For 1st and 2nd year undergraduate courses in Modern European History in departments of history. Also, higher level courses on enlightenment.This book provides a wide-ranging account and discussion of the history of Europe from 1713-1789. As well as political events, problems and institutions, it looks at the economic life of the continent, social structures and problems and intellectual and religious life. It also covers all aspects of Europe's relations with the rest of the world during a key period in European history.
For 1st and 2nd year undergraduate courses in Modern European History in departments of history. Also, higher level courses on enlightenment.This book provides a wide-ranging account and discussion of the history of Europe from 1713-1789. As well as political events, problems and institutions, it looks at the economic life of the continent, social structures and problems and intellectual and religious life. It also covers all aspects of Europe's relations with the rest of the world during a key period in European history.
This book discusses examples of how the U.S. Founding Fathers were influenced and inspired by Chinese agriculture, architecture, and philosophy. China, then one of the most stable and powerful civilizations in the world, offered unique perspectives on various aspects of society which were distinct from the Founding Fathers’ European heritage. China provided an alternative set of social and political frameworks which supported the Founding Fathers’ efforts to craft a unique heritage for their young nation. These Founders sought to establish a political identity that was distinct from European aristocratic traditions.
Fischer has examined price records in many nations, and finds that great waves of rising prices in the 13th-, 16th-, 18th-, and 20th centuries were all marked by price swings of increasing volatility, falling wages, a growing gap between rich and poor, and an increase in violent crime, family disintegration, and cultural despair. 109 graphs & charts. 7 maps.
The apparently accelerating arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and the precarious political conditions existing in many parts of the world have given rise to new anxiety about the possibility of military confrontation between the superpowers. Despite the fateful nature of the risk, we have little knowledge, as Jack S. Levy has pointed out, "of the conditions, processes, and events which might combine to generate such a calamity." No empirically confirmed theory of the causes of war exists, and the hypotheses—often contradictory—that have been proposed remain untested. As a step toward the formulation of a theory of the causes of war that can be tested against historical experience, Levy has developed a unique data base that will serve as an invaluable resource for students of international conflict in coming years. War in the Modern Great Power System provides a much-needed perspective on the major wars of the past. In this thorough and systematic study, Levy carefully defines the Great Power concept and identifies the Great Powers and their international wars since the late fifteenth century. The resulting compilation of war data is unique because of its five-century span and its focus on a well-defined set of Great Powers. Turning to a quantitative analysis of the characteristics, patterns, and trends in war, Levy demonstrates that although wars between the Great Powers have become increasingly serious in every respect but duration over the last five hundred years, their frequency has diminished. He rejects the popular view that the twentieth century has been the most warlike on record, and he demonstrates that it instead constitutes a return to the historical norm after the exceptionally peaceful nineteenth century. Applying his data to the question whether war is "contagious," he finds that the likelihood of war is indeed highest when another war is under way, but that this contagious effect disappears after the first war is over. Contrary to the popular "war-weariness" theory, he finds no evidence that war generates an aversion to subsequent war. This study, extending the scientific analysis of war back over five centuries of international history, constitutes a major contribution to our knowledge of international conflict.
A Cultural History of Education in the Age of Enlightenment presents essays that examine the following key themes of the period: church, religion and morality; knowledge, media and communications; children and childhood; family, community and sociability; learners and learning; teachers and teaching; literacies; and life histories. The Age of Enlightenment is characterized by a growing belief in the human capacity to change the world. This volume shows how the educational endeavors of the period contributed in their diversity to a thoroughly educationalized culture around 1800, the very foundation of the modern nation state, which then developed into the long 19th century. An essential resource for researchers, scholars, and students in history, literature, culture, and education.
This book examines Max Weber's understanding of bureaucracy by applying his ideas to the development of officialdom from the ninth century to the present in six territories: England, Sweden, France, Germany, Spain, and Hungary. Edward Page takes a broad view of bureaucracy that includes not only officials in important central or national institutions but also those providing goods and services locally. The 'scorecard' is based on expected developments in four key areas of Weber's analysis: the functional differentiation of tasks within government, professionalism, formalism, and monocracy. After discussing the character of officialdom in the ninth, twelfth, fifteenth, eighteenth, and twenty-first centuries, the book reveals that Weber's scorecard has a mixed record, especially weak in its account of the development of monocracy and formalism. A final chapter discusses alternative conceptions of bureaucratic development and sets out an account based on understanding processes of routinization, institutional integration, and the instrumentalization of law.
When and why do powerful countries seek to enact major changes to international order, the broad set of rules that guide behavior in world politics? This question is particularly important today given the Trump administration's clear disregard for the reigning liberal international order in the United States. Across the globe, there is also uncertainty over what China might seek to replace that order with as it continues to amass power and influence. Together, these developments mean that what motivates great powers to shape and change order will remain at the forefront of debates over the future of world politics. Prior studies have focused on how the origins of international orders have been consensus-driven and inclusive. By contrast, Kyle Lascurettes argues in Orders of Exclusion that the propelling motivation for great power order building has typically been exclusionary. Dominant powers pursue fundamental changes to order when they perceive a major new threat on the horizon. Moreover, they do so for the purpose of targeting this perceived threat, be it another powerful state or a foreboding ideological movement. The goal of order building, then, is blocking that threatening entity from amassing further influence, a motive Lascurettes illustrates at work across more than three hundred years of international history. Far from falling outside of the bounds of traditional statecraft, order building is the continuation of power politics by other means.
