A new translation of the final work of French philosopher Jean Cavaillès. In this short, dense essay, Jean Cavaillès evaluates philosophical efforts to determine the origin—logical or ontological—of scientific thought, arguing that, rather than seeking to found science in original intentional acts, a priori meanings, or foundational logical relations, any adequate theory must involve a history of the concept. Cavaillès insists on a historical epistemology that is conceptual rather than phenomenological, and a logic that is dialectical rather than transcendental. His famous call (cited by Foucault) to abandon "a philosophy of consciousness" for "a philosophy of the concept" was crucial in displacing the focus of philosophical enquiry from aprioristic foundations toward structural historical shifts in the conceptual fabric. This new translation of Cavaillès's final work, written in 1942 during his imprisonment for Resistance activities, presents an opportunity to reencounter an original and lucid thinker. Cavaillès's subtle adjudication between positivistic claims that science has no need of philosophy, and philosophers' obstinate disregard for actual scientific events, speaks to a dilemma that remains pertinent for us today. His affirmation of the authority of scientific thinking combined with his commitment to conceptual creation yields a radical defense of the freedom of thought and the possibility of the new.
Scientists use concepts and principles that are partly specific for their subject matter, but they also share part of them with colleagues working in different fields. Compare the biological notion of a 'natural kind' with the general notion of 'confirmation' of a hypothesis by certain evidence. Or compare the physical principle of the 'conservation of energy' and the general principle of 'the unity of science'. Scientists agree that all such notions and principles aren't as crystal clear as one might wish. An important task of the philosophy of the special sciences, such as philosophy of physics, of biology and of economics, to mention only a few of the many flourishing examples, is the clarification of such subject specific concepts and principles. Similarly, an important task of 'general' philosophy of science is the clarification of concepts like 'confirmation' and principles like 'the unity of science'. It is evident that clarfication of concepts and principles only makes sense if one tries to do justice, as much as possible, to the actual use of these notions by scientists, without however following this use slavishly. That is, occasionally a philosopher may have good reasons for suggesting to scientists that they should deviate from a standard use. Frequently, this amounts to a plea for differentiation in order to stop debates at cross-purposes due to the conflation of different meanings. While the special volumes of the series of Handbooks of the Philosophy of Science address topics relative to a specific discipline, this general volume deals with focal issues of a general nature. After an editorial introduction about the dominant method of clarifying concepts and principles in philosophy of science, called explication, the first five chapters deal with the following subjects. Laws, theories, and research programs as units of empirical knowledge (Theo Kuipers), various past and contemporary perspectives on explanation (Stathis Psillos), the evaluation of theories in terms of their virtues (Ilkka Niiniluto), and the role of experiments in the natural sciences, notably physics and biology (Allan Franklin), and their role in the social sciences, notably economics (Wenceslao Gonzalez). In the subsequent three chapters there is even more attention to various positions and methods that philosophers of science and scientists may favor: ontological, epistemological, and methodological positions (James Ladyman), reduction, integration, and the unity of science as aims in the sciences and the humanities (William Bechtel and Andrew Hamilton), and logical, historical and computational approaches to the philosophy of science (Atocha Aliseda and Donald Gillies).The volume concludes with the much debated question of demarcating science from nonscience (Martin Mahner) and the rich European-American history of the philosophy of science in the 20th century (Friedrich Stadler). - Comprehensive coverage of the philosophy of science written by leading philosophers in this field - Clear style of writing for an interdisciplinary audience - No specific pre-knowledge required
The first volume in this new series explores, through extensive co-operation, new ways of achieving the integration of science in all its diversity. The book offers essays from important and influential philosophers in contemporary philosophy, discussing a range of topics from philosophy of science to epistemology, philosophy of logic and game theoretical approaches. It will be of interest to philosophers, computer scientists and all others interested in the scientific rationality.
Winner of the 2018 Choice Award for Outstanding Academic Title! PRAISE FOR PREVIOUS EDITIONS "This is a brilliantly clear introduction (and indeed reframing) of the history and philosophy of science in terms of worldviews and their elements.... In addition, the book is incredibly well-informed from both a scientific and philosophical angle. Highly recommended." Scientific and Medical Network "Unlike many other introductions to philosophy of science, DeWitt's book is at once historically informative and philosophically thorough and rigorous. Chapter notes, suggested readings, and references enhance its value." Choice "Written in clear and comprehensible prose and supplemented by effective diagrams and examples, Worldviews is an ideal text for anyone new to the history and philosophy of science. As the reader will come to find out, DeWitt is a gifted writer with the unique ability to break down complex and technical concepts into digestible parts, making Worldviews a welcoming and not overwhelming book for the introductory reader." History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, vol. 28(2) Now in its third edition, Worldviews: An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science strengthens its reputation as the most accessible and teachable introduction to the history and philosophy of science on the market. Geared toward engaging undergraduates and those approaching the history and philosophy of science for the first time, this intellectually-provocative volume takes advantage of its author's extensive teaching experience, parsing complex ideas using straightforward and sensible examples drawn from the physical sciences. Building on the foundations which earned the book its critical acclaim, author Richard DeWitt considers fundamental issues in the philosophy of science through the historical worldviews that influenced them, charting the evolution of Western science through the rise and fall of dominant systems of thought. Chapters have been updated to include discussion of recent findings in quantum theory, general relativity, and evolutionary theory, and two new chapters exclusive to the third edition enrich its engagement with radical developments in contemporary science. At a time in modern history when the nature of truth, fact, and reality seem increasingly controversial, the third edition of Worldviews presents complex concepts with clarity and verve, and prepares inquisitive minds to engage critically with some of the most exciting questions in the philosophy of science.
Rectifying misrepresentations of Popperian thought with a historical approach to Popper’s philosophy, Gattei reconstructs the logic of Popper’s development to show how one problem and its tentative solution led to a new problem.
History of Science and Philosophy of Science, a primarily interdisciplinary study, deals with the historical and philosophical perspectives of science and explores the mutuality of the relations between the two disciplines. To present the study in a reader-friendly format, it has been divided into two parts, with the first volume (Part 6) dedicated to the 'history' of science and the second volume (Part 7) to the 'philosophy' of science. History of Science and Philosophy of Science: A Philosophical Perspective of the Logic of Ideas in Science, the second part of Volume XIII, tries to explain how science is an open-ended quest where man continually uses his logic and critical thinking faculties to arrive at better results, which are in turn subject to further revision. The main focus of this part is directed to the procedures and results of the natural sciences, particularly physics. It also includes essays on sociology, history and other allied disciplines covering the legal, moral and aesthetic aspects of science. This part seeks to address the basic question about the logically structured character of scientific knowledge, its evolutionary strength for survival and its methodological adequacy. The ultimate aim is to understand how and why the universe exists as it does and what role humans play in their daily interactions with it. Written in simplified language, with elaborate explanations and discussions tracing out ideas and arguments, these volumes will interest and engage both researchers and well-informed general readers.
The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know well, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of pre sentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foun dational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodol ogy and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.
Conjectures and Refutations is one of Karl Popper's most wide-ranging and popular works, notable not only for its acute insight into the way scientific knowledge grows, but also for applying those insights to politics and to history. It provides one of the clearest and most accessible statements of the fundamental idea that guided his work: not only our knowledge, but our aims and our standards, grow through an unending process of trial and error.
