This publication, Field Manual FM 4-0 Sustainment Operations July 2019, describes how Army sustainment forces, as part of a joint team, provide support to Army and other forces with particular emphasis on support to large-scale combat operations. The principal audiences for FM 4-0 are all Army Soldiers and civilians who provide sustainment support as well as those members of the Army profession who depend on and receive that support. Sustainment commanders and staffs of Army headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning support to joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication as the foundation for training and education.FM 4-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
This publication, Field Manual FM 1-0 Human Resources Support April 2014, provides the fundamentals, principles, and concepts of Army human resources (HR) support doctrine. It provides the doctrinal bases for developing operational plans (OPLANS) and standard operating procedures (SOPs) that support national objectives that reinforce the Army's vision that Soldiers and readiness are the principle focus of HR support. This publication applies to the range of military operations and supports Army doctrine publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations and ADP 4-0, Sustainment.
ADP 3-0, Operations, constitutes the Army's view of how to conduct prompt and sustained operations across multiple domains, and it sets the foundation for developing other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications. It articulates the Army's operational doctrine for unified land operations. ADP 3-0 accounts for the uncertainty of operations and recognizes that a military operation is a human undertaking. Additionally, this publication is the foundation for training and Army education system curricula related to unified land operations. The principal audience for ADP 3-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will use this publication as well.
Field Manual (FM) 6-02, Signal Support to Operations, is the premier Signal doctrine publication, and only field manual. FM 6-02 compiles Signal Corps doctrine into three chapters with supporting appendices that address network operations in support of mission command and unified land operations and the specific tactics and procedures associated with organic and nonorganic Signal forces. The fundamental idea of Signal Corps tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of Signal forces in a supporting role to provide LandWarNet across the range of military operations. The detailed techniques regarding the ways and methods to accomplish the missions, functions or tasks of the Signal Corps indicated in this FM will be addressed in supporting Army techniques publications (ATPs). Army forces operate worldwide and require a secure and reliable communications capability that rapidly adapts to changing demands.
This manual, Army Doctrine Publication ADP 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces July 2019, provides a discussion of the fundamentals of mission command, command and control, and the command and control warfighting function. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the art and science of command and control to understand situations, make decisions, direct actions, and lead forces toward mission accomplishment.The doctrine in ADP 6-0 forms the foundation for command and control tactics, techniques, and procedures.For an explanation of these tactics and procedures, see FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. For an explanation of the techniques associated with command and control, see ATP 6-0.5, Command Post Organization and Operations, as well as other supporting techniques publications.The principal audience for ADP 6-0 is Army commanders, leaders, and unit staffs. Mission command demands more from subordinates at all levels, and understanding and practicing the mission command principles during operations and garrison activities are imperative for all members of the Army Profession.This revision to ADP 6-0 represents an evolution of mission command doctrine based upon lessons learned since 2012. The use of the term mission command to describe multiple things-the warfighting function, the system, and a philosophy-created unforeseen ambiguity. Mission command replaced command and control, but in practical application it often meant the same thing. This led to differing expectations among leadership cohorts regarding the appropriate application of mission command during operations and garrison activities. Labeling multiple things mission command unintentionally eroded the importance of mission command, which is critical to the command and control of Army forces across the range of military operations. Differentiating mission command from command and control provides clarity, allows leaders to focus on mission command in the context of the missions they execute, and aligns the Army with joint and multinational partners, all of whom use the term command and control.Command and control-the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces-is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single specialized military function, either by itself or combined with others, has a purpose without it. Commanders are responsible for command and control. Through command and control, commanders provide purpose and direction to integrate all military activities towards a common goal-mission accomplishment. Military operations are inherently human endeavors, characterized by violence and continuous adaptation by all participants. Successful execution requires Army forces to make and implement effective decisions faster than enemy forces. Therefore, the Army has adopted mission command as its approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.
In 2003, the U.S. Army began a process to transform from a division-based to a modular force structure. Congress requested a study of the process and outcomes of the initiative to assess the impact on the Army's capabilities in a range of operations.
The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the Army's initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country's slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to "surge" additional forces to Iraq, placing the conduct of the "surge" and its aftermath in the second volume.
This field manual aims to provide techniques to assist planners in planning, coordinating, executing, synchronizing, and assessing military deception (MILDEC). While the means and techniques may evolve over generations, the principles and fundamentals of deception planning remain constant. FM 3-13.4 applies to all members of the Army profession: leaders, Soldiers, Army Civilians, and contractors. The principal audience for this publication is Army commanders, staffs, and all leaders. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning joint or multinational planning. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this publication as a guide for teaching MILDEC. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations.
This fast-paced and compelling read closes a significant gap in the historiography of the late Cold War U.S. Army and is crucial for understanding the current situation in the Middle East. From the author's introduction: “My purpose is a narrative history of the 1st Infantry Division from 1970 through the Operation Desert Storm celebration held 4th of July 1991. This story is an account of the revolutionary changes in the late Cold War. The Army that overran Saddam Hussein’s Legions in four days was the product of important changes stimulated both by social changes and institutional reform. The 1st Infantry Division reflected benefits of those changes, despite its low priority for troops and material. The Division was not an elite formation, but rather excelled in the context of the Army as an institution.” This book begins with a preface by Gordon R. Sullivan, General, USA, Retired. In twelve chapters, author Gregory Fontenot explains the history of the 1st infantry Division from 1970 to 1991. In doing so, his fast-paced narrative includes elements to expand the knowledge of non-military readers. These elements include a glossary, a key to abbreviations, maps, nearly two dozen photographs, and thorough bibliography. The First infantry Division and the U.S. Army Transformed: Road to Victory in Desert Storm is published with support from the First Division Museum at Cantigny.
Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.
