Formal Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism
Formal Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism

Author: Tomoji Shogenji

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2017-11-15

Total Pages: 194

ISBN-13: 135133655X

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This book develops new techniques in formal epistemology and applies them to the challenge of Cartesian skepticism. It introduces two formats of epistemic evaluation that should be of interest to epistemologists and philosophers of science: the dual-component format, which evaluates a statement on the basis of its safety and informativeness, and the relative-divergence format, which evaluates a probabilistic model on the basis of its complexity and goodness of fit with data. Tomoji Shogenji shows that the former lends support to Cartesian skepticism, but the latter allows us to defeat Cartesian skepticism. Along the way, Shogenji addresses a number of related issues in epistemology and philosophy of science, including epistemic circularity, epistemic closure, and inductive skepticism.

Formal Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism
Formal Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism

Author: Tomoji Shogenji

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2017-11-15

Total Pages: 207

ISBN-13: 1351336541

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This book develops new techniques in formal epistemology and applies them to the challenge of Cartesian skepticism. It introduces two formats of epistemic evaluation that should be of interest to epistemologists and philosophers of science: the dual-component format, which evaluates a statement on the basis of its safety and informativeness, and the relative-divergence format, which evaluates a probabilistic model on the basis of its complexity and goodness of fit with data. Tomoji Shogenji shows that the former lends support to Cartesian skepticism, but the latter allows us to defeat Cartesian skepticism. Along the way, Shogenji addresses a number of related issues in epistemology and philosophy of science, including epistemic circularity, epistemic closure, and inductive skepticism.

Pyrrhonian Skepticism
Pyrrhonian Skepticism

Author: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2004-07-22

Total Pages: 246

ISBN-13: 0198037953

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Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skeptical claim. The only skeptical view that has been truly held--by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume, Wittgenstein, and, most recently, Robert Fogelin--has been Pyrrohnian skepticism. Pyrrhonian skeptics do not assert Cartesian skepticism, but neither do they deny it. The Pyrrhonian skeptics' doubts run so deep that they suspend belief even about Cartesian skepticism and its denial. Nonetheless, some Pyrrhonians argue that they can still hold "common beliefs of everyday life" and can even claim to know some truths in an everyday way. This edited volume presents previously unpublished articles on this subject by a strikingly impressive group of philosophers, who engage with both historical and contemporary versions of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Among them are Gisela Striker, Janet Broughton, Don Garrett, Ken Winkler, Hans Sluga, Ernest Sosa, Michael Williams, Barry Stroud, Robert Fogelin, and Roy Sorensen. This volume is thematically unified and will interest a broad spectrum of scholars in epistemology and the history of philosophy.

Mainstream and Formal Epistemology
Mainstream and Formal Epistemology

Author: Vincent F. Hendricks

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2006

Total Pages: 220

ISBN-13: 9780521857895

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This book provides an analysis of the meeting point between mainstream and formal theories of knowledge.

Scepticism and Perceptual Justification
Scepticism and Perceptual Justification

Author: Dylan Dodd

Publisher:

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 385

ISBN-13: 019965834X

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New essays on scepticism about the senses explore the problem of whether and how experience can provide knowledge or justification for belief about the objective world outside the experiencer's mind.

Optimality Justifications
Optimality Justifications

Author: Gerhard Schurz

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2024-02-08

Total Pages: 329

ISBN-13: 019888754X

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Optimality Justifications argues for a renewal of foundation-theoretic epistemology based on optimality justifications, ways of showing that certain epistemic methods are optimal with regard to all accessible alternatives. Gerhard Schurz offers a range of new ideas for epistemology, philosophy of science, and cognitive science.

Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity
Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity

Author: Patrick Bondy

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2017-11-27

Total Pages: 263

ISBN-13: 1315412519

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The aim of this book is to answer two important questions about the issue of normativity in epistemology: Why are epistemic reasons evidential and what makes epistemic reasons and rationality normative? Bondy's argument proceeds on the assumption that epistemic rationality goes hand in hand with basing beliefs on good evidence. The opening chapters defend a mental-state ontology of reasons, a deflationary account of how kinds of reasons are distinguished, and a deliberative guidance constraint on normative reasons. They also argue in favor of doxastic voluntarism—the view that beliefs are subject to our direct voluntary control—and embrace the controversial view that voluntarism bears directly on the question of what kinds of things count as reasons for believing. The final three chapters of the book feature a noteworthy critique of the instrumental conception of the nature of epistemic rationality, as well as a defense of the instrumental normativity of epistemic rationality. The final chapter defends the view that epistemic reasons and rationality are normative for us when we have normative reason to get to the truth with respect to some proposition, and it provides a response to the swamping problem for monistic accounts of value.

Handbook of Abductive Cognition
Handbook of Abductive Cognition

Author: Lorenzo Magnani

Publisher: Springer Nature

Published: 2023-03-31

Total Pages: 1921

ISBN-13: 3031101359

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This Handbook offers the first comprehensive reference guide to the interdisciplinary field of abductive cognition, providing readers with extensive information on the process of reasoning to hypotheses in humans, animals, and in computational machines. It highlights the role of abduction in both theory practice: in generating and testing hypotheses and explanatory functions for various purposes and as an educational device. It merges logical, cognitive, epistemological and philosophical perspectives with more practical needs relating to the application of abduction across various disciplines and practices, such as in diagnosis, creative reasoning, scientific discovery, diagrammatic and ignorance-based cognition, and adversarial strategies. It also discusses the inferential role of models in hypothetical reasoning, abduction and creativity, including the process of development, implementation and manipulation for different scientific and technological purposes. Written by a group of internationally renowned experts in philosophy, logic, general epistemology, mathematics, cognitive, and computer science, as well as life sciences, engineering, architecture, and economics, the Handbook of Abductive Cognition offers a unique reference guide for readers approaching the process of reasoning to hypotheses from different perspectives and for various theoretical and practical purposes. Numerous diagrams, schemes and other visual representations are included to promote a better understanding of the relevant concepts and to make concepts highly accessible to an audience of scholars and students with different scientific backgrounds.