With a selection of essays chosen from a wide range of possible candidates this collection strikes an optimal balance between direct relevance to controversies and rigorous contributions from Hegelian scholarship with regard to Hegel and the law.
The first collection of essays directed towards jurisprudence with a Hegelian theme. The editors are committed to the idea that Hegel is the future source of great energy and insight within the legal academy.
This volume provides the first sustained treatment of the legal theory of Eduard Gans (1789--1839) and the first translation of Gans's Systems of Roman Civil Law in Outline (1827). Hegel's close personal friend and recognized leader of the Hegelian movement, Gans posthumously edited Hegel's Philosophy of Law and Philosophy of History. As Professor of Law in Berlin, Gans championed legal codification in opposition to Savigny and the Historical School of Jurisprudence. Hoffheimer argues that Gans's legal writings, especially his systematic exposition of Roman Law, combined a brilliant application of Romanist legal scholarship with a creative, original vision of Hegelian methodology. The teacher of Karl Marx and Felix Mendelssohn, Gans promoted a liberal interpretation of Hegel and influenced an important generation of German thinkers.
Originally published in 1949. Huntington Cairns identifies the views that major Western philosophers took on law, the problems they considered significant about law, and the nature of the solutions they proposed. This book develops ideas discussed in Cairns' Law and the Social Sciences (1935) and Theory of Legal Science (1941). The object of these three volumes is the same: to construct the foundation of a theory of law that is the necessary antecedent to a possible jurisprudence. The inventory of philosophers that Cairns examines includes Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Hegel.
An introduction to Hegel's ideas on the nature of law. This book takes readers through different structures of legal consciousness, from the private law of property, contract, and crimes to intentionality, the family, the role of the state, and international law.
Drawing from a variety of Hegel's writings, Shannon Hoff articulates a theory of justice that requires answering simultaneously to three irreducibly different demands: those of community, universality, and individuality. The domains of "ethicality," "legality," and "morality" correspond to these essential dimensions of human experience, and a political system that fails to give adequate recognition to any one of these will become oppressive. The commitment to legality emphasized in modern and contemporary political life, Hoff argues, systematically precludes adequate recognition of the formative cultural contexts that Hegel identifies under the name of "ethical life" and of singular experiences of moral duty, or conscience. Countering the perception of Hegel as a conservative political thinker and engaging broadly with contemporary work in liberalism, critical theory, and feminism, Hoff focuses on these themes of ethicality and conscience to consider how modern liberal politics must be transformed if it is to accommodate these essential dimensions of human life.
What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational. Hegel's Outlines of the Philosophy of Right is one of the greatest works of moral, social, and political philosophy. It contains significant ideas on justice, moral responsibility, family life, economic activity, and the political structure of the state - all matters of profound interest to us today. Hegel's aim is to lay out the various forms that human freedom must take on, if it is to be true freedom. He seeks to show that genuine human freedom does not consist in doing whatever we please, but involves living with others in accordance with publicly recognized rights and laws. Hegel demonstrates that institutions such as the family and the state provide the context in which individuals can flourish and enjoy full freedom. He also demonstrates that misunderstanding the true nature of freedom can lead to crime, evil, and poverty. His penetrating analysis of the causes of poverty in modern civil society was to be a great influence on Karl Marx. Hegel's study remains one of the most subtle and perceptive accounts of freedom that we possess. This new edition combines a revised translation with a cogent introduction to his work. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more.
This book aims to contribute a single idea – a new way to interpret legal decisions in any field of law and in any capacity of interpreting law through a theory called legal dialects. This theory of the dialectical path of law uses the Hegelian dialectic which compares and contrasts two ideas, showing how they are concurrently the same but separate, without the original ideas losing their inherent and distinctive properties – what in Hegelian terms is referred to as the sublation. To demonstrate this theory, Lincoln takes different aspects of international tax law and corporate law, two fields that seem entirely contradictory, and shows how they are similar without disregarding their key theoretical properties. Primarily focusing on the technical rules of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) approach to international tax law and the United States approach to tax law, Lincoln shows that both engage in the Hegelian dialectical approach to law.
One of the central problems in the history of moral and political philosophy since antiquity has been to explain how human society and its civil institutions came into being. In attempting to solve this problem philosophers developed the idea of natural law, which for many centuries was used to describe the system of fundamental, rational principles presumed universally to govern human behavior in society. By the eighteenth century the doctrine of natural law had engendered the related doctrine of natural rights, which gained reinforcement most famously in the American and French revolutions. According to this view, human society arose through the association of individuals who might have chosen to live alone in scattered isolation and who, in coming together, were regarded as entering into a social contract. In this important early essay, first published in English in this definitive translation in 1975 and now returned to print, Hegel utterly rejects the notion that society is purposely formed by voluntary association. Indeed, he goes further than this, asserting in effect that the laws brought about in various countries in response to force, accident, and deliberation are far more fundamental than any law of nature supposed to be valid always and everywhere. In expounding his view Hegel not only dispenses with the empiricist explanations of Hobbes, Hume, and others but also, at the heart of this work, offers an extended critique of the so-called formalist positions of Kant and Fichte.
One of Hegel’s most controversial and confounding claims is that “the real is rational and the rational is real.” In this book, one of the world’s leading scholars of Hegel, Jean-François Kervégan, offers a thorough analysis and explanation of that claim, along the way delivering a compelling account of modern social, political, and ethical life. ?Kervégan begins with Hegel’s term “objective spirit,” the public manifestation of our deepest commitments, the binding norms that shape our existence as subjects and agents. He examines objective spirit in three realms: the notion of right, the theory of society, and the state. In conversation with Tocqueville and other theorists of democracy, whether in the Anglophone world or in Europe, Kervégan shows how Hegel—often associated with grand metaphysical ideas—actually had a specific conception of civil society and the state. In Hegel’s view, public institutions represent the fulfillment of deep subjective needs—and in that sense, demonstrate that the real is the rational, because what surrounds us is the product of our collective mindedness. This groundbreaking analysis will guide the study of Hegel and nineteenth-century political thought for years to come.