Academic research shows that well-known principal-agent and capital market problems are strongly influenced by tax considerations. Against this background, this volume is the first to present a fully-fledged overview of the interdependence of tax and corporate governance. Not only the basic political, legal and economic questions but also major topics like income measurement, shareholding structures, corporate social responsibility and tax shelter disclosure are covered.
There is a widespread concern that, in some parts of the world, governments are unable to exercise effective authority. When governments fail, more sinister forces thrive: warlords, arms smugglers, narcotics enterprises, kidnap gangs, terrorist networks, armed militias. Why do governments fail? This book explores an old idea that has returned to prominence: that authority, effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness is closely related to the ways in which governments are financed. It matters that governments tax their citizens rather than live from oil revenues and foreign aid, and it matters how they tax them. Taxation stimulates demands for representation, and an effective revenue authority is the central pillar of state capacity. Using case studies from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, this book presents and evaluates these arguments, updates theories derived from European history in the light of conditions in contemporary poorer countries, and draws conclusions for policy-makers.
Academic Paper from the year 2018 in the subject Law - Tax / Fiscal Law, grade: 3.5, University of Nigeria, language: English, abstract: In Nigeria, the need to improve voluntary payment of taxes or voluntary tax compliance has resulted in the various tax reform attempts by various successive governments. Suffice to mention that these reforms have not been able to stimulate the expected increase in tax revenue over the years, and this has snowballed into an unarguable tax gap as revealed in the share of income taxes in total revenue profile of the country. This poor tax compliance behavior often referred to in the literature as the “compliance puzzle” is a challenging experience across countries but suspected to be more critical in developing economies. In modeling tax compliance, the answer under the traditional theory of compliance is fear of detection and punishment. However, this model has been found to be inadequate in explaining the motives and intentions for tax compliance. The argument is that tax compliance may be subdivided into compliance resulting from enforcements or influence of tax authorities and voluntary compliance. This leads to a logical question which interestingly extends the compliance issue; what would lead citizens to behave more honestly, provide correct information and improve the tax compliance rate voluntarily? One answer to this question is the existence of an intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, which have been sometimes called, “tax morale”. Tax morale has evolved as an instrumental component in understanding voluntary tax compliance using a more integrated approach with a bias for non-economic factors. This study argues that the citizens’ perception of government accountability is an instrumental factor that shapes the emergence and maintenance of tax morale resulting in voluntary tax compliance. The underlining framework is that there is a social contract that defines the relationship between the government and the governed.
Widespread voluntary tax compliance plays a significant role in countries’ efforts to raise the revenues necessary to achieve Sustainable Development Goals. As part of this process, governments are increasingly reaching out to taxpayers – current and future – to teach, communicate and assist them in order to foster a “culture of compliance” based on rights and responsibilities, in which citizens see paying taxes as an integral aspect of their relationship with their government.
