This book analyses the European Court of Justice's power from a political-science perspective. It argues that this power can be assessed through studying the policy implications of there being a supranational constitution that was drafted as an international treaty. An international treaty contains a set of policy goals for future cooperation. Direct effect and supremacy give constitutional status to these policy goals, allowing the Court to develop the Treaty's implications for policymaking at the European and the member-state levels. By focusing on the four freedoms (of goods, services, persons, and capital) and citizenship rights, the book analyses the implications of case law for policymaking in different case studies. It shows how major EU legislation (for instance, the Services and Citizenship Directives) are significantly influenced by case law and how controversial policies, such as EU citizens' access to tax-financed social benefits, are closely linked to the Court.
Whereas individual Member State governments of the European Union occasionally complain about judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), especially when those judgments curtail that State's policy autonomy in a sensitive domain, the collectivity of the Member State governments have agreed in each treaty revision so far to confirm and extend the far-reaching powers which the ECJ possesses for enforcing EU law. The explanation of the paradox can only be that, deep down, the Member States of the EU remain convinced that an effective ECJ with strong enforcement powers is one of the salient features of EU law which have stood the test of time and feel no inclination to clip the wings of the ECJ for fear that this would affect the effectiveness of the European integration process. Nevertheless, the grumblings about single judgments, or about the consistency and direction of the ECJ in particular policy fields, have never ceased and indeed have become more audible in recent years. This book - now available in paperback - deals with the perception that the ECJ quite often does not leave sufficient autonomy to the Member States in developing their own legal and policy choices in areas where European and national competences overlap.
This book revisits, in a new light, some of the classic cases which constitute the foundations of the EU legal order and is timed to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaty establishing a European Economic Community. Its broader purpose, however, is to discuss the future of the EU legal order by examining, from a variety of different perspectives, the most important judgments of the ECJ which established the foundations of the EU legal order. The tone is neither necessarily celebratory nor critical, but relies on the viewpoint of the distinguished line-up of contributors - drawn from among former and current members of the Court (the view from within), scholars from other disciplines or lawyers from other legal orders (the view from outside), and two different generations of EU legal scholars (the classics revisit the classics and a view from the future). Each of these groups will provide a different perspective on the same set of selected judgments. In each short essay, questions such as 'what would have EU law been without this judgment of the Court? what factors might have influenced it?; did the judgment create expectations which were not fully fulfilled?' and so on, are posed and answered. The result is a profound, wide-ranging and fresh examination of the 'founding cases' of EU law.
The present book offers the reader insight into how the Court of Justice of the European Communities justifies its interpretations of the European legal rules on international jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. Our examination of the more than one hundred decisions which the Court has delivered under the 1968 Brussels Convention shows that the Court uses the principles, which in its opinion underlie the explicit rules, as reasons to justify its decisions. These principles are described in the book and it is shown how they relate to each other. The system of principles that has been identified in this study forms an important part of the Brussels Convention’s legacy for the new Regulation No. 44/2001, which replaced the Convention on March 1, 2002. It constitutes a catalogue of arguments that will be employed by the Court to justify its interpretation of the provisions of the new regulation. As such, this book will be of great value to practitioners in international law as well as to academics and students alike. Jannet A. Pontier (Ph.D.) Edwige Burg (Ph.D.) Professor of Law Lecturer and researcher Department of Private International Law Department of Private International Law Senior Research Associate at the Research Associate at the Amsterdam Institute for Private Law Amsterdam Institute for Private Law University of Amsterdam University of Amsterdam Amsterdam, The Netherlands, January 2004 VII TABLE OF CONTENTS
This volume offers a critical inquiry into the ever-evolving notion of cultural heritage and the way it has been made accessible, governed, and protected by the institutional, operational, and legal structures of the European Union.
One of the most noted developments in international law over the past twenty years is the proliferation of international courts and tribunals. They decide who has the right to exploit natural resources, define the scope of human rights, delimit international boundaries and determine when the use of force is prohibited. As the number and influence of international courts grow, so too do challenges to their legitimacy. This volume provides new interdisciplinary insights into international courts' legitimacy: what drives and undermines the legitimacy of these bodies? How do drivers change depending on the court concerned? What is the link between legitimacy, democracy, effectiveness and justice? Top international experts analyse legitimacy for specific international courts, as well as the links between legitimacy and cross-cutting themes. Failure to understand and respond to legitimacy concerns can endanger both the courts and the law they interpret and apply.
For international lawyers, the European rules on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters are of great practical importance. Since March 2002, these rules have been laid down in an EU Regulation (44/2001) which essentially replaced the 1968 Brussels Convention. The preliminary considerations to the Regulation imply that the decisions in which the Court of Justice of the EC has interpreted the Brussels Convention remain relevant for the interpretation of the Regulation. Hence, in order to have a thorough understanding of the Regulation, an in-depth knowledge of the EC Court’s case law regarding the Brussels Convention is imperative. The present study is based on an analysis of more than one hundred decisions that the Court has delivered under the Brussels Convention. It appears that the significance of the Court’s case law lies not only in the final outcome of these decisions, but also in the principles that the Court consistently refers to in arriving at its decisions. The authors piece together the system of principles that has become apparent in the Court’s reasoning. An understanding of this system not only sheds light on how and why the Court has reached its past decisions, but it also enables lawyers to understand the confines within which the Court’s argumentation is likely to take place in future cases under the Regulation. A publication which focuses on the principles used by the Court to justify its decisions in this particular area of law, has been lacking. This book aims to fill that gap. Its value extends beyond the academic realm and into the field of legal practice.
An important provision of the European Convention on Human Rights is that in the event of a violation being found, not only is the state in question required to redress the consequences of the violation vis-á-vis the applicant - by such means as reopening of proceedings at the origin of the violation, reversal of a judicial verdict, discontinuation of expulsion proceedings or, where necessary, payment of a monetary award to the applicant; but it must also take general measures to prevent the repetition of the violation. These latter measures may take the form, for example, of a change in legislation, recognition of the Court's judgment in national case-law, the appointment of extra judges or magistrates to absorb a backlog of cases, the construction of detention centres suitable for juvenile delinquents, the introduction of training for the police, or other similar steps. This second edition continues to examine both individual measures and general measures taken by states in accordance with the Court's judgments and with the supervisory proceedings of the Committee of Ministers, as published in its human rights (DH) resolutions.