From Theater Missile Defense to Antimissile Offensive Actions
From Theater Missile Defense to Antimissile Offensive Actions

Author: Merrick E. Krause

Publisher:

Published: 1999

Total Pages: 92

ISBN-13:

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This study examines the question: What strategic approach should the USAF take toward Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and Anti-Missile Offensive Actions in the near-term? The thesis begins with an introductory chapter asking the stated question in context, presenting the methodology used, and summarizing the proposals given at the end of the treatment. The methodological approach to this thesis involves historical and literature reviews, interviews, and a qualitative comparison of current and proposed weapons systems, capabilities, and doctrine. Broad strategic options, not specific tactical systems, are the focus of this study. The second chapter reviews milestones of missile and anti-missile, diplomatic, and political history to establish a basis for how we arrived at the present situation. Next, the third chapter reviews the current theater ballistic missile (TBM) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat situation. Also, an overview of contemporary political and military reasoning is presented to provide a baseline of support for the critical need of an integrated joint and multi-layered TMD. The fourth chapter compares current and near-term Anti-Missile systems and programs, identifies a near-term Anti-Missile Capabilities Gap, and distills the plethora of situational information to four succinct implications. Finally, the last chapter provides and analyzes four proposals for possible actions that the USAF can take to answer the thesis question while taking into account the implications of the current and near-term TBM situation. Overall, this thesis recommends a philosophical shift to one in which USAF near-term Attack Operations (AO) and BMC4I integration are considered as part of an air and space power Anti-Missile Offensive Counterair effort, not simply an adjunct to a ground-force driven TMD paradigm.

Centralized Control of Space
Centralized Control of Space

Author: Ricky B. Kelly

Publisher:

Published: 1993

Total Pages: 64

ISBN-13:

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"The purpose of this paper is to determine to what extent and how the Joint Force Commander (JFC) should control support from space forces. Current Air Force doctrine, as delineated in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, identifies the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) as being responsible for both air and space for the theater. This statement follows the Air Force notion that air and space are an indivisible medium of warfare. On the other hand, Joint Pub 3-14 states the Operations Directorate, J-3, on the supported commander's (the JFC's) staff functions in this role. To examine this issue of in-theater control of space forces more closely, this study is divided into five chapters. Following the Introduction, Chapter 2 looks into how space forces were planned for and employed during Desert Storm. This chapter discusses who was in-charge and what planning processes were used. In Chapter 3, lessons and initiatives to improve planning and employment of support from space forces are discussed. Chapter 4 explores the possible need to have one individual in-theater clearly identified as being responsible for directing space forces. Centralized control, similar to air, may have beneficial effects that allow joint commanders to take better advantage of space forces' full potential. The study concludes by offering recommendations."--Abstract.

Eliminating the Rhetoric
Eliminating the Rhetoric

Author: Mark C. Nowland

Publisher:

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 100

ISBN-13:

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"The purpose of this study is to identify criteria that will provide objective analysis of a Halt Phase strategy. The study identifies the key criteria by examining air combat in three operations: the Battle of Bismarck Sea, the 1973 Golan Heights battles of the Yom Kippur War, and finally the Iraqi Republican Guard "escape" from Basra. The examination focuses on air operations looking for tactics, tactical innovations, and operational circumstances that inhibit or enhance air operations designed to halt the advance or retreat of significant ground formations. The study evaluates each case in three major phases: pre-hostility preparation, conduct of combat operations and finally the results and analysis of the operation. Pre-hostility operations specifically examine the doctrine, organization, equipment and technology, and the training of friendly forces. The conduct of operations phase explores the contextual elements, including a summary of the operation, and investigates intelligence, command and control and logistical factors. Finally, the results of each case are analyzed to discover factors that contribute positively, negatively, or not significantly to the outcome of the operation. Each case study's unique circumstances shaped the result; however, the criteria of organization and training appear dominant with command and control, doctrine and technology being recurrent in allowing air forces to halt an enemy surface force. The specific context of the battle, the intelligence preparation, and logistics of each conflict cannot be ignored, but were not determined as recurrent factors in all three case studies, although intelligence was significant in the Bismarck Sea. The study concludes with three major lessons. First, people make the Air Force successful; second, the halt strategy is appropriate for certain circumstances, but some sister service critiques of the strategy are valid; third, the Air Force should acknowledge the limitations of airpower, but it should also develop methods to minimize the limits in the application of airpower in order to make 'halt' the strategy even more effective in the future than it has been in the past."--Air University Library.

U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Analytic Capabilities
U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Analytic Capabilities

Author: National Research Council

Publisher: National Academies Press

Published: 2015-01-02

Total Pages: 286

ISBN-13: 0309298741

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Since the early 1960s, the U.S. strategic nuclear posture has been composed of a triad of nuclear-certified long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Since the early 1970s, U.S. nuclear forces have been subject to strategic arms control agreements. The large numbers and diversified nature of the U.S. nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear forces, which cannot be ignored as part of the overall nuclear deterrent, have decreased substantially since the Cold War. While there is domestic consensus today on the need to maintain an effective deterrent, there is no consensus on precisely what that requires, especially in a changing geopolitical environment and with continued reductions in nuclear arms. This places a premium on having the best possible analytic tools, methods, and approaches for understanding how nuclear deterrence and assurance work, how they might fail, and how failure can be averted by U.S. nuclear forces. U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Analytic Capabilities identifies the broad analytic issues and factors that must be considered in seeking nuclear deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies in the 21st century. This report describes and assesses tools, methods - including behavioral science-based methods - and approaches for improving the understanding of how nuclear deterrence and assurance work or may fail in the 21st century and the extent to which such failures might be averted or mitigated by the proper choice of nuclear systems, technological capabilities, postures, and concepts of operation of American nuclear forces. The report recommends criteria and a framework for validating the tools, methods, and approaches and for identifying those most promising for Air Force usage.

Ballistic Missile Defense In The Post-cold War Era
Ballistic Missile Defense In The Post-cold War Era

Author: David B H Denoon

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2021-11-28

Total Pages: 176

ISBN-13: 0429723652

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With the end of the Cold War and the visibility of U.S. Patriot missile defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, the cost and benefits of ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) need to be re-evaluated. In this detailed and balanced study, David Denoon assesses new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses. In the post Cold War era, two fundamental changes have made missile defense for the United States and its military forces more compelling: The United States and Russia no longer see each other as direct threats and there has been a dramatic proliferation of ballistic missile capability in the Third World. Consequently, U.S. forces deployed overseas are more likely to be at risk and, eventually, the United States itself could become vulnerable to missile threats. With these changes in mind, David Denoon analyzes the current BMD dilemma, arguing that active defenses against missiles should be seen as a form of insurance against catastrophe. He assesses the likelihood of missile attacks and the appropriate level of investment for the United States to defend against such attacks. The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses.