All political decision making processes reflect the interaction of different utility maximising actors: politicians, voters, bureaucrats and interest groups. Theoretical literature on the subject is not conclusive, and thus far, little empirical work exists. This study presents an econometric analysis of the allocation of development aid to Pakistan based on a political economic framework of aid allocation. Looking at bi- and multilateral aid to Pakistan from 1960 to 2002, results suggest that aid flows to Pakistan are highly motivated by special interests within donor countries and international financial institutions (IFIs). Looking more specifically at bilateral aid, and especially aid by the single largest donor to Pakistan, i.e. the US, analysis suggests that Pakistan and Indian ethnic lobbies could play a role in aid flows, and in the passage of two important amendments, the Pressler and Brown Amendments, in US aid authorisation bills regarding aid to Pakistan. Analysis of multilateral financial flows to Pakistan shows that Pakistan receives a large amount of lending but with considerable variations over time. To some extent personal contacts of Pakistani international civil servants appear to play a role in multilateral lending to Pakistan, along with major shareholders economic interests.
This paper represents the study about the impact of foreign aid on the economic growth of Pakistan. It takes into consideration previous studies done on the same topic for different developing countries. Results show that if aids are properly allocated in desired section which really need development, it can prove fruitful. But normally aid is given to such countries that always have some objective behind that with an already defined section where that aid should be utilized. But if such countries are given free hand to use them in their desired section, they can have more appropriate and better results in their development. Also in such countries there comes the prospect of corruption. If corruption is properly removed from the roots of that economy than it necessarily would have better developmental result on its economy.
Thirty percent of foreign development aid is channeled through NGOs or community-based organizations to improve service delivery to the poor, build social capital, and establish democracy in developing nations. However, growing evidence suggests that aid often erodes, rather than promotes, cooperation within developing nations. This book presents a rare, micro level account of the complex decision-making processes that bring individuals together to form collective-action platforms. It then examines why aid often breaks down the very institutions for collective action that it aims to promote. Breakdown in Pakistan identifies concrete measures to check the erosion of cooperation in foreign aid scenarios. Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of international development aid, and therefore the empirical details presented are particularly relevant for policy. The book's argument is equally applicable to a number of other developing countries, and has important implications for recent discussions within the field of economics.
This timely work presents cutting-edge analysis of the problems of U.S. foreign assistance programs - why these problems have not been solved in the past, and how they might be solved in the future. The book focuses primarily on U.S. foreign assistance and foreign policy as they apply to nation building, governance, and democratization. The expert contributors examine issues currently in play, and also trace the history and evolution of many of these problems over the years. They address policy concerns as well as management and organizational factors as they affect programs and policies. "Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy" includes several chapter-length case studies (on Iraq, Pakistan, Ghana, Haiti, and various countries in Eastern Europe and Africa), but the bulk of the book presents broad coverage of general topics such as foreign aid and security, NGOs and foreign aid, capacity building, and building democracy abroad. Each chapter offers recommendations on how to improve the U.S. system of aid in the context of foreign policy.