At present much of political science consists of a large body of formal mathematical work that remains largely unexplored empirically and an expanding use of sophisticated statistical techniques. While there are examples of noteworthy efforts to bridge the gap between these, there is still a need for much more cooperative work between formal theorists and empirical researchers in the discipline. This book explores how empirical analysis has, can, and should be used to evaluate formal models in political science. The book is intended to be a guide for active and future political scientists who are confronting the issues of empirical analysis with formal models in their work and as a basis for a needed dialogue between empirical and formal theoretical researchers in political science. These developments, if combined, are potentially a basis for a new revolution in political science.
How do nations act in a crisis? This book seeks to answer that question both theoretically and historically. It tests and synthesizes theories of political behavior by comparing them with the historical record. The authors apply theories of bargaining, game theory, information processing, decision-making, and international systems to case histories of sixteen crises that occurred during a seventy-five year period. The result is a revision and integration of diverse concepts and the development of a new empirical theory of international conflict. Originally published in 1978. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
International relations theory is a diverse and constantly evolving area of scholarly research reflecting the fluctuations in world politics. This volume brings together a number of the most important research papers published on this subject during the last sixty years. Divided into five thematic sections, this work provides the reader with a comprehensive overview of developments and debates in this area of study. Topics covered include the history and development of alternative approaches to international relations theory; the importance of domestic politics in shaping a state's foreign policy; the absence of a global 'government' and the meaning and implications of this 'state of international anarchy'; power and its role as a variable in international relations theory and the challenges of state security, war and peace. The introduction anchors the collection, putting the articles within the context of the evolution of this field to date.
Political scientists use models to investigate and illuminate causal mechanisms, generate comparative data, and more. But how do we justify and rationalize the method? Why test predictions from a deductive, and thus truth-preserving, system? Primo and Clarke tackle these central questions in this novel work of methodology.
Is military power central in determining which states get their voice heard? Must states run a high risk of war to communicate credible intent? In this book, Slantchev shows that states can often obtain concessions without incurring higher risks when they use military threats. Unlike diplomatic forms of communication, physical military moves improve a state's expected performance in war. If the opponent believes the threat, it will be more likely to back down. Military moves are also inherently costly, so only resolved states are willing to pay these costs. Slantchev argues that powerful states can secure better peaceful outcomes and lower the risk of war, but the likelihood of war depends on the extent to which a state is prepared to use military threats to deter challenges to peace and compel concessions without fighting. The price of peace may therefore be large: states invest in military forces that are both costly and unused.
The Great War is an immense, confusing and overwhelming historical conflict - the ideal case study for teaching game theory and international relations. Using thirteen historical puzzles, from the outbreak of the war and the stability of attrition, to unrestricted submarine warfare and American entry into the war, this book provides students with a rigorous yet accessible training in game theory. Each chapter shows, through guided exercises, how game theoretical models can explain otherwise challenging strategic puzzles, shedding light on the role of individual leaders in world politics, cooperation between coalitions partners, the effectiveness of international law, the termination of conflict, and the challenges of making peace. Its analytical history of World War I also surveys cutting edge political science research on international relations and the causes of war. Written by a leading game theorist known for his expertise of the war, this textbook includes useful student features such as chapter key terms, contemporary maps, a timeline of events, a list of key characters and additional end-of-chapter game-theoretic exercises.