In today's environment of rapidly evolving conflicts, the Army's goal is to have units that have the combat power of heavy units but that can be transported anywhere in the world in a matter of days. To address concerns about the armored vehicle fleet's aging and the difficulties involved in transporting it as well as to equip the Army more suitably to conduct operations overseas on short notice using forces based in the United States the service created the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program in 2000. A major modernization effort, the program is designed in part to develop and purchase vehicles to replace those now in the heavy forces; the new vehicles would be much lighter, thereby easing the deployment of units equipped with them. In the analysis presented in this report, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined the current status of the Army's fleet of armored vehicles and assessed the speed of deployment of the service's heavy forces. It also evaluated the FCS program, considering the program's costs as well as its advantages and disadvantages and comparing it with several alternative plans for modernizing the Army's heavy forces.
To become a more responsive and dominant combat force, the U.S. Army is changing its strategy from bigger and stronger weapons to faster and more agile ones. The Future Combat Systems (FCS) -- which the Army calls the ¿greatest technology and integration challenge ever undertaken¿ -- is expected to meet the Army¿s transformational objectives. For FCS¿ first developmental increment, the Army has set aside a 5-1/2-year timetable from program start (May 2003) until the initial production decision (Nov. 2008). This testimony is about FCS¿ key features, whether the program carries any risks, and, if so, whether there are alternatives for developing FCS capabilities with fewer risks. Illustrations.
Since 2003, the Future Combat System (FCS) program has been the centerpiece of the Army¿s efforts to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. In 2009, however, concerns over the program¿s performance led to the Secretary of Defense¿s decision to significantly restructure and ultimately cancel the program. As a result, the Army has outlined a new approach to ground force modernization. This report: (1) outlines the Army¿s preliminary post-FCS plans; and (2) identifies the challenges and opportunities the DoD and the Army must address as they proceed with Army ground force modernization efforts. The report evaluated FCS equipment, and interviewed DoD and Army officials. Includes recommendations. Illustrations.
This book provides an authoritative account of how the US, British, and French armies have transformed since the end of the Cold War. All three armies have sought to respond to changes in their strategic and socio-technological environments by developing more expeditionary capable and networked forces. Drawing on extensive archival research, hundreds of interviews, and unprecedented access to official documents, the authors examine both the process and the outcomes of army transformation, and ask how organizational interests, emerging ideas, and key entrepreneurial leaders interact in shaping the direction of military change. They also explore how programs of army transformation change over time, as new technologies moved from research to development, and as lessons from operations were absorbed. In framing these issues, they draw on military innovation scholarship and, in addressing them, produce findings with general relevance for the study of how militaries innovate.
The Future Combat System (FCS) program -- which comprises 14 integrated weapon systems and an advanced information network -- is the centerpiece of the Army¿s effort to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. This report includes an examination of: (1) how the definition, development, and demonstration of FCS capabilities are proceeding, particularly in light of the go/no-go decision scheduled for 2009; (2) the Army¿s plans for making production commitments for FCS and any risks related to the completion of development; and (3) the estimated costs for developing and producing FCS. Includes recommendations. Tables and figures.