Game Theory, Two-player Animal Contests, Evolutionary Stable Strategies, and Evolution
Author: John Calhoun Zajac
Publisher:
Published: 1984
Total Pages: 596
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKRead and Download eBook Full
Author: John Calhoun Zajac
Publisher:
Published: 1984
Total Pages: 596
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: John Maynard Smith
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 1982-10-21
Total Pages: 244
ISBN-13: 9780521288842
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis 1982 book is an account of an alternative way of thinking about evolution and the theory of games.
Author: Jörgen W. Weibull
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 1997
Total Pages: 292
ISBN-13: 9780262731218
DOWNLOAD EBOOKIntroduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries. Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field. Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.
Author: Steven N. Durlauf
Publisher: Springer
Published: 2016-07-14
Total Pages: 391
ISBN-13: 0230280846
DOWNLOAD EBOOKSpecially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
Author: American Mathematical Society. Short Course
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
Published: 2011-10-27
Total Pages: 186
ISBN-13: 0821853260
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents (for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data packets over the Internet). While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system, attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision rules.
Author: Robert Axelrod
Publisher: Basic Books
Published: 2009-04-29
Total Pages: 258
ISBN-13: 0786734884
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Author: Tamer Basar
Publisher:
Published: 19??
Total Pages:
ISBN-13: 9783319273358
DOWNLOAD EBOOKRésumé : "This will be a two-part handbook on Dynamic Game Theory and part of the Springer Reference program. Part I will be on the fundamentals and theory of dynamic games. It will serve as a quick reference and a source of detailed exposure to topics in dynamic games for a broad community of researchers, educators, practitioners, and students. Each topic will be covered in 2-3 chapters with one introducing basic theory and the other one or two covering recent advances and/or special topics. Part II will be on applications in fields such as economics, management science, engineering, biology, and the social sciences."
Author: John Maynard Smith
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 1993-07-30
Total Pages: 380
ISBN-13: 9780521451284
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA century ago Darwin and Wallace explained how evolution could have happened in terms of processes known to take place today. This book describes how their theory has been confirmed, but at the same time "transformed", by recent research.
Author: John M. McNamara
Publisher:
Published: 2020
Total Pages: 353
ISBN-13: 0198815778
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis novel reassessment of the field presents the central concepts in evolutionary game theory and provides an authoritative and up-to-date account. The focus is on concepts that are important for biologists in their attempts to explain observations. This strong connection between concepts and applications is a recurrent theme throughout the book.
Author: Larry Samuelson
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 1997
Total Pages: 332
ISBN-13: 9780262692199
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.