Author: Youfei Liu

Publisher: Open Dissertation Press

Published: 2017-01-27

Total Pages:

ISBN-13: 9781361470282

This dissertation, "Network and Temporal Effects on Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets" by Youfei, Liu, 劉有飛, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: of thesis entitled "Network And Temporal Effects On Strategic Bidding In Electricity Markets" Submitted by Youfei Liu for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong in February 2006 The global deregulation of power industries has given rise to many fascinating research topics. This thesis addresses issues of strategic bidding by power generators. The problem of strategic bidding is to optimize an individual power generation bid by maximizing profits, based on production cost, expectation of rival behavior and system demand. Electrical power flow over different links is governed by the physical law (Kirchhoff law). As a result, electrical power flow cannot be independently determined and the electricity transmission system has global network effects. One major contribution of this study is to investigate the network effects of electricity transmission on strategic bidding and analyze the network-constrained electricity market equilibria. A three-node electricity system is used for investigation. The decision space of generators is divided into the congestion-on region and congestion-off region, and the optimal response curves of generators in each region are then derived. The market equilibrium is located as the intersection of these optimal response curves. It is analytically shown that this may consist either of a unique unconstrained market equilibrium, a unique constrained market equilibrium, multiple-equilibria, or no pure Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, the interaction between transmission rights holding and market power exercising is addressed. It is shown that in the situation with a positive PTDF, holding transmission rights mitigate market power, and produce an improvement in market efficiency, while in other situations, the reverse is true. Furthermore it is demonstrated that a possible allocation of transmission rights to generators can be found to achieve maximum efficiency. Another unique characteristic of electricity markets is their notable temporal ii effects. In other words, electricity prices have significant volatilities because of the non-storability of power energy and the large variations of system demand. The second part of this study investigates the temporal effects of the electricity market on strategic bidding. A periodic dynamic feedback system is proposed to model the generation competition process. With the developed system dynamics, an optimal control problem is formulated to study the multi-period optimization behavior (called the 'advanced' strategy) of a generator, and the state-feedback control rule is then derived via a sweeping method. It is demonstrated that the generator with optimal control can obtain more profits, and a sensitivity analysis is provided to locate the market factors that affect the performance of optimal control. Next, system uncertainties are included, and a stochastic optimal control problem for generation decision is formulated and solved. Two interesting problems are investigated, namely the effect of the generator's 'advanced' strategic behavior on market efficiency, and the way in which an individual's payoff evolves with other generators' 'advanced' strategic behavior. It is shown that the 'advanced' strategic behavior of generators will improve market efficiency, while an individual's payoff evolution resembles a 'Prisoner Dilemma'. An analysis of risk management of generation decisi...