Causation is one of the most important and enduring topics in philosophy, going back to Aristotle. In this important book, Helen Beebee covers all the major debates and issues in the philosophy of causation.
This Companion evaluates Hume's philosophical arguments in A Treatise of Human Nature and considers their historical context, particularly within British empiricism.
Causation has always been a central topic in the history of philosophy. Many theories causation have been advanced, but not one has approached anything like general acceptance. Yet the concept of causation is prevalent in many areas of contemporary philosophy: there are the causal theories of language, of action, of personal identity, of knowledge, of perception, of scientific explanation, and of reference. If causation is doing all this philosophical work, it seems essential to strive for an intelligible account of what a 'cause' actually is. One obvious place to start is Hume's analysis of causation, which is generally thought to be the most significant and influential single contribution to the topic. But despite the widely recognized importance of his analysis, many opposing interpretations surround his causal theory. There are some commentators who believe that his theory is a version of realism and many others who argue that it is a version of anti-realism. There is considerable textual evidence for, and also against, each interpretation. Angela Coventry develops a more conciliatory approach. She argues that Hume's causal theory is best understood as 'quasi-realist' - an intermediate position between realism and anti-realism. This makes sense of some seemingly contradictory passages in Hume's work and also provides an answer to a major objection which is commonly thought to devastate his causal theory. Coventry then goes on to outline a general, topic-independent, conception of quasi-realism as distinct from realistm and anti-realism that allows it to stand as a consistent third alternative.
In the first ever book-length treatment of David Hume's philosophy of action, Constantine Sandis brings together seemingly disparate aspects of Hume's work to present an understanding of human action that is much richer than previously assumed. Sandis showcases Hume's interconnected views on action and its causes by situating them within a wider vision of our human understanding of personal identity, causation, freedom, historical explanation, and morality. In so doing, he also relates key aspects of the emerging picture to contemporary concerns within the philosophy of action and moral psychology, including debates between Humeans and anti-Humeans about both 'motivating' and 'normative' reasons. Character and Causation takes the form of a series of essays which collectively argue that Hume's overall project proceeds by way of a soft conceptual revisionism that emerges from his Copy Principle. This involves re-calibrating our philosophical ideas of all that agency involves to fit a scheme that more readily matches the range of impressions that human beings actually have. On such a reading, once we rid ourselves of a certain kind of metaphysical ambition we are left with a perfectly adequate account of how it is that people can act in character, freely, and for good reasons. The resulting picture is one that both unifies Hume's practical and theoretical philosophy and radically transforms contemporary philosophy of action for the better.
Immanuel Kant famously said that he was awoken from his "dogmatic slumbers," and led to question the possibility of metaphysics, by David Hume's doubts about causation. Because of this, many philosophers have viewed Hume's influence on Kant as limited to metaphysics. More recently, some philosophers have questioned whether even Kant's metaphysics was really motivated by Hume. In Knowledge, Reason, and Taste, renowned Kant scholar Paul Guyer challenges both of these views. He argues that Kant's entire philosophy--including his moral philosophy, aesthetics, and teleology, as well as his metaphysics--can fruitfully be read as an engagement with Hume. In this book, the first to describe and assess Hume's influence throughout Kant's philosophy, Guyer shows where Kant agrees or disagrees with Hume, and where Kant does or doesn't appear to resolve Hume's doubts. In doing so, Guyer examines the progress both Kant and Hume made on enduring questions about causes, objects, selves, taste, moral principles and motivations, and purpose and design in nature. Finally, Guyer looks at questions Kant and Hume left open to their successors.
David Hume's theory of action is well known for several provocative theses, including that passion and reason cannot be opposed over the direction of action. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe defends an original interpretation of Hume's views on passion, reason, and motivation which is consistent with other theses in Hume's philosophy, loyal to his texts, and historically situated. She challenges the now orthodox interpretation of Hume on motivation, presenting an alternative that situates Hume closer to "Humeans" than many recent interpreters have. Part of the strategy is to examine the thinking of the early modern intellectuals to whom Hume responds. Most of these thinkers insisted that passions lead us to pursue harmful objects unless regulated by reason; and most regarded passions as representations of good and evil, which can be false. Understanding Hume's response to these claims requires appreciating his respective characterizations of reason and passion. The author argues that Hume's thesis that reason is practically impotent apart from passion is about beliefs generated by reason, rather than about the capacity of reason. Furthermore, the argument makes sense of Hume's sometimes-ridiculed description of passions as "original existences" having no reference to objects. The author also shows how Hume understood morality as intrinsically motivating, while holding that moral beliefs are not themselves motives, and why he thought of passions as self-regulating, contrary to the admonitions of the rationalists.
In this revised edition of The Secret Connexion, Galen Strawson explores one of the most discussed subjects in philosophy: David Hume's work on causation. He argues that Hume believes in causal influence, but insists that we cannot know its nature. The regularity theory of causation is indefensible, and Hume never adopted it in any case.