This monograph carries out the program which the author formulated in earlier work, the formalization of the theory of recursive functions of type 0 and 1 and of the theory of realizability.
Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, Volume 123: Constructivism in Mathematics: An Introduction, Vol. II focuses on various studies in mathematics and logic, including metric spaces, polynomial rings, and Heyting algebras. The publication first takes a look at the topology of metric spaces, algebra, and finite-type arithmetic and theories of operators. Discussions focus on intuitionistic finite-type arithmetic, theories of operators and classes, rings and modules, linear algebra, polynomial rings, fields and local rings, complete separable metric spaces, and located sets. The text then examines proof theory of intuitionistic logic, theory of types and constructive set theory, and choice sequences. The book elaborates on semantical completeness, sheaves, sites, and higher-order logic, and applications of sheaf models. Topics include a derived rule of local continuity, axiom of countable choice, forcing over sites, sheaf models for higher-order logic, and complete Heyting algebras. The publication is a valuable reference for mathematicians and researchers interested in mathematics and logic.
The volume is the outgrowth of a workshop with the same title held at MSRI in the week of November 13-17, 1989, and for those who did not get it, Logic from Computer Science is the converse of Logic in Computer Science, the full name of the highly successful annual LICS conferences. We meant to have a conference which would bring together the LICS commu nity with some of the more traditional "mathematical logicians" and where the emphasis would be on the flow of ideas from computer science to logic rather than the other way around. In a LICS talk, sometimes, the speaker presents a perfectly good theorem about (say) the A-calculus or finite model theory in terms of its potential applications rather than its (often more ob vious) intrinsic, foundational interest and intricate proof. This is not meant to be a criticism; the LICS meetings are, after all, organized by the IEEE Computer Society. We thought, for once, it would be fun to see what we would get if we asked the speakers to emphasize the relevance of their work for logic rather than computer science and to point out what is involved in the proofs. I think, mostly, it worked. In any case, the group of people represented as broad a selection of logicians as I have seen in recent years, and the quality of the talks was (in my view) exceptionally, unusually high. I learned a lot and (I think) others did too.
Since their inception, the Perspectives in Logic and Lecture Notes in Logic series have published seminal works by leading logicians. Many of the original books in the series have been unavailable for years, but they are now in print once again. This volume, the second publication in the Lecture Notes in Logic series, is the proceedings of the Association for Symbolic Logic meeting held in Helsinki, Finland, in July 1990. It contains eighteen papers by leading researchers, covering all fields of mathematical logic from the philosophy of mathematics, through model theory, proof theory, recursion theory, and set theory, to the connections of logic to computer science. The articles published here are still widely cited and continue to provide ideas for ongoing research projects.
In the area of mathematical logic, a great deal of attention is now being devoted to the study of nonclassical logics. This book intends to present the most important methods of proof theory in intuitionistic logic and to acquaint the reader with the principal axiomatic theories based on intuitionistic logic.
The logician Kurt Gödel in 1951 established a disjunctive thesis about the scope and limits of mathematical knowledge: either the mathematical mind is not equivalent to a Turing machine (i.e., a computer), or there are absolutely undecidable mathematical problems. In the second half of the twentieth century, attempts have been made to arrive at a stronger conclusion. In particular, arguments have been produced by the philosopher J.R. Lucas and by the physicist and mathematician Roger Penrose that intend to show that the mathematical mind is more powerful than any computer. These arguments, and counterarguments to them, have not convinced the logical and philosophical community. The reason for this is an insufficiency if rigour in the debate. The contributions in this volume move the debate forward by formulating rigorous frameworks and formally spelling out and evaluating arguments that bear on Gödel's disjunction in these frameworks. The contributions in this volume have been written by world leading experts in the field.