Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction focuses on the development of game theory, taking into consideration empirical research, theoretical formulations, and research procedures involved. The book proceeds with a discussion on the theory of one-person games. The individual decision that a player makes in these kinds of games is noted as influential as to the outcome of these games. This discussion is followed by a presentation of pure coordination games and minimal situation. The ability of players to anticipate the choices of others to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome is emphasized. A favorable social situation is also influential in these kinds of games. The text moves forward by presenting studies on various kinds of competitive games. The research studies presented are coupled with empirical evidence and discussion designed to support the claims that are pointed out. The book also discusses several kinds of approaches in the study of games. Voting as a way to resolve multi-person games is also emphasized, including voting procedures, the preferences of voters, and voting strategies. The book is a valuable source of data for readers and scholars who are interested in the exploration of game theories.
The mathematical study of games is an intriguing endeavor with implications and applications that reach far beyond tic-tac-toe, chess, and poker to economics, business, and even biology and politics. Most texts on the subject, however, are written at the graduate level for those with strong mathematics, economics, or business backgrounds. In
This book both summarizes the basic theory of evolutionary games and explains their developing applications, giving special attention to the 2-player, 2-strategy game. This game, usually termed a "2×2 game” in the jargon, has been deemed most important because it makes it possible to posit an archetype framework that can be extended to various applications for engineering, the social sciences, and even pure science fields spanning theoretical biology, physics, economics, politics, and information science. The 2×2 game is in fact one of the hottest issues in the field of statistical physics. The book first shows how the fundamental theory of the 2×2 game, based on so-called replicator dynamics, highlights its potential relation with nonlinear dynamical systems. This analytical approach implies that there is a gap between theoretical and reality-based prognoses observed in social systems of humans as well as in those of animal species. The book explains that this perceived gap is the result of an underlying reciprocity mechanism called social viscosity. As a second major point, the book puts a sharp focus on network reciprocity, one of the five fundamental mechanisms for adding social viscosity to a system and one that has been a great concern for study by statistical physicists in the past decade. The book explains how network reciprocity works for emerging cooperation, and readers can clearly understand the existence of substantial mechanics when the term "network reciprocity" is used. In the latter part of the book, readers will find several interesting examples in which evolutionary game theory is applied. One such example is traffic flow analysis. Traffic flow is one of the subjects that fluid dynamics can deal with, although flowing objects do not comprise a pure fluid but, rather, are a set of many particles. Applying the framework of evolutionary games to realistic traffic flows, the book reveals that social dilemma structures lie behind traffic flow.
Andrew Coleman provides an accessible introduction to the fundamentals of mathematical gaming and other major applications in social psychology, decision theory, economics, politics, evolutionary biology, philosophy, operational research and sociology.
This is an introduction to game theory and applications with an emphasis on self-discovery from the perspective of a mathematical modeller. The book deals in a unified manner with the central concepts of both classical and evolutionary game theory. The key ideas are illustrated throughout by a wide variety of well-chosen examples of both human and non-human behavior, including car pooling, price fixing, food sharing, sex allocation and competition for territories or oviposition sites. There are numerous exercises with solutions.
The main purpose of this book is to introduce a theory of solutions for the n-person cooperative game through the simple case with 3-persons. It is intended to give the necessary background for readers, students and researchers in the quantitative and social sciences to enhance their theories and approaches with basic mathematical tools applied and developed for game theory analysis within a systems perspective. Von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced the theory of games as the "proper instrument with which to develop a theory of economic behavior". The snowballing development of game theory and its applications, in the last seventy years, has proven to be not only the proper instrument to develop a theory of economic behavior but the appropriate one for developing the theories for different types of interactive behavior as studied in political, social, environmental, biological, economic and behavioral sciences. Modeling examples of such applications are presented throughout the book.
Addressing the controversial concept of the invisible hand, this book questions, examines and explicates the strengths and weaknesses of the concept by analyzing its paradigmatic examples such as Carl Menger's Origin of Money and Thomas Schelling's famous checkerboard model of residential segregation.