-- Demonstrates the decisive German contribution to victory at Waterloo -- Unpublished German eyewitness accounts and regimental reports -- Covers the battles of Waterloo, Wavre and the taking of Paris Peter Hofschroer, in this second volume of his masterly study of 1815, challenges the accepted version of events at the battle of Waterloo. He demonstrates convincingly that Allied victory was due not to steadfast British infantry repelling the French, but to the timely arrival of Prussian troops who stole victory from Napoleon and sealed the fate of the last Grande Armee. Drawing on previously unpublished accounts, Hofschroer gives not only the Prussian perspective of their march to Waterloo and decisive attack on Napoleon's flank, but also details of the actions fought by some of the 25,000 Germans in Wellington's 'British' army -- more than a third of the Duke's force. A gripping narrative of astonishing detail captures such key episodes of Waterloo as La Haye Sainte, Papelotte, Hougoumont and the Prussian struggle with the Imperial Guard for Plancenoit. In addition, Hofschroer examines the battle at Wavre, the Allied offensive into France, the taking of Paris and the sieges across northern France. 1815: The Waterloo Campaign-The German Victory is a definitive work on an epic confrontation by one of today's leading military writers.
Napoleon's Waterloo Campaign: An Alternate History is a story of this famous campaign with a twist. What would have happened if Marshal Grouchy, Napoleon's wing commander, had marched to the sound of the guns as his subordinate commanders had urged? This intriguing idea is an open invitation for taking a closer look at what might have been in June of 1815. This volume is the first modern full length alternative history written about the Waterloo campaign but it does not stop there. First, the narrative seeks to examine and explain the logic behind the French emperor's decisions and, to a lesser extent, those made by his famous enemies. Then, the change in history is seamlessly inserted into the overall context of the campaign and followed to its dramatic climax at the battle of Ohain on June 19, 1815. The campaign of Waterloo was a series of opportunities taken and missed by both sides and the volume shows how a single decision could have changed the course of history.
Napoleon's Waterloo Campaign: An Alternate History is a story of this famous campaign with a twist. What would have happened if Marshal Grouchy, Napoleon's wing commander, had marched to the sound of the guns as his subordinate commanders had urged? This intriguing idea is an open invitation for taking a closer look at what might have been in June of 1815. This volume is the first modern full length alternative history written about the Waterloo campaign but it does not stop there. First, the narrative seeks to examine and explain the logic behind the French emperor's decisions and, to a lesser extent, those made by his famous enemies. Then, the change in history is seamlessly inserted into the overall context of the campaign and followed to its dramatic climax at the battle of Ohain on June 19, 1815. The campaign of Waterloo was a series of opportunities taken and missed by both sides and the volume shows how a single decision could have changed the course of history.
The author of this book was commander of 'G' Troop, Royal Horse Artillery, in Wellington's army, who jotted down notes on the events of the day each evening. It is an account of what he saw and felt from leaving Colchester for Belgium on 8 April 1815 to his final return to England at the end of January 1816. It is a remarkable and compelling account, especially of the three days which ended the career of Napoleon.
One of the enduring controversies of the Waterloo campaign is the conduct of Marshal Grouchy. Given command of a third of Napoleons army and told to keep the Prussians from joining forces with Wellington, he failed to keep Wellington and Blcher apart with the result that Napoleon was overwhelmed at Waterloo. Grouchy, though, was not defeated. He kept his force together and retreated in good order back to France.Many have accused Grouchy of intentionally holding back his men and not marching to join Napoleon when the sound of the gunfire at Waterloo could clearly be heard, and he has been widely blamed for Napoleons defeat.Now, for the first time, Grouchys conduct during the Waterloo campaign is analyzed in fine detail, drawing principally on French sources not previously available in English. The author, for example, answers questions such as whether key orders did actually exist in 1815 or were they later fabrications to make Grouchy the scapegoat for Napoleons failures? Did General Grard really tell Grouchy to march to the sound of the guns? Why did Grouchy appear to move so slowly when speed was essential?This is a subject which is generally overlooked by British historians, who tend to concentrate on the actions of Wellington and Napoleon, and which French historians choose not to look at too closely for fear that it might reflect badly upon their hero Napoleon.Despite the mass of books written on Waterloo, this is a genuinely unique contribution to this most famous campaign. This book is certain to fuel debate and prompt historians to reconsider the events of June 1815.
This book at last makes available in English a penetrating exchange between two of history's most famous soldiers concerning the dramatic events of the Waterloo campaign of 1815. The Duke of Wellington is one of the greatest military commanders in British history; General Carl von Clausewitz is widely regarded as the greatest military thinker in the history of Western civilization. Both men had vast experience in the Napoleonic Wars, and both were prominent participants in the campaign. Wellington commanded the Anglo-Dutch-Belgian army; the much younger Clausewitz was chief-of-staff to Prussia's 3rd Corps. Wellington went on to become prime minister of Great Britain and commander-in-chief-for-life of the British Army. Clausewitz went on to author VOM KRIEGE (ON WAR), a seminal and still hotly debated treatise on the theory and philosophy of war. He also became the founder of modern, "scientific" military history, via the work of his disciple, military historian Hans Delbrück. Oddly, Clausewitz's study of the campaign of 1815 was never published in English, and Wellington's once-famous response to it has been strangely but studiously ignored by British military historians since 1914. Hence this book. It contains Wellington's initial battle report; Clausewitz's post-battle letters to his wife Marie; correspondence within Wellington's circle concerning Clausewitz's work; Clausewitz's strategic analysis of the entire campaign (not just the Battle of Waterloo); Wellington's memorandum in response; and enlightening essays by prominent experts on Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Battle of Waterloo. Major General [U.S. Army] David T. Zabecki, Ph.D., writes in the April 2011 edition of The Journal of Military History: "Long overdue, we now have two English translations of [Clausewitz's] The Campaign of 1815 [i.e., Peter Hofschröer's translation of Clausewitz's study and Bassford, Moran, and Pedlow's edition of the full Clausewitz-Wellington exchange]. Either of these volumes would be a welcome addition to the bookshelf of any serious student of military affairs, but On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815 is clearly the richer of the two." Napoleonic expert Bruno Colson wrote [in War in History 19(3)] that Pedlow "convincingly resurrects Wellington's ideas and actions, and gives a final and excellent reply to the arguments of Peter Hofschröer, while remaining balanced, recognizing the latter's merits and quoting him courteously. Waterloo 'was neither a British victory nor a Prussian victory; it was an Allied victory, ' says Pedlow (p. 282). For Waterloo enthusiasts, this essay alone justifies buying the book." Noted Clausewitz scholar Jon Sumida (U.Md) writes that "On Waterloo is essential reading for those seeking an understanding of Clausewitz's distinctive approach to historical case study as the basis of practical knowledge of armed conflict. Clausewitz's history of the campaign of 1815 incorporates methods of critical analysis explained in Book II of On War, which were addressed primarily to the observation and assessment of past cases of strategic and operational decision-making by commanders-in chief. The Bassford, Moran, and Pedlow edition provides a highly readable translation of a work previously accessible only in German that illustrates Clausewitz's approach to the replication and evaluation of the experience of high command." The Editors: Christopher Bassford is Professor of Strategy at the National War College, in Washington, DC. Daniel Moran is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, CA. Gregory W. Pedlow is Chief of the Historical Office at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), near Mons, Belgium.
