The concept of fair division is as old as civil society itself. Aristotle's "equal treatment of equals" was the first step toward a formal definition of distributive fairness. The concept of collective welfare, more than two centuries old, is a pillar of modern economic analysis. Reflecting fifty years of research, this book examines the contribution of modern microeconomic thinking to distributive justice. Taking the modern axiomatic approach, it compares normative arguments of distributive justice and their relation to efficiency and collective welfare. The book begins with the epistemological status of the axiomatic approach and the four classic principles of distributive justice: compensation, reward, exogenous rights, and fitness. It then presents the simple ideas of equal gains, equal losses, and proportional gains and losses. The book discusses three cardinal interpretations of collective welfare: Bentham's "utilitarian" proposal to maximize the sum of individual utilities, the Nash product, and the egalitarian leximin ordering. It also discusses the two main ordinal definitions of collective welfare: the majority relation and the Borda scoring method. The Shapley value is the single most important contribution of game theory to distributive justice. A formula to divide jointly produced costs or benefits fairly, it is especially useful when the pattern of externalities renders useless the simple ideas of equality and proportionality. The book ends with two versatile methods for dividing commodities efficiently and fairly when only ordinal preferences matter: competitive equilibrium with equal incomes and egalitarian equivalence. The book contains a wealth of empirical examples and exercises.
What are the methodologies for assessing and improving governmental policy in light of well-being? The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy provides a comprehensive, interdisciplinary treatment of this topic. The contributors draw from welfare economics, moral philosophy, and psychology and are leading scholars in these fields. The Handbook includes thirty chapters divided into four Parts. Part I covers the full range of methodologies for evaluating governmental policy and assessing societal condition-including both the leading approaches in current use by policymakers and academics (such as GDP, cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, inequality and poverty metrics, and the concept of the "social welfare function"), and emerging techniques. Part II focuses on the nature of well-being. What, most fundamentally, determines whether an individual life is better or worse for the person living it? Her happiness? Her preference-satisfaction? Her attainment of various "objective goods"? Part III addresses the measurement of well-being and the thorny topic of interpersonal comparisons. How can we construct a meaningful scale of individual welfare, which allows for comparisons of well-being levels and differences, both within one individual's life, and across lives? Finally, Part IV reviews the major challenges to designing governmental policy around individual well-being.
The definition and measurement of social welfare have been a vexed issue for the past century. This book makes a constructive, easily applicable proposal and suggests how to evaluate the economic situation of a society in a way that gives priority to the worse-off and that respects each individual's preferences over his or her own consumption, work, leisure and so on. This approach resonates with the current concern to go 'beyond the GDP' in the measurement of social progress. Compared to technical studies in welfare economics, this book emphasizes constructive results rather than paradoxes and impossibilities, and shows how one can start from basic principles of efficiency and fairness and end up with concrete evaluations of policies. Compared to more philosophical treatments of social justice, this book is more precise about the definition of social welfare and reaches conclusions about concrete policies and institutions only after a rigorous derivation from clearly stated principles.
Psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the conscious choice not to seek information. The history of intellectual thought abounds with claims that knowledge is valued and sought, yet individuals and groups often choose not to know. We call the conscious choice not to seek or use knowledge (or information) deliberate ignorance. When is this a virtue, when is it a vice, and what can be learned from formally modeling the underlying motives? On which normative grounds can it be judged? Which institutional interventions can promote or prevent it? In this book, psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the scope of deliberate ignorance.
Although the relationship between fairness and the economic concept of efficiency is usually cast as an adversarial one, this collection demonstrates the robust and diverse ways in which economics engages - and cannot avoid engaging - with fairness. Part I contains papers presenting positive analyses of fairness preferences and beliefs, which are fundamental means through which fairness matters for economic models. Part II turns to normative analysis and the broad question of how law should reconcile fairness and efficiency considerations. Part III presents a sampling of legal and policy applications in which both fairness and efficiency considerations prove important. Along with an original introduction by the editors this is a must-have volume that will appeal to students, academics and practitioners who are interested in this exciting field.
This book covers the main topics of welfare economics — general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un certainty, externalities and public goods — and some of the major topics of social choice theory — compensation criteria, fairness, voting. Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones. Chapters 4, 6, 11, 15 and 16 are new, added in this edition. The first edition of the book grew out of an undergraduate welfare economics course at Brown University. The book is intended for the undergraduate student who has some prior familiarity with microeconomics. However, the book is also useful for graduate students and professionals, economists and non-economists, who want an overview of welfare and social choice results unburdened by detail and mathematical complexity. Welfare economics and social choice both probably suffer from ex cessively technical treatments in professional journals and monographs.
The Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Solow directs his attention here to one of today's most controversial social issues: how to get people off welfare and into jobs. With characteristic eloquence, wit, and rigor, Solow condemns the welfare reforms recently passed by Congress and President Clinton for confronting welfare recipients with an unworkable choice--finding work in the current labor market or losing benefits. He argues that the only practical and fair way to move recipients to work is, in contrast, through an ambitious plan to guarantee that every able-bodied citizen has access to a job. Solow contends that the demand implicit in the 1996 Welfare Reform Act for welfare recipients to find work in the existing labor market has two crucial flaws. First, the labor market would not easily make room for a huge influx of unskilled, inexperienced workers. Second, the normal market adjustment to that influx would drive down earnings for those already in low-wage jobs. Solow concludes that it is legitimate to want welfare recipients to work, but not to want them to live at a miserable standard or to benefit at the expense of the working poor, especially since children are often the first to suffer. Instead, he writes, we should create new demand for unskilled labor through public-service employment and incentives to the private sector--in effect, fair "workfare." Solow presents widely ignored evidence that recipients themselves would welcome the chance to work. But he also points out that practical, morally defensible workfare would be extremely expensive--a problem that politicians who support the idea blithely fail to admit. Throughout, Solow places debate over welfare reform in the context of a struggle to balance competing social values, in particular self-reliance and altruism. The book originated in Solow's 1997 Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton University. It includes reactions from the distinguished scholars Gertrude Himmelfarb, Anthony Lewis, Glenn Loury, and John Roemer, who expand on and take issue with Solow's arguments. Work and Welfare is a powerful contribution to debate about welfare reform and a penetrating look at the values that shape its course.
As a lawyer who has for many years been working on the interface between law and economics, I have observed with impatience the increasing divergence between academic economics and governmental policy-making. Too often economists are too obsessed with the mathematical modelling of their ideas and insufficiently concerned with the applications. This book constitutes a major and refreshing exception to that trend. Dieter Schmidtchen and his colleagues at Saarbrücken have addressed some issues of European transport policy by re-examining the fundamental ideas on which current analysis appears to be based and finding them wanting because they take too narrow a view on the options available. From the foreword by Anthony Ogus, University of Manchester, UK An excellent and comprehensive book of both theory and application for the Cheapest Cost Avoider principle (CCAP), being better for the society s welfare than the commonly applied Polluters Pay Principle for dealing with transport external impacts. It is easily readable although scientifically rigorous with useful examples. The relation to the European Transport Policy is quite valuable. The book deserves a prominent place in the literature of applied transport economics, and I highly recommend it for students following these disciplines. Dimitrios A. Tsamboulas, National Technical University of Athens, Greece This book discusses for the first time the relevance of the economic analysis of law for transport policy. The difference between applying the polluter-pays-principle and Calabresi s notion of the cheapest cost avoider are clearly explained and distributional consequences are also considered. Moreover, in addition to a brilliant economic analysis, the book also discusses important cases and the consequences of their analysis for European transport policy. It is a must-read for anyone interested either in law and economics generally or transport policy in particular. Michael Faure, Maastricht University and Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands This book discusses a paradigm shift for dealing with the internalization of external costs in transport. Crucial to the analysis is the insight that the polluters are not the only cost drivers; both pollutees and the state can also contribute to reducing social costs. The authors show that applying the Cheapest Cost Avoider Principle (CCAP) instead of the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) can lead to substantial welfare improvements. This book develops the foundations for the CCAP, which is shown to be superior to the PPP, both methodologically and practically, in identifying the most appropriate policy for dealing with external effects in transport. The PPP neglects the fact that external costs are jointly caused by all involved parties and that the externality problem is of a reciprocal nature: to avoid harm to a pollutee necessarily inflicts harm on the polluter. The real problem for welfare maximization addressed by the CCAP is to avoid the most serious harm. The CCAP guarantees efficiency, fair competition and equity. Its use of some form of cost benefit analysis also helps to avoid regulatory failure. The CCAP incorporates polluter pays as one possible outcome; however, this is not a foregone conclusion. Two case studies showing that the methodology of the CCAP can be applied in practice and a critical assessment of the European greening transport policy complete this volume. Discussing the relevance of the economic analysis of law for transport policy, this book will appeal to academics in the fields of law and economics, environmental policy and regulatory impact assessment, and European transport policy. Policymakers and civil servants concerned with transport policy, environmental policy and regulatory impact assessment will also find this book valuable.
