This report presents a logical and transparent methodology for evaluating strategic offensive forces on the basis of first-strike stability, which the authors define as a condition that exists when neither superpower perceives the other as motivated by the strategic force posture to launch the first nuclear strike in a crisis. The methodology underlines that (1) first-strike stability under current conditions is relatively robust, (2) postures of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces become increasingly important under an arms reduction regime if the current level of first-strike stability is desired, (3) enlarging U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons inventories does not necessarily erode first-strike stability, (4) the superpowers should realize the importance of both sides generating forces early in a crisis to render these forces nontargetable, and (5) whatever the index of first-strike stability, the index applies equally to both the United States and the Soviet Union, and thus suggests a dimension of U.S.-Soviet cooperation.
In this briefing prepared for the 41st meeting of the Military Operations Research Society, the author challenges much of the current thinking behind U.S. arms control and strategic policies. He argues that counterforce capabilities should be sought, not eschewed or proscribed. He sees counterforce capabilities more as deterrents to conflict than as inducements to nuclear warfighting. Where some would embrace counterforce capabilities only as a retaliatory option, the author goes much further and advocates them as a credible, advantageous, first-strike initiative. He questions the generally accepted belief that counterforce capabilities are inherently destabilizing. Because of enduring asymmetries in vital interests and conventional force capabilities, the author argues that the United States, more than the Soviet Union, has a need for a credible and advantageous nuclear initiative.
The lifting of the Iron Curtain in response to pressures for democratic reform in the Eastern Bloc nations and the refusal of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to use the Red Army to police countries of the Warsaw Pact have led to a radically changed international environment. Preceded by over 40 years of peace and stability, unprecedented in the history of modern Europe, the Cold War ended in a climate of upheaval and uncertainty. This volume addresses issues associated with the political and military vacuum created by recent events and explores in depth a problem of military uncertainty: first strike stability. Stephen J. Cimbala argues that war in a system undergoing rapid change, including reductions in forces and political realignment, remains disturbingly possible due to the unforeseeable, inadvertent, and uncontrollable uncertainties that plague decision making and military planning in Washington, Moscow, and other international power centers, hence, first strike instability. This timely volume clarifies the kind of bargain superpowers and their allies have made in regard to nuclear weapons and command systems. Cimbala provides enhanced understandings of the concept and practice of nuclear deterrence and of first strike stability in a post-Cold War world that can help direct arms control efforts toward those areas that are most important to actual security. Broad aspects of the problem of first strike stability are set forth in the first chapter which also anticipates some of the connections between political and military levels of analysis discussed in the conclusion. Chapter two introduces the concepts of the state of nature and the state of war, explains how they apply to the problem of first strike stability, and why the possibility of war, including nuclear war, cannot be excluded. Chapter three focuses on the New Soviet Thinking and why the probability of accidental and inadvertent war and escalation is not affected by reducing the levels of armaments alone. Chapter four emphasizes the problems facing the United States and NATO, and the approaches to escalation control which NATO assumes will be implemented, should deterrence fail. The results of the theoretical and administrative confusion over approaches to escalation control, outlined in chapter four, reappear in chapter five in the form of problems for war termination. The controversial issue of eliminating nuclear deterrence, with emphasis on the proposal for elimination by preclusive antinuclear strategic defenses is the focus of chapter six. The final chapter reviews the implications of the preceding chapters and arrives at some startling conclusions. Scholars and students of military affairs, political scientists, government officials, and members of the military establishment will find the up-to-the-minute information and judgements contained in First Strike Stability invaluable aids to their own decision making on this profoundly important world issue.
First-strike stability between two adversaries is robust when both leaders perceive no great difference between the expected 'cost' to each side of striking first and the expected 'cost' of incurring a first strike if one withholds his attack. Conclusions include: (1) First-strike stability is currently quite robust. (2) Deployment of strategic nationwide ballistic missile defenses by either superpower in competition with the other's strategic offenses generally erodes first-strike stability. (3) Neither country would be likely to continue to adhere to agreements that constrain and reduce offensive arms under the specter of intent by the other to deploy robust strategic defenses in contravention to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. (4) There may be a 'window' in which United States and Soviet strategic nationwide BMD could be robust in defending against 'limited' attacks (third-country ballistic missile attacks, unauthorized attacks, and accidental launches), yet not so robust that first-strike stability is seriously undermined. (5) The level of U.S. defenses attributed to the so-called 'Phase I' deployment seems to go beyond the upper bounds of this 'window' even with current offensive forces, and certainly with offensive forces constrained by START I. (6) Any attempt to transition to a situation in which each side's strategic defenses dominate the opponent's ballistic missiles must include a careful negotiation on the critical role of bomber forces in maintaining firs-strike stability.
The impact of strategic defenses on stability is a central theme in the Strategic Defense Initiative debate. This report examines the effects of defenses on first-strike stability. It is principally concerned with assessing first-strike stability during the transition from an offense-dominated strategic balance to a defense-dominated balance. It also examines the implications of various offensive and defensive force structures. The findings suggest that (1) first-strike instability during the defense transition can be minimized by careful force planning; (2) the most stable defense transition occurs when the ballistic missile defense transition is completed before significant levels of air defense are deployed; (3) arms control efforts will not necessarily reduce potential first-strike instabilities unless each side's counterforce capability is reduced; (4) asymmetries in each side's ability to suppress the opponent's defenses can lead to instabilities during, and after, the defense transition; and (5) biased perceptions make the defense transition either more or less stable, depending on the nature of the bias.
A pressing issue facing the United States in the early 1990s centers on whether, and for what strategic purposes, the United States should deploy nationwide ballistic missile defenses (BMD). One argument is that such defenses could enhance stability. This report extends the methodology developed in R-3765 to assess the effect of BMD deployments on first-strike stability. The authors conclude that (1) first-strike stability is currently robust; (2) deployment of strategic nationwide BMD by either superpower in competition with the other's strategic offenses generally erodes first-strike stability; (3) there might be a level at which U.S. and Soviet BMD could effectively defend against third-country ballistic missile attacks, unauthorized attacks, and accidental launches, without being so robust that it would undermine first-strike stability; (4) the buildup of U.S. defenses during Phase I deployment seems to exceed this level; and (5) maintaining effective bomber forces on both sides would be critical to any attempt to move from offense dominance to defense dominance.
