From Fictionalism to Realism

From Fictionalism to Realism

Author: Carola Barbero

Publisher: Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Published: 2013-02-14

Total Pages: 160

ISBN-13: 144384649X

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In ontology, realism and anti-realism may be taken as opposite attitudes towards entities of different kinds, so that one may turn out to be a realist with respect to certain entities, and an anti-realist with respect to others. In this book, the editors focus on this controversy concerning social entities in general and fictional entities in particular, the latter often being considered nowadays as kinds of social entities. More specifically, fictionalists (those who maintain that we only make-believe that there are entities of a certain kind) and creationists (those who believe that entities of a certain kind are the products of human activity) present themselves as the champions of the anti-realist and the realist stance, respectively, regarding the above entities. By evaluating the pros and cons of both these positions, this book intends to focus new light on a longstanding debate.


Fictionalism in Metaphysics

Fictionalism in Metaphysics

Author: Mark Eli Kalderon

Publisher: Clarendon Press

Published: 2005-07-07

Total Pages: 364

ISBN-13: 0191557757

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Fictionalism is the view that a serious intellectual inquiry need not aim at truth. It came to prominence in philosophy in 1980, when Hartry Field argued that mathematics does not have to be true to be good, and Bas van Fraassen argued that the aim of science is not truth but empirical adequacy. Both suggested that the acceptance of a mathematical or scientific theory need not involve belief in its content. Thus the distinctive commitment of fictionalism is that acceptance in a given domain of inquiry need not be truth-normed, and that the acceptance of a sentence from the associated region of discourse need not involve belief in its content. In metaphysics fictionalism is now widely regarded as an option worthy of serious consideration. This volume represents a major benchmark in the debate: it brings together an impressive international team of contributors, whose essays (all but one of them appearing here for the first time) represent the state of the art in various areas of metaphysical controversy, relating to language, mathematics, modality, truth, belief, ontology, and morality.


Moral Fictionalism

Moral Fictionalism

Author: Mark Eli Kalderon

Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA

Published: 2005-04-14

Total Pages: 206

ISBN-13: 0199275971

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Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions - propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded as somethingto be debunked by philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and makes public our noncognitive attitudes. The realist fiction might be understood as a philosophical misconception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical.There is, however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of debunking, but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in accepting a moral sentence competent speakers do not believe the moral proposition expressed but rather adopt the relevant non-cognitive attitudes. Noncognitivism, in its primary sense, is aclaim about moral acceptance: the acceptance of a moral sentence is not moral belief but is some other attitude. Standardly, non-cognitivism has been linked to non-factualism - the claim that the content of a moral sentence does not consist in its expressing a moral proposition. Indeed, the terms'noncognitivism' and 'nonfactualism' have been used interchangeably. But this misses an important possibility, since moral content may be representational but the acceptance of moral sentences might not be belief in the moral proposition expressed. This possibility constitutes a novel form of noncognitivism, moral fictionalism. Whereas nonfactualists seek to debunk the realist fiction of a moral subject matter, the moral fictionalist claims that that fiction stands in no need of debunking butis the means by which the noncognitive attitudes involved in moral acceptance are conveyed by moral utterance. Moral fictionalism is noncognitivism without a non-representational semantics.


Fiction and Fictionalism

Fiction and Fictionalism

Author: R. M. Sainsbury

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2009-09-11

Total Pages: 264

ISBN-13: 1135278342

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Are fictional characters such as Sherlock Holmes real? Fiction and Fictionalism is an excellent introduction to this central topic in philosophy and includes chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary of technical terms.


Religious Fictionalism

Religious Fictionalism

Author: Robin Le Poidevin

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2019-05-09

Total Pages:

ISBN-13: 1108616828

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This Element is an introduction to contemporary religious fictionalism, its motivation and challenges. Among the issues raised are: can religion be viewed as a game of make-believe? In what ways does religious fictionalism parallel positions often labelled 'fictionalist' in ethics and metaphysics? Does religious fictionalism represent an advance over its rivals? Can fictionalism provide an adequate understanding of the characteristic features of the religious life, such as worship, prayer, moral commitment? Does fictionalism face its own version of the problem of evil? Is realism about theistic (God-centred) language less religiously serious than fictionalism?


