Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection
Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection

Author: Larry Samuelson

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 1997

Total Pages: 332

ISBN-13: 9780262692199

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The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.

Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games
Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games

Author: Ross Cressman

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2003

Total Pages: 346

ISBN-13: 9780262033053

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Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory.

Evolutionary Game Dynamics
Evolutionary Game Dynamics

Author: American Mathematical Society. Short Course

Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.

Published: 2011-10-27

Total Pages: 186

ISBN-13: 0821853260

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This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents (for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data packets over the Internet). While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system, attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision rules.

Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary Game Theory

Author: Jörgen W. Weibull

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 1997

Total Pages: 292

ISBN-13: 9780262731218

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Introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries. Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field. Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.

Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics
Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics

Author: William H. Sandholm

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2010-12-17

Total Pages: 618

ISBN-13: 0262195879

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Evolutionary game theory studies the behaviour of large populations of strategically interacting agents & is used by economists to predict in settings where traditional assumptions about the rationality of agents & knowledge may be inapplicable.

Evolution, Games, and God
Evolution, Games, and God

Author: Martin A. Nowak

Publisher: Harvard University Press

Published: 2013-05-07

Total Pages: 398

ISBN-13: 0674075536

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According to the reigning competition-driven model of evolution, selfish behaviors that maximize an organism’s reproductive potential offer a fitness advantage over self-sacrificing behaviors—rendering unselfish behavior for the sake of others a mystery that requires extra explanation. Evolution, Games, and God addresses this conundrum by exploring how cooperation, working alongside mutation and natural selection, plays a critical role in populations from microbes to human societies. Inheriting a tendency to cooperate, argue the contributors to this book, may be as beneficial as the self-preserving instincts usually thought to be decisive in evolutionary dynamics. Assembling experts in mathematical biology, history of science, psychology, philosophy, and theology, Martin Nowak and Sarah Coakley take an interdisciplinary approach to the terms “cooperation” and “altruism.” Using game theory, the authors elucidate mechanisms by which cooperation—a form of working together in which one individual benefits at the cost of another—arises through natural selection. They then examine altruism—cooperation which includes the sometimes conscious choice to act sacrificially for the collective good—as a key concept in scientific attempts to explain the origins of morality. Discoveries in cooperation go beyond the spread of genes in a population to include the spread of cultural transformations such as languages, ethics, and religious systems of meaning. The authors resist the presumption that theology and evolutionary theory are inevitably at odds. Rather, in rationally presenting a number of theological interpretations of the phenomena of cooperation and altruism, they find evolutionary explanation and theology to be strongly compatible.

Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science
Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

Author:

Publisher: Springer

Published: 2009-06-26

Total Pages: 10398

ISBN-13: 9780387758886

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This encyclopedia provides an authoritative single source for understanding and applying the concepts of complexity theory together with the tools and measures for analyzing complex systems in all fields of science and engineering. It links fundamental concepts of mathematics and computational sciences to applications in the physical sciences, engineering, biomedicine, economics and the social sciences.

Symmetry and Collective Fluctuations in Evolutionary Games
Symmetry and Collective Fluctuations in Evolutionary Games

Author: Eric Smith

Publisher: Iop Expanding Physics

Published: 2015

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9780750311380

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Evolutionary game theory has the potential to provide an integrated framework to model many aspects of evolution, development, and ecology. The reliable use of game models, however, requires an understanding of their behaviour when the number of players becomes very large, resulting in the emergence of thermodynamic limits. This behaviour is controlled by the symmetries that characterize the game, and the approach to the thermodynamic limit is governed by collective fluctuations in the actions of the players. In this book, the authors present methods to derive large-deviations limits for population processes, and apply these to game models illustrating the many roles of symmetry and collective fluctuations in evolutionary dynamics.

Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria
Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria

Author: Eric van Damme

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 331

ISBN-13: 364296978X

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The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts.

Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory
Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory

Author: Tamer Basar

Publisher:

Published: 19??

Total Pages:

ISBN-13: 9783319273358

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Résumé : "This will be a two-part handbook on Dynamic Game Theory and part of the Springer Reference program. Part I will be on the fundamentals and theory of dynamic games. It will serve as a quick reference and a source of detailed exposure to topics in dynamic games for a broad community of researchers, educators, practitioners, and students. Each topic will be covered in 2-3 chapters with one introducing basic theory and the other one or two covering recent advances and/or special topics. Part II will be on applications in fields such as economics, management science, engineering, biology, and the social sciences."