCE process itself: negotiation rules were drawn up, interpreted, negotiated and re-negotiated. The contributions to this volume offer solid insights into the follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977/78, the Cold War, and in particular the CSCE process.