Academic Paper from the year 2016 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, language: English, abstract: The significance of good governance in ensuring effective tax administration in the public sector and enhancing tax collection is an undeniable fact that is generally accepted. Yet, there is scanty empirical evidence on the actual application of the principles of good governance in the structure and operation of public sector institutions and its outcome, particularly in the tax administration system. Hence, purpose of this study is to investigate the measures taken to institutionalize the principles of good governance within the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority (ERCA). More specifically, the study assessed the level of conceptual understanding and commitment to the principles of good governance, measures taken to create ownership of the principles; the extent to which the ERCA put in place organizational policies, standards, strategies and structures to institutionalize good governance, and measures taken to improve human resource capacity to implement the principles of good governance. In terms of scope, the study focuses on the assessment and collection of taxes from category "C" taxpayers in selected sub-city branches of the ERCA. The research is essentially a case study that uses quantitative and qualitative data gathered from primary and secondary sources to inform its findings. The bulk of the data for this study was generated from primary sources namely, the leadership and staff of the ERCA and category 'c' taxpayers as clients of the Authority. The study accessed these informants through key informant interviews, knowledge, attitude and perception (KAP) questionnaires and survey questionnaires. The research also utilized secondary sources in the form of documentation on the activities of the ERCA. Secondary data was gathered from both print and electronic sources including academic literature, laws and policies, organizational d
[Valerie] Braithwaite merges her considerable knowledge of a wide range of disciplines to produce an exemplar of interdisciplinary research. The use of the taxation system as the basis for analysis of how people manage their relationship with authority is effective and produces a much-needed addition to the behavioural literature. While the book is primarily about defiance in taxation, many instances of non-taxation related defiance are included, which provides excellent support and extension of the tax-based arguments. Braithwaite has produced an excellent example of a book that is grounded in the extant literature, while expanding our understanding of the importance of understanding the behaviours that drive defiance. The aim of the book is to show how authorities can live symbiotically with defiance and she achieves this superbly, illustrating how improved satisfaction with the process can minimise defiance. Lisa Marriott, Pacific Accounting Review This innovative book presents a theory of tax defiance, integrating five years of research on people s hopes, fears and expectations of the tax system and the authority that administers it. Valerie Braithwaite makes a major contribution to regulatory theory by mapping the psychological processes of defiance. At the heart of the analysis is the concept of motivational posturing signals sent to indicate how favourably an authority is viewed and readiness to defer to an authority's demands. The author explains how resistant defiance expresses disapproval of the way an authority operates and signals to government the need to improve performance to win back public confidence. Resistance weakens as the authority claws back its institutional integrity. Dismissive defiance, on the other hand, is challenging and undermining, and is not so responsive. The book argues for institutional reforms that are both mindful of grievance and of alternative authorities that challenge power. It illustrates that in delivering institutional reform, commitment to democratic principles and integrity of government will enable authorities to argue their case for community co-operation where appropriate. Finally, the book goes on to show that power sharing is likely to be a more apt remedy when dismissive defiance is entrenched. Safeguarding these deliberations in mature democracies are moral obligation and social capital, both of which are likely to erode when authorities show neither justice nor wisdom in handling defiance. This unique and innovative example of how psychology can be integrated into new institutional theory and public policy practice will prove an interesting read for scholars, students and researchers in the fields of regulatory studies, economics, public policy and public finance, politics and psychology.
This report is the ninth edition of the OECD's Tax Administration Series. It provides internationally comparative data on aspects of tax systems and their administration in 59 advanced and emerging economies.
This project, based on the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) data set, researched how PEFA can be used to shape policy development in public financial management (PFM) and other major relevant policy areas such as anticorruption, revenue mobilization, political economy analysis, and fragile states. The report explores what shapes the PFM system in low- and middle-income countries by examining the relationship between political institutions and the quality of the PFM system. Although the report finds some evidence that multiple political parties in control of the legislature is associated with better PFM performance, the report finds the need to further refine and test the theories on the relationship between political institutions and PFM. The report addresses the question of the outcomes of PFM systems, distinguishing between fragile and nonfragile states. It finds that better PFM performance is associated with more reliable budgets in terms of expenditure composition in fragile states, but not aggregate budget credibility. Moreover, in contrast to existing studies, it finds no evidence that PFM quality matters for deficit and debt ratios, irrespective of whether a country is fragile or not. The report also explores the relationship between perceptions of corruption and PFM performance. It finds strong evidence of a relationship between better PFM performance and improvements in perceptions of corruption. It also finds that PFM reforms associated with better controls have a stronger relationship with improvements in perceptions of corruption compared to PFM reforms associated with more transparency. The last chapter looks at the relationship between PEFA indicators for revenue administration and domestic resource mobilization. It focuses on the credible use of penalties for noncompliance as a proxy for the type of political commitment required to improve tax performance. The analysis shows that countries that credibly enforce penalties for noncompliance collect more taxes on average.
