En beskrivelse og vurdering af den tyske strategi overfor Sovjetunionen 1939-1941 herunder den tyske generalstabs (OKW) planlægning af "Operation BARBAROSSA."
On June 22, 1941, just less than two years after signing the Nazi-Soviet Agreements, Adolf Hitler's German army invaded the Soviet Union. The attack hardly came as a surprise to Josef Stalin; in fact, history has long held that Stalin spent the two intervening years building up his defenses against a Nazi attack. With the gradual declassifying of former Soviet documents, though, historians are learning more and more about Stalin's grand plan during the years 1939-1941. Longtime Soviet expert Albert L. Weeks has studied the newly-released information and come to a different conclusion about the Soviet Union's pre-war buildup_it was not precaution against German invasion at all. In fact, Weeks argues, the evidence now suggests Soviet mobilization was aimed at an eventual invasion of Nazi Germany. The Soviets were quietly biding their time between 1939 and 1941, allowing the capitalist powers to destroy one another, all the while preparing for their own Westward march. Stalin, Weeks shows, wasn't waiting for a Nazi attack_Hitler simply beat him to the punch.
19. Bartow, O.: A View from Below: Survival, Cohesion, and Brutality on the Eastern Front. Part IV: Soviet Politics and War Strategy, 1941. 20. Gorodetsky, G.: Stalin and Hitler's Attack on the Soviet Union. 21. Hoffmann, J.: The Soviet Union's Offensive Preparations in 1941. 22. Kirshin, Y.Y.: The Soviet Armed Forces on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War. 23. Bonwetsch, B.: The Purge of the Military and the Red Army's Operational Capability during the "Great Patriotic War". 24. Chor'kov, A, G.: The Red Army during the Initial Phase of the Great Patriotic War. 25. Harrison, M.: "Barbarossa": The Soviet Response, 1941. 26. Pinkus, B.: The Deportation of the German Minority in the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. 27. Volkogonow, D.A.: Stalin as Supreme Commander. Part V: Germany and the Soviet Union in International Politics. 28. Schönherr, K.: Neutrality, "Non-belligerence", or War: Turkey and the European Powers' Conflict of Interests, 1939-1941. 29. Petracchi, G.: Pinocchio, the Cat, and the Fox: Italy between Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941. 30. Menger, M.: Germany and the Finnish "Separate War" against the Soviet Union. 31. Krebs, G.: Japan and the German-Soviet War, 1941. 32. Kimball, W.F.: "They don't come out where you expect": Roosevelt Reacts to the German-Soviet War. 33. Kettenacker, L.: Great Britain and the German Attack on the Soviet Union. 34. Bourgeois, D: Operation "Barbarossa" and Switzerland. 35. Wegner, B.: Facing the Global War: Germany's strategic Dilemma after the Failure of "Blitzkrieg".
On 22 June 1941 Hilter unleashed his forces on the Soviet Union. Spearheaded by four powerful Panzer groups and protected by an impenetrable curtain of air support, the seemingly invincible Wehrmacht advanced from the Soviet Union's western borders to the immediate outskirts of Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov in the shockingly brief period of less than six months. The sudden, deep, relentless German advance virtually destroyed the entire peacetime Red Army and captured almost 40 percent of European Russia before expiring inexplicably at the gates of Moscow and Leningrad. An invasion designed to achieve victory in three to six weeks failed and, four years later, resulted in unprecendented and total German defeat. David Glantz challenges the time-honoured explanation that poor weather, bad terrain and Hitler's faulty strategic judgement produced German defeat, and reveals how the Red Army thwarted the German Army's dramatic and apparently inexorable invasion before it achieved its ambitious goals.
On June 22, 1941, Germany launched the greatest land assault in history on the Soviet Union, an attack that Adolf Hitler deemed crucial to ensure German economic and political survival. As the key theater of the war for the Germans, the eastern front consumed enormous levels of resources and accounted for 75 percent of all German casualties. Despite the significance of this campaign to Germany and to the war as a whole, few English-language publications of the last thirty-five years have addressed these pivotal events. In Ostkrieg: Hitler's War of Extermination in the East, Stephen G. Fritz bridges the gap in scholarship by incorporating historical research from the last several decades into an accessible, comprehensive, and coherent narrative. His analysis of the Russo-German War from a German perspective covers all aspects of the eastern front, demonstrating the interrelation of military events, economic policy, resource exploitation, and racial policy that first motivated the invasion. This in-depth account challenges accepted notions about World War II and promotes greater understanding of a topic that has been neglected by historians.
Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West, including combat records of early engagements, David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns - and both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides a complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany.
This study examines the determinants and character of German policies toward the Soviet non-Russian nationalities and their effects on the Soviet and German war efforts and on the nationalities themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on the analysis of the nature and magnitude of military collaboration with the Germans by the non-Russian nationalities, in an attempt to examine the military exploitability of the political warfare opportunities that presented themselves. Section II outlines the attitudes toward the Soviet nationalities prevalent among the Nazi leadership and the role envisaged for them in a postwar German-dominated Europe, and juxtaposes them on the views of German officials who did not share Nazi dogma and advocated a more pragmatic approach. German policies in the occupied non-Russian territories and their implications are examined in Sec. III. Section IV describes the different types and degrees of military collaboration with the Germans. The main conclusions are summarized in Sec. V.
An account of the early years of World War II based on extensive new research: “A genuinely fresh approach . . . exceptional” (The Wall Street Journal). James Holland, one of the leading young historians of World War II, has spent over a decade conducting new research, interviewing survivors, and exploring archives that have never before been so accessible to unearth forgotten memoirs, letters, and official records. In The Rise of Germany 1938–1941, Holland draws on this research to reconsider the strategy, tactics, and economic, political, and social aspects of the war. The Rise of Germany is a masterful book that redefines our understanding of the opening years of World War II. Beginning with the lead-up to the outbreak of war in 1939 and ending in the middle of 1941 on the eve of Operation Barbarossa, the Nazi invasion of Russia, this book is a landmark history of the war on land, in the air, and at sea. “Magnificent.” —Andrew Roberts, New York Times–bestselling author of The Storm of War
History remembers the Soviets and the Nazis as bitter enemies and ideological rivals, the two mammoth and opposing totalitarian regimes of World War II whose conflict would be the defining and deciding clash of the war. Yet for nearly a third of the conflict's entire timespan, Hitler and Stalin stood side by side as partners. The Pact that they agreed had a profound -- and bloody -- impact on Europe, and is fundamental to understanding the development and denouement of the war. In The Devils' Alliance, acclaimed historian Roger Moorhouse explores the causes and implications of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, an unholy covenant whose creation and dissolution were crucial turning points in World War II. Forged by the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and his Soviet counterpart, Vyacheslav Molotov, the nonaggression treaty briefly united the two powers in a brutally efficient collaboration. Together, the Germans and Soviets quickly conquered and divided central and eastern Europe -- Poland, the Baltic States, Finland, and Bessarabia -- and the human cost was staggering: during the two years of the pact hundreds of thousands of people in central and eastern Europe caught between Hitler and Stalin were expropriated, deported, or killed. Fortunately for the Allies, the partnership ultimately soured, resulting in the surprise June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union. Ironically, however, the powers' exchange of materiel, blueprints, and technological expertise during the period of the Pact made possible a far more bloody and protracted war than would have otherwise been conceivable. Combining comprehensive research with a gripping narrative, The Devils' Alliance is the authoritative history of the Nazi-Soviet Pact -- and a portrait of the people whose lives were irrevocably altered by Hitler and Stalin's nefarious collaboration.