Taking Morality Seriously

Taking Morality Seriously

Author: David Enoch

Publisher: OUP Oxford

Published: 2011-07-28

Total Pages: 308

ISBN-13: 019161856X

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In Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly. This view—according to which there are perfectly objective, universal, moral and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other, natural truths—is familiar, but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into reasonably precise arguments. And when the book turns defensive—defending Robust Realism against traditional objections—it mobilizes the original positive arguments for the view to help with fending off the objections. The main underlying motivation for Robust Realism developed in the book is that no other metaethical view can vindicate our taking morality seriously. The positive arguments developed here—the argument from the deliberative indispensability of normative truths, and the argument from the moral implications of metaethical objectivity (or its absence)—are thus arguments for Robust Realism that are sensitive to the underlying, pre-theoretical motivations for the view.


Fictionalism in Philosophy

Fictionalism in Philosophy

Author: Bradley Armour-Garb

Publisher:

Published: 2020

Total Pages: 257

ISBN-13: 0190689609

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This volume collects some of the most up-to-date work on philosophical fictionalism-the idea that a notion of pretense or fiction can help resolve certain puzzles or problems in philosophy. After a detailed discussion in the book's introductory chapter of how philosophers should think of fictionalism and its connection to metaontology more generally, the remaining chapters provide readers with arguments for and against this view from leading scholars in the fields of epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and others.


Realism and Anti-Realism

Realism and Anti-Realism

Author: Stuart Brock

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2014-12-18

Total Pages: 226

ISBN-13: 1317494261

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There are a bewildering variety of ways the terms "realism" and "anti-realism" have been used in philosophy and furthermore the different uses of these terms are only loosely connected with one another. Rather than give a piecemeal map of this very diverse landscape, the authors focus on what they see as the core concept: realism about a particular domain is the view that there are facts or entities distinctive of that domain, and their existence and nature is in some important sense objective and mind-independent. The authors carefully set out and explain the different realist and anti-realist positions and arguments that occur in five key domains: science, ethics, mathematics, modality and fictional objects. For each area the authors examine the various styles of argument in support of and against realism and anti-realism, show how these different positions and arguments arise in very different domains, evaluate their success within these fields, and draw general conclusions about these assorted strategies. Error theory, fictionalism, non-cognitivism, relativism and response-dependence are taken as the most important positions in opposition to the realist and these are explored in depth. Suitable for advanced level undergraduates, the book offers readers a clear introduction to a subject central to much contemporary work in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of language.


Transcending Fictionalism

Transcending Fictionalism

Author: Jessica Eastwood

Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing

Published: 2024-05-16

Total Pages: 265

ISBN-13: 1350327646

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Exploring alternative conceptions of the divine, Jessica Eastwood considers the ways of believing in God that are authentic and sincere, moving beyond traditional metaphysical structures that many find difficult to accept. In this study, she examines a unique branch of religious non-realism known as religious fictionalism, making the case for its ability to resonate on an intellectual and emotional level. Considering the extent to which fictionalism allows us to make sense of the role of religion in our spiritual lives, she presents its limitations on adhering to what might be an attractive contemporary model for philosophy of religion called 'the humane turn'. Articulating an alternative conception of God that we can relate to in an intellectual, emotional and spiritual way, Eastwood sheds light on a minimalist form of religious realism, which preserves the reality of God without committing the theist to a host of additional religious beliefs.


Mathematics and Reality

Mathematics and Reality

Author: Mary Leng

Publisher: OUP Oxford

Published: 2010-04-22

Total Pages: 288

ISBN-13: 0191576247

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Mary Leng offers a defense of mathematical fictionalism, according to which we have no reason to believe that there are any mathematical objects. Perhaps the most pressing challenge to mathematical fictionalism is the indispensability argument for the truth of our mathematical theories (and therefore for the existence of the mathematical objects posited by those theories). According to this argument, if we have reason to believe anything, we have reason to believe that the claims of our best empirical theories are (at least approximately) true. But since claims whose truth would require the existence of mathematical objects are indispensable in formulating our best empirical theories, it follows that we have good reason to believe in the mathematical objects posited by those mathematical theories used in empirical science, and therefore to believe that the mathematical theories utilized in empirical science are true. Previous responses to the indispensability argument have focussed on arguing that mathematical assumptions can be dispensed with in formulating our empirical theories. Leng, by contrast, offers an account of the role of mathematics in empirical science according to which the successful use of mathematics in formulating our empirical theories need not rely on the truth of the mathematics utilized.