The author also contrasts the Commission's decisional practice with the case law, assesses approaches under U.S. antitrust law to similar forms of conduct, and incorporates insights from economic theory. --
Under Article 102 TFEU, dominant firms are allowed to compete, but only to the extent their market behaviour does not constitute an abuse. Needless to say, the wording of the article neither explains what an abusive restriction of competition is nor how such a practice can be identified. Rather than developing a one-size-fits-all test applicable to all forms of market behaviour by dominant firms, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the General Court (ex; Court of First Instance) have set out a system of tests for separate categories of conduct. Drawing on the full range of the EU Courts’ relevant case law, this very useful book analyses the conditions that must be fulfilled for a broad range of business practices to be deemed abusive within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, and also identifies the criteria that must be fulfilled for a practice to be ‘objectively justified’. The potentially abusive practices studied here (as defined in the relevant case law) include the following: predatory pricing; margin squeezing; exclusivity agreements; loyalty rebates; refusals to supply to induce exclusivity; secondary line price discrimination; vexatious litigation; acquisitions of intellectual property rights (IPRs); refusals to supply necessary inputs; provision of storage equipment on the condition of exclusive use; selective above-cost price cuts; tying; technological integration; and refusal to license IPRs. The author also contrasts the Commission’s decisional practice with the case law, assesses approaches under U.S. antitrust law to similar forms of conduct, and incorporates insights from economic theory. This study greatly enhances our understanding of the distinction between abusive conduct and lawful competition. In the course of its clarification of the EU Courts’ responses to individual forms of market behaviour, an overall approach to the identification of exclusionary abuses under Article 102 TFEU begins to come into view. Apart from the important new synthesis the work offers legal scholars, there can be little doubt this book will prove a valuable asset and even an inspiration to competition lawyers.
Succinct and concise, this textbook covers all the procedural and substantive aspects of EU competition law. It explores primary and secondary law through the prism of ECJ case law. Abuse of a dominant position and merger control are discussed and a separate chapter on cartels ensures the student receives the broadest possible perspective on the subject. In addition, the book's consistent structure aids understanding: section summaries underline key principles, questions reinforce learning and essay discussion topics encourage further exploration. By setting out the economic principles which underpin the subject, the author allows the student to engage with the complexity of competition law with confidence. Integrated examples and an uncluttered writing style make this required reading for all students of the subject.
This timely book, with contributions from prominent experts including Luis Ortiz Blanco, Valentine Korah, Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, Lorenzo F. Pace and Richard Whish, examines the novel aspects of the 2009 Guidance on Article 102. They present a critical assessment of the Guidance that could be relevant to the result of the ongoing Commission'sinvestigations, for example, the opened procedure against Google. Moreover, the contributing authors identify the differences between the Guidance and the prohibition of exclusionary abuses in some member states (including France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Spain) and reveal the ways in which the relevant national laws treat exclusionary abuses, and assess how they differ from the approach of the Guidance. They also reveal the history and development of the relevant national legislation on prohibitions of unilateral conduct.
This book explores the interface between competition law and market integration in the application of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), focusing on the notion of 'market separation'-namely conduct that may hinder cross-border trade. The discussion reviews, among other things, the treatment of geographic price discrimination and exclusionary abuse, by which out-of-state competitors are affected. 'Market separation' cases are treated in the book as a case study for appraising the interface between competition and the Internal Market. On this basis, the book provides a comparative analysis of the Treaty requirements under Article 102 TFEU when applied in 'market separation' cases and the Treaty requirements under the free movement provisions. In addition, it utilises 'market separation' cases as a springboard for advancing an informed reformulation of the application of Article 102 TFEU when state action comes into play. All in all, the analysis presented in the book deconstructs the elements for establishing 'market separation' as an abuse of the dominant position. It shows that there is nothing that would justify a distinctive treatment of 'market separation' under Article 102 TFEU, other than a principled understanding of Internal Market law as a whole: whatever understanding one reaches about the proper shape of the Internal Market, interrogation of the proper application of competition law comes after that and thus should be informed by this understanding.
