Ownership and Asymmetric Information Problems in the Corporate Loan Market

Ownership and Asymmetric Information Problems in the Corporate Loan Market

Author: Lewis Gaul

Publisher: CreateSpace

Published: 2015-01-01

Total Pages: 32

ISBN-13: 9781505310306

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In credit markets, asymmetric information problems arise when borrowers have private information about their creditworthiness that is not observable by lenders. If these informational asymmetries do not negatively affect lenders' profitability, then they are irrelevant to lenders.


Asymmetric Information and the Market Structure of the Banking Industry

Asymmetric Information and the Market Structure of the Banking Industry

Author: Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 1998-06-01

Total Pages: 32

ISBN-13: 145195154X

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The paper analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi-period model of spatial competition. All lenders face uncertainty with regard to borrowers’ creditworthiness, but, in the process of lending, incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients, acquiring an advantage over potential entrants. These informational asymmetries are an important determinant of the industry structure and may represent a barrier to entry for new banks. The paper shows that, in contrast with traditional models of horizontal differentiation, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of fixed costs.


Essays in Financial Economics

Essays in Financial Economics

Author: Rita Biswas

Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing

Published: 2019-10-24

Total Pages: 167

ISBN-13: 1789733898

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This volume, dedicated to John W. Kensinger, explores a variety of topics in financial economics, including firm growth, investment risks, and the profitability of