American Trade and Power in the 1960s is a timely examination of the success and failure of United States trade policy under presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Assessing a critical decade in postwar economic relations, Thomas W. Zeiler shows trade policy to be the decisive factor hastening America's economic decline vis-a-vis Western Europe and Japan. By the early 1960s, the international commercial might of the U.S. had begun to diminish as a result of the increased strength of the six-member European Economic Community and a persistent balance-of-payments deficit. Believing that America must either "trade or fade," Kennedy proposed a visionary foreign trade bill as a way to reinvigorate the U.S. economy and maintain the Western alliance against the Soviet. With an astute reading of previously unused documents, Zeiler provides a fascinating description of how Kennedy skillfully juggled powerful protectionist interests with his own more liberal trade sentiments to win passage of the bill. Illustrating the harsh realities faced by the U.S. in a world where its economic dominance was no longer assured, Zeiler also presents a masterful compendium of the GATT talks known as the Kennedy Round. In a narrative noteworthy for its clarity, theoretical sophistication, and scrupulous attention to detail, Zeiler shows how U.S. trade policy was thwarted by rising EEC integration and Gaullist obstructionism. The GATT talks conclusively demonstrated that "American hegemony had ended." American Trade and Power in the 1960s brilliantly illuminates the roots of America's economic decline.
In The Commander-in-Chief Test, Jeffrey A. Friedman offers a fresh explanation for why Americans are often frustrated by the cost and scope of US foreign policy—and how we can fix that for the future. Americans frequently criticize US foreign policy for being overly costly and excessively militaristic. With its rising defense budgets and open-ended "forever wars," US foreign policy often appears disconnected from public opinion, reflecting the views of elites and special interests rather than the attitudes of ordinary citizens. The Commander-in-Chief Test argues that this conventional wisdom underestimates the role public opinion plays in shaping foreign policy. Voters may prefer to elect leaders who share their policy views, but they prioritize selecting presidents who seem to have the right personal attributes to be an effective commander in chief. Leaders then use hawkish foreign policies as tools for showing that they are tough enough to defend America's interests on the international stage. This link between leaders' policy positions and their personal images steers US foreign policy in directions that are more hawkish than what voters actually want. Combining polling data with survey experiments and original archival research on cases from the Vietnam War through the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, Friedman demonstrates that public opinion plays a surprisingly extensive—and often problematic—role in shaping US international behavior. With the commander-in-chief test, a perennial point of debate in national elections, Friedman's insights offer important lessons on how the politics of image-making impacts foreign policy and how the public should choose its president.