Hedge funds have become important players in the U.S. & global capital markets. These largely unregulated funds use: a variety of complex trading strategies & instruments, in their liberal use of leverage, in their opacity to outsiders, & in their convex compensation structure. These differences can exacerbate market failures associated with agency problems, externalities, & moral hazard. Counterparty credit risk mgmt. (CCRM) practices are the first line of defense against market disruptions with potential systemic consequences. This article examines how the unique nature of hedge funds may generate market failures that make CCRM for exposures to the funds intrinsically more difficult to manage, both for regulated institutions & for policymakers. Ill.
In a recently released New York Fed staff report, we present a forward-looking monitoring program to identify and track time-varying sources of systemic risk.
Master's Thesis from the year 2011 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: 2,0, Berlin School of Economics and Law, language: English, abstract: Over the past decades the architecture of the financial system has undergone a significant change, whereby the alternative investment industry has claimed an ever increasing importance and popularity. Hedge funds have taken the leading role in this development. From a handful of hedge fund managers in the United States (U.S.), hedge funds have been growing to a worldwide business at the forefront of sophisticated financial innovation. Despite their rising success in the alternative investment industry, only a few subjects in the financial world appear to create such diverse opinions as hedge funds do. On the one hand, there are policy makers and academics, which appreciate and highlight hedge funds’ main role in increasing profits and effectively diversifying risks in traditional portfolios. Moreover, Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve System (Fed), stated that hedge funds “have become major contributors to the flexibility of the financial system.” Provided with flexibility and light regulatory oversight, their participation in various markets has been proven important. Especially, due to the provision of liquidity, financial markets have become more efficient but also resilient by absorbing many financial shocks in past years, including the most recent financial crisis. On the other hand, there are also policy makers and academics, who claim that hedge funds are large enough to destabilize markets or even trigger financial crises. A common concern following the near failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 is that one single hedge fund, as a highly leveraged investment pool, can create systemic risk to the worldwide financial system. Such ongoing concern about the vulnerability paired with the tremendous development and opaque nature of hedge funds, emphasize their potential threat to financial stability. Despite the fact that only little is known about these loosely regulated private investment pools, an unstudied reaction to 1998 is to regulate them. Against this background, the aim of this paper is to give the reader a better oversight and understanding of the hedge fund industry by deeply analyzing and discussing their beneficial characteristics but more importantly the issue of how they may be an essential threat to the financial system. Therefore, the paper is split into four main parts. The first part provides the reader with an overall picture of the unfolding of the hedge fund industry from the beginnings...
Until about twenty years ago, the consensus view on the cause of financial-system distress was fairly simple: a run on one bank could easily turn to a panic involving runs on all banks, destroying some and disrupting the financial system. Since then, however, a series of events—such as emerging-market debt crises, bond-market meltdowns, and the Long-Term Capital Management episode—has forced a rethinking of the risks facing financial institutions and the tools available to measure and manage these risks. The Risks of Financial Institutions examines the various risks affecting financial institutions and explores a variety of methods to help institutions and regulators more accurately measure and forecast risk. The contributors--from academic institutions, regulatory organizations, and banking--bring a wide range of perspectives and experience to the issue. The result is a volume that points a way forward to greater financial stability and better risk management of financial institutions.
This paper discusses the impact of the rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in the financial sector. It highlights the benefits these technologies bring in terms of financial deepening and efficiency, while raising concerns about its potential in widening the digital divide between advanced and developing economies. The paper advances the discussion on the impact of this technology by distilling and categorizing the unique risks that it could pose to the integrity and stability of the financial system, policy challenges, and potential regulatory approaches. The evolving nature of this technology and its application in finance means that the full extent of its strengths and weaknesses is yet to be fully understood. Given the risk of unexpected pitfalls, countries will need to strengthen prudential oversight.
The recent global financial crisis has forced a re-examination of risk transmission in the financial sector and how it affects financial stability. Current macroprudential policy and surveillance (MPS) efforts are aimed establishing a regulatory framework that helps mitigate the risk from systemic linkages with a view towards enhancing the resilience of the financial sector. This paper presents a forward-looking framework ("Systemic CCA") to measure systemic solvency risk based on market-implied expected losses of financial institutions with practical applications for the financial sector risk management and the system-wide capital assessment in top-down stress testing. The suggested approach uses advanced contingent claims analysis (CCA) to generate aggregate estimates of the joint default risk of multiple institutions as a conditional tail expectation using multivariate extreme value theory (EVT). In addition, the framework also helps quantify the individual contributions to systemic risk and contingent liabilities of the financial sector during times of stress.
The events of the past six months have demonstrated the fragility of the global financial system and raised fundamental questions about the effectiveness of the response by private and public sector institutions. the report assesses the vulnerabilities that the system is facing and offers tentative conclusions and policy lessons. the report reflects information available up to March 21, 2008.
This book presents the Clarendon Lectures in Finance by one of the leading exponents of financial booms and crises. Hyun Song Shin's work has shed light on the global financial crisis and he has been a central figure in the policy debates. The paradox of the global financial crisis is that it erupted in an era when risk management was at the core of the management of the most sophisticated financial institutions. This book explains why. The severity of the crisis is explained by financial development that put marketable assets at the heart of the financial system, and the increased sophistication of financial institutions that held and traded the assets. Step by step, the lectures build an analytical framework that take the reader through the economics behind the fluctuations in the price of risk and the boom-bust dynamics that follow. The book examines the role played by market-to-market accounting rules and securitisation in amplifying the crisis, and draws lessons for financial architecture, financial regulation and monetary policy. This book will be of interest to all serious students of economics and finance who want to delve beneath the outward manifestations to grasp the underlying dynamics of the boom-bust cycle in a modern financial system - a system where banking and capital market developments have become inseparable.
This publication serves as a roadmap for exploring and managing climate risk in the U.S. financial system. It is the first major climate publication by a U.S. financial regulator. The central message is that U.S. financial regulators must recognize that climate change poses serious emerging risks to the U.S. financial system, and they should move urgently and decisively to measure, understand, and address these risks. Achieving this goal calls for strengthening regulators’ capabilities, expertise, and data and tools to better monitor, analyze, and quantify climate risks. It calls for working closely with the private sector to ensure that financial institutions and market participants do the same. And it calls for policy and regulatory choices that are flexible, open-ended, and adaptable to new information about climate change and its risks, based on close and iterative dialogue with the private sector. At the same time, the financial community should not simply be reactive—it should provide solutions. Regulators should recognize that the financial system can itself be a catalyst for investments that accelerate economic resilience and the transition to a net-zero emissions economy. Financial innovations, in the form of new financial products, services, and technologies, can help the U.S. economy better manage climate risk and help channel more capital into technologies essential for the transition. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5247742
We analyze how bank profitability impacts financial stability from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We first develop a theoretical model of the relationship between bank profitability and financial stability by exploring the role of non-interest income and retail-oriented business models. We then conduct panel regression analysis to examine the empirical determinants of bank risks and profitability, and how the level and the source of bank profitability affect risks for 431 publicly traded banks (U.S., advanced Europe, and GSIBs) from 2004 to 2017. Results reveal that profitability is negatively associated with both a bank’s contribution to systemic risk and its idiosyncratic risk, and an over-reliance on non-interest income, wholesale funding and leverage is associated with higher risks. Low competition is associated with low idiosyncratic risk but a high contribution to systemic risk. Lastly, the problem loans ratio and the cost-to-income ratio are found to be key factors that influence bank profitability. The paper’s findings suggest that policy makers should strive to better understand the source of bank profitability, especially where there is an over-reliance on market-based non-interest income, leverage, and wholesale funding.
