This Safety Report complements Safety Guide No. 50-SG-O12, Periodic Safety Review of Operational Nuclear Power Plants (1994). It provides practical information for the safety assessment and judgement process for operating nuclear power plants built to earlier standards, on the basis of a comparison with current safety standards and operational practices.
The present report is a revision of Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-3 (1988), updating the statements made on the objectives and principles of safe design and operation for electricity generating nuclear power plants. It includes the improvements made in the safety of operating nuclear power plants and identifies the principles underlying the best current safety policies to be applied in future plants. It presents INSAG's understanding of the principles underlying the best current safety policies and practices of the nuclear power industry.
On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.
Proceedings of a symposium organized in co-operation with OECD/NEA, Vienna, 8-11 October 1996. The symposium was a follow-up to the 1991 International Conference on The Safety of Nuclear Power: Strategy for the Future and will be remembered as the initiating force behind the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which entered into force on 24 October 1996. The goal was to review the progress made in implementing the recommendations of the 1991 Conference relating to the safety of existing nuclear power plants, and to make available to all those involved in maintaining the safety of nuclear power plants information on effective methods, practices and criteria for safety review and operating experience feedback systems.
A periodic safety review is considered an effective way to obtain an overview of nuclear power plant safety. It is also used to determine reasonable and practicable modifications to maintain a high level of safety during continued operation, and to justify operation of a nuclear power plant beyond the original time frame. The review considers life limiting processes and features of structures, systems and components important to safety, and whether there are any foreseeable circumstances that could endanger the safe operation of the nuclear power plant. This publication addresses the scope of assessment, methods and applicable criteria within the periodic safety review and long term operation programmes framework, to support decision making for long term operation of nuclear power plants.
This report was prepared in response to the recommendation of the IAEA General Conference in 1992 that the Director General develop a process to provide a common basis on which the acceptable level of safety of all operating nuclear power plants built to earlier standards can be judged. This followed a recommendation made at the IAEA Conference on 'The Safety of Nuclear Power: Strategy for the Future' held in September 1991. The report also provides a basis for allocating responsibilities for, and deciding on the best approach to, making a safety assessment, and for selecting criteria to adopt in deciding on what corrective action to take.
This publication identifies the fundamental safety objective and associated safety principles that underpin the IAEA's safety standards and its related safety programme. They provide the basis for requirements and measures for the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks, the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, including, in particular, nuclear installations and uses of radiation and radioactive sources, the transport of radioactive material and the management of radioactive waste.
Author: National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants
The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. They were responsible for more than 15,900 deaths and 2,600 missing persons as well as physical infrastructure damages exceeding $200 billion. The earthquake and tsunami also initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Explosion of the released hydrogen damaged three reactor buildings and impeded onsite emergency response efforts. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. "Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants" is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This report examines the causes of the crisis, the performance of safety systems at the plant, and the responses of its operators following the earthquake and tsunami. The report then considers the lessons that can be learned and their implications for U.S. safety and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, commercial nuclear reactor safety and security regulations, and design improvements. "Lessons Learned" makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. This report's recommendations to incorporate modern risk concepts into safety regulations and improve the nuclear safety culture will help the industry prepare for events that could challenge the design of plant structures and lead to a loss of critical safety functions. In providing a broad-scope, high-level examination of the accident, "Lessons Learned" is meant to complement earlier evaluations by industry and regulators. This in-depth review will be an essential resource for the nuclear power industry, policy makers, and anyone interested in the state of U.S. preparedness and response in the face of crisis situations.
