An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
Author: David Hume
Publisher:
Published: 1907
Total Pages: 202
ISBN-13:
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Author: David Hume
Publisher:
Published: 1907
Total Pages: 202
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Philip A. Reed
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2018-06-27
Total Pages: 386
ISBN-13: 1351720511
DOWNLOAD EBOOKRecent work at the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of psychology has dealt mostly with Aristotelian virtue ethics. The dearth of scholarship that engages with Hume’s moral philosophy, however, is both noticeable and peculiar. Hume's Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology demonstrates how Hume’s moral philosophy comports with recent work from the empirical sciences and moral psychology. It shows how contemporary work in virtue ethics has much stronger similarities to the metaphysically thin conception of human nature that Hume developed, rather than the metaphysically thick conception of human nature that Aristotle espoused. It also reveals how contemporary work in moral motivation and moral epistemology has strong affinities with themes in Hume’s sympathetic sentimentalism.
Author: John Bricke
Publisher: Clarendon Press
Published: 2000
Total Pages: 290
ISBN-13: 9780198250111
DOWNLOAD EBOOK"This work is essential for the philosophical assessment of Hume's contributions to our understanding of what moral agency is....It is written in a manner that is constantly sensitive to the philosophical perplexities that lie in wai for each position that the author, and Hume, considers, and it demonstrates, if anyone still needs this, just how resourceful Hume's moral theory is, even when judged in the light of our contemporary debates."--Ethics
Author: David Hume
Publisher:
Published: 1826
Total Pages: 582
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Henry E. Allison
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Published: 2010-09-02
Total Pages: 426
ISBN-13: 0191615528
DOWNLOAD EBOOKHenry Allison examines the central tenets of Hume's epistemology and cognitive psychology, as contained in the Treatise of Human Nature. Allison takes a distinctive two-level approach. On the one hand, he considers Hume's thought in its own terms and historical context. So considered, Hume is viewed as a naturalist, whose project in the first three parts of the first book of the Treatise is to provide an account of the operation of the understanding in which reason is subordinated to custom and other non-rational propensities. Scepticism arises in the fourth part as a form of metascepticism, directed not against first-order beliefs, but against philosophical attempts to ground these beliefs in the "space of reasons." On the other hand, Allison provides a critique of these tenets from a Kantian perspective. This involves a comparison of the two thinkers on a range of issues, including space and time, causation, existence, induction, and the self. In each case, the issue is seen to turn on a contrast between their underlying models of cognition. Hume is committed to a version of the perceptual model, according to which the paradigm of knowledge is a seeing with the "mind's eye" of the relation between mental contents. By contrast, Kant appeals to a discursive model in which the fundamental cognitive act is judgment, understood as the application of concepts to sensory data, Whereas regarded from the first point of view, Hume's account is deemed a major philosophical achievement, seen from the second it suffers from a failure to develop an adequate account of concepts and judgment.
Author: Anthony O'Hear
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2004-11-18
Total Pages: 328
ISBN-13: 0521603269
DOWNLOAD EBOOKCollection of original essays by leading researchers on current approaches to moral philosophy.
Author: Rachel Cohon
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 2008-10-02
Total Pages: 296
ISBN-13: 0199268444
DOWNLOAD EBOOKRachel Cohon offers an original interpretation of the ethical thinking of the 18th-century philosopher David Hume. She focuses on two claims: that human beings figure out what is good or evil by using our feelings or emotions, and that some of the good traits we recognize are produced by informal social agreement and teaching.
Author: Ilya Kasavin
Publisher: Cambridge Scholars Publishing
Published: 2013-07-16
Total Pages: 335
ISBN-13: 1443850047
DOWNLOAD EBOOKDavid Hume bridges a gap between classical and non-classical philosophy. Two major approaches in 20th century systematic philosophy – naturalism and relativism – have both basically been inspired by Hume and create the most controversy nowadays. The dethroning of the knowing agent and the spiritual substance from their privileged place opens way to “the death of God” (F. Nietzsche) or “the death of the Author” (R. Barthes). Hume’s criticism of causality corresponds to the indeterminism of the quantum mechanics (B. Russell). K. Popper’s falsificationism would hardly be possible without Hume’s account of induction. L. Wittgenstein’s considerations on rule following reveal similarities with Hume’s idea of habit (S. Kripke) as well as with P. Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus”. D. Bloor likes “to think of Hume as Edinburgh’s great sociologist of knowledge”. The present collection is not a mere contribution to the history of philosophy, though it covers many problems of contemporary Humean scholarship and contains articles written by leading researchers in the field (B. Straud, R. Harre, J. Bricke, etc.). Its aim, rather, is to demonstrate the “vivacity” of Hume for contemporary philosophy. The authors’ considerations range from the subtlest questions of the development of his thought and its impact on the contemporary, to the most recent and controversial topics in epistemology, philosophy of science, political theory and ethics.
Author: Philip A. Reed
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2018
Total Pages: 386
ISBN-13: 9781315180830
DOWNLOAD EBOOKRecent work at the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of psychology has dealt mostly with Aristotelian virtue ethics. The dearth of scholarship that engages with Hume's moral philosophy, however, is both noticeable and peculiar. Hume's Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology demonstrates how Hume's moral philosophy comports with recent work from the empirical sciences and moral psychology. It shows how contemporary work in virtue ethics has much stronger similarities to the metaphysically thin conception of human nature that Hume developed, rather than the metaphysically thick conception of human nature that Aristotle espoused. It also reveals how contemporary work in moral motivation and moral epistemology has strong affinities with themes in Hume's sympathetic sentimentalism.
Author: Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2018
Total Pages: 243
ISBN-13: 0199573298
DOWNLOAD EBOOKDavid Hume's theory of action is well known for several provocative theses, including that passion and reason cannot be opposed over the direction of action. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe defends an original interpretation of Hume's views on passion, reason, and motivation which is consistent with other theses in Hume's philosophy, loyal to his texts, and historically situated. She challenges the now orthodox interpretation of Hume on motivation, presenting an alternative that situates Hume closer to "Humeans" than many recent interpreters have. Part of the strategy is to examine the thinking of the early modern intellectuals to whom Hume responds. Most of these thinkers insisted that passions lead us to pursue harmful objects unless regulated by reason; and most regarded passions as representations of good and evil, which can be false. Understanding Hume's response to these claims requires appreciating his respective characterizations of reason and passion. The author argues that Hume's thesis that reason is practically impotent apart from passion is about beliefs generated by reason, rather than about the capacity of reason. Furthermore, the argument makes sense of Hume's sometimes-ridiculed description of passions as "original existences" having no reference to objects. The author also shows how Hume understood morality as intrinsically motivating, while holding that moral beliefs are not themselves motives, and why he thought of passions as self-regulating, contrary to the admonitions of the rationalists.