The objective(s) of Article 102 TFEU, what exactly makes a practice abusive and the standard of harm under Article 102 TFEU have not yet been settled. This lack of clarity creates uncertainty for businesses and, coupled with the current state of economics in this area, raises an important question of legitimacy. Using law and economic approaches, this book inquires into the possible objectives of Article 102 TFEU and proposes a modern approach to interpreting 'abuse'. In doing so, this book establishes an overarching concept of 'abuse' that conforms to the historical roots of the provision, to the text of the provision itself, and to modern economic thinking on unilateral conduct. This book therefore inquires into what Article 102 TFEU is about, what it can be about and what it should be about regarding both objectives and scope. The book demonstrates that the separation of exploitative abuse from exclusionary abuse is artificial and unsound. It examines the roots of Article 102 TFEU and the historical context of the adoption of the Treaty, the case law, policy and literature on exploitative abuses and, where relevant, on exclusionary abuses. The book investigates potential objectives, such as fairness and welfare, as well as the potential conflict between such objectives. Finally, it critically assesses the European Commission's modernisation of Article 102 TFEU, before proposing a reformed approach to 'abuse' which is centred on three necessary and sufficient conditions: exploitation, exclusion and a lack of an increase in efficiency.
Article 102 TFEU constitutes that a firm holding a dominant position in its market is not allowed to abuse this dominant market power through unilateral conduct. Although this provision is clearly of great importance in curbing the adverse effects of market power, it remains far from clear when dominant firms exclusionary conduct is in breach of this provision. This book presents an in-depth analysis of the limited case law, soft law, and theory in the field of law and economics on the matter, confronting the complex issues raised by the effects-based approach used to determine whether competition law has been breached, and clarifying how this approach can best be applied in future cases. Among the issues and topics covered are the following: – relevant case law, notably Post Danmark I, Tomra, and Intel; – analyses and discussions of when and how to apply the effect-based approach, including by object restrictions; – economic theories in the context of Article 102 TFEU; and – predation versus exclusion. While the book is grounded in the legal framework it also applies a law and economics based approach with the aim of supporting the legal arguments and conclusions, and thereby providing more robust arguments for the reached conclusions. As the first study to offer a much-needed clarification of the assessment relating to exclusionary conduct within Article 102 TFEU after the Post Danmark I case, this book provides suggestions on how to structure the approach, thus creating greater legal certainty for dominant firms (and their competitors) and providing a sound basis for both practice and research in this area. It is sure to be read and studied widely by practitioners and academics concerned with the application of Article 102 TFEU.
How does it come about that a certain firm dominates a market? Can an understanding of this process lead to a more effective enforcement of competition law? That is the question approached in this compelling book. The author reviews the European Union’s (EU’s) Article 102 case law, comparing it with United States (US) provisions, demonstrating that new ways of looking at market power are needed – today’s tech giants differ from older monopolies. He clarifies the role of dominant firms in the competitive process, proposing that conduct should be scrutinized differently depending on the source of market power, rather than using the same approach for all dominant undertakings. Supporting his contention that the legal consequences that derive from holding a dominant position cannot be disassociated from the sources of that market power—that a dynamic understanding of dominance requires looking both forwards and backwards in time—the author examines such sources of dominance as the following: ‒ statutory dominance derived from explicit protectionist measures or subtler geoeconomic strategies; ‒ legacy firms such as the telecommunications or transport industries; ‒ natural monopolies, e.g., the exploitation of a mine; ‒ investment efforts undertaken in a competitive environment; ‒ intangible resources such as timing, reputation, experience, innovation capabilities, or managerial processes; ‒ lucky monopolies; and ‒ anticompetitive behavior on the road to dominance. Drawing insights from EU and US case law, industrial organization scholarship, and strategic management literature, the book resolves questions related to the role that the origins of market power have played and should play in the enforcement of EU competition rules against dominant firms. It concludes with a list of policy recommendations bringing the application of Article 102 TFEU against dominant firms more in line with the objective of protecting the competitive process. With its focus on how EU competition law enforcement should be fine-tuned to adequately incorporate the origins of firm dominance into the analysis of single-firm behavior, the book makes a major contribution to the analysis of anticompetitive effects. Practitioners, competition authorities, and academics in competition law will greatly appreciate the book’s combination of legal analysis and recommendations for policy reform.