Subnational governments can create sizable fiscal risks for central governments. In addition to impacting service delivery at the grassroots level, unsustainable subnational finances can be a continuous drain on central resources. The need for stronger public financial management systems and capacities to analyze and manage risks at the subnational government level cannot be overemphasized. Central governments need to develop sound institutional mechanisms to systematically monitor the health of subnational finances to be able to proactively manage associated risks. This How to Note provides a framework for central governments that seek to assess and manage fiscal risks stemming from weak subnational finances. It analyzes the sources of subnational finance vulnerabilities and argues that central governments would benefit from putting in place the following: (1) a stronger regulatory framework, (2) improved fiscal reporting, and (3) enhanced central oversight. The lessons distilled from the international experience are particularly useful for developing economies where the management of risks can be improved.
A number of member countries have expressed interest in advice regarding disclosure and management of fiscal risks (defined as the possibility of deviations of fiscal outcomes from what was expected at the time of the budget or other forecast). This paper analyzes the main sources of fiscal risks and—building on an overview of existing practices in a wide range of countries—provides practical suggestions in this area, including a possible Statement of Fiscal Risks and a set of Guidelines for Fiscal Risk Disclosure and Management.
This departmental paper investigates how countries in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) can improve fiscal transparency, thereby raising government efficiency and reducing corruption vulnerabilities.
Investment in infrastructure can be a driving force of the economic recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic in the context of shrinking fiscal space. Public-private partnerships (PPP) bring a promise of efficiency when carefully designed and managed, to avoid creating unnecessary fiscal risks. But fiscal illusions prevent an understanding the sources of fiscal risks, which arise in all infrastructure projects, and that in PPPs present specific characteristics that need to be addressed. PPP contracts are also affected by implicit fiscal risks when they are poorly designed, particularly when a government signs a PPP contract for a project with no financial sustainability. This paper reviews the advantages and inconveniences of PPPs, discusses the fiscal illusions affecting them, identifies a diversity of fiscal risks, and presents the essentials of PPP fiscal risk management.
Many governments have faced serious instability as a result of their contingent liabilities. But conventional public finance analysis and institutions fail to address such fiscal risks. This book aims to provide motivation and practical guidance to governments seeking to improve their management of fiscal risks. The book addresses some of the difficult analytical and institutional challenges that face reformers tooling up to manage government fiscal risks. It discusses the inadequacies of conventional practices as well as recent advances in dealing with fiscal risk.
Comprehensive analysis and management of fiscal risks can help ensure sound fiscal public finances and macroeconomic stability. This has been underscored by the global financial crisis and the more recent collapse in commodity prices, which starkly illustrate the vulnerability of public finances to risk. Indeed, over the past quarter century, governments experienced on average an adverse fiscal shock of 6 percent of GDP once every 12 years, with some of the largest stemming from financial crises. Countries need a more complete understanding of these potential threats to their fiscal position. Existing fiscal risk disclosure and analysis practices tend to be incomplete, fragmented, and qualitative in nature. A more comprehensive and integrated assessment of the potential shocks to government finances, in the form of a fiscal stress test, can help policymakers simulate the effects of shocks to their central forecasts and their implications for government solvency, liquidity, and financing needs. Comprehensive, reliable, and timely fiscal data covering all public entities, stocks, and flows are a necessary foundation for such analysis. Countries should also enhance their capacity to mitigate and manage fiscal risks. Fiscal risk management practices are often blunt, ad hoc, and too focused on imposing limits on the creation of exposures. Countries need to expand their toolkits for fiscal risk management and adopt the use of instruments to transfer, share, or provision for risks. In doing so, countries need to weigh the possible benefits from reducing their exposure to shocks against the financial and other costs of the policies that may be needed. Finally, countries should make greater use of probabilistic forecasting methods when setting long-run objectives and medium-term targets for fiscal policy. The paper illustrates how simple probabilistic tools can be used to map the uncertainty around medium-term trajectories for public debt. In combination with fiscal stress tests, these tools can provide valuable information regarding the probabilities that a country will stay within the debt ceilings embedded in their fiscal rules. The Fund is playing an important role in supporting improvements in fiscal risk analysis and management among its members. This includes technical assistance in constructing public sector balance sheets; developing institutions and capacity to identify specific fiscal risks and to quantify their potential impact; undertaking fiscal stress tests; and integrating risks into the design of medium-term fiscal targets.
This report evaluates the state of fiscal transparency in Georgia. Georgia has taken important steps to enhance its fiscal transparency practices over the past decade. Fiscal reports have become more comprehensive, with the development of a central government balance sheet and income statement. Fiscal forecasts and budgets have become more forward looking and policy oriented, with the introduction of a four-year medium-term budget framework, formal fiscal objectives, and a program budget classification. In addition, fiscal risk disclosure and analysis have improved dramatically, with the publication of a detailed statement on fiscal risks. At the same time, the evaluation highlights a number of areas where Georgia’s fiscal transparency practices could be further improved.
To provide policymakers in the Caribbean with a governance framework for improving infrastructure through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), while limiting their fiscal costs and risks for the government. And to showcase Canada support to FAD technical assistance in the region and FAD collaboration with CARTAC and the Caribbean Development Bank
Studies have shown that markets may underprice sub-national governments’ risk on the implicit assumption that these entities would be bailed out by their central government in case of financial difficulties. However, the question of whether sovereigns pay a premium on their own borrowing as a result of (implicitly or explicitly) guaranteeing sub-entities’ debt has been explored only little. We use an event study approach with separate equations for two levels of government to test for a simultaneous increase in sovereign risk premia and decrease in sub-national risk premia—or a de facto transfer of risk from the latter to the former—on the day a sovereign bailout is announced. Using daily financial market data for Spain and its autonomous regions from January 2010 to June 2013, we find support for our risk transfer hypothesis. We estimate that the Spanish sovereign’s spread may have increased by around 70 basis points as a result of the central government’s support for fiscally distressed comunidades autónomas.
Fiscal decentralization is becoming a pressing issue in a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting demands for a greater local voice in spending decisions and efforts to strengthen social cohesion. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to distill the lessons for an effective fiscal decentralization reform, focusing on the macroeconomic aspects. The main findings for sub-Saharan African countries that have decentralized, based on an empirical analysis and four case studies (Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda), are as follows: • Determinants and effectiveness: Empirical results suggest that (1) the major driving forces behind fiscal decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa include efforts to defuse ethnic conflicts, the initial level of income, and the urban-ization rate, whereas strength of democracy is not an important determi-nant for decentralization; and (2) decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa is associated with higher growth in the presence of stronger institutions. • Spending assignments: The allocation of spending across levels of gov-ernment in the four case studies is broadly consistent with best practice. However, in Uganda, unlike in the other three case studies, subnational governments have little flexibility to make spending decisions as a result of a deconcentrated rather than a devolved system of government. • Own revenue: The assignment of taxing powers is broadly in line with best practice in the four case studies, with the bulk of subnational revenue coming from property taxes and from fees for local services. However, own revenues are a very small fraction of subnational spending, reflecting weak cadaster systems and a high level of informality in the economy.
