Mars must be fed. His tools of war demand huge quantities of fodder, fuel, ammunition, and food. All these must be produced, transported, and distributed to contending forces in the field. No one can doubt the importance of feeding Mars in modern warfare, and it takes no great effort to recognize that it has always been a major aspect of large scal
One of the main dangers to Britain during the Second World War was the possibility of the country being starved out of the war. Indeed, it was what Churchill feared the most. Before the war, Britain was hugely dependent upon foreign imports of food and supplies, but with unrestricted submarine warfare these lifelines were in danger of being cut and the amount of imports hugely reduced. Britain was not unprepared. Lessons had been learned during the First World War, when people had been encouraged to grow more of their own food. The Ministry of Food, in particular, had detailed plans in the event of a future war and the ‘Dig for Victory’ campaign rightly went down in history as one of the great successes of the British Home Front. For the farmers of Britain the war meant a massive upheaval, as the government ordered them to plough up millions of acres of land to grow valuable arable crops. Meanwhile, with rationing a daily and inescapable part of life, the people of Britain had to get used to different foodstuffs, including powdered egg, Spam and even whale meat. Incredibly, the diets of many British people actually improved during the war and the fact that the country avoided starvation demonstrated not only the success of government planning, but also the determination and ingenuity of the wartime generation.
Why did Napoleon succeed in 1805 but fail in 1812? Were the railways vital to Prussia's victory over France in 1870? Was the famous Schlieffen Plan militarily sound? Could the European half of World War II have been ended in 1944? These are only a few of the questions that form the subject-matter of this meticulously researched, lively book. Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the 'nuts and bolts' of war: namely, those formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, so often mentioned - but rarely explored - by the vast majority of books on military history. In doing so he casts his net far and wide, from Gustavus Adolphus to Rommel, from Marlborough to Patton, subjecting the operations of each to a thorough analysis from a fresh and unusual point of view. The result is a fascinating book that has something new to say about virtually every one of the most important campaigns waged in Europe during the last two centuries.
Mandatory food rationing during World War II significantly challenged the image of the United States as a land of plenty and collapsed the boundaries between women's public and private lives by declaring home production and consumption to be political activities. Examining the food-related propaganda surrounding rationing, Eating for Victory decodes the dual message purveyed by the government and the media: while mandatory rationing was necessary to provide food for U.S. and Allied troops overseas, women on the home front were also "required" to provide their families with nutritious food. Amy Bentley reveals the role of the Wartime Homemaker as a pivotal component not only of World War II but also of the development of the United States into a superpower.
Winner of the Colonel Richard W. Ulbrich Memorial Book Award Winner of the Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award Civil War Supply and Strategy stands as a sweeping examination of the decisive link between the distribution of provisions to soldiers and the strategic movement of armies during the Civil War. Award-winning historian Earl J. Hess reveals how that dynamic served as the key to success, especially for the Union army as it undertook bold offensives striking far behind Confederate lines. How generals and their subordinates organized military resources to provide food for both men and animals under their command, he argues, proved essential to Union victory. The Union army developed a powerful logistical capability that enabled it to penetrate deep into Confederate territory and exert control over select regions of the South. Logistics and supply empowered Union offensive strategy but limited it as well; heavily dependent on supply lines, road systems, preexisting railroad lines, and natural waterways, Union strategy worked far better in the more developed Upper South. Union commanders encountered unique problems in the Deep South, where needed infrastructure was more scarce. While the Mississippi River allowed Northern armies to access the region along a narrow corridor and capture key cities and towns along its banks, the dearth of rail lines nearly stymied William T. Sherman’s advance to Atlanta. In other parts of the Deep South, the Union army relied on massive strategic raids to destroy resources and propel its military might into the heart of the Confederacy. As Hess’s study shows, from the perspective of maintaining food supply and moving armies, there existed two main theaters of operation, north and south, that proved just as important as the three conventional eastern, western, and Trans-Mississippi theaters. Indeed, the conflict in the Upper South proved so different from that in the Deep South that the ability of Federal officials to negotiate the logistical complications associated with army mobility played a crucial role in determining the outcome of the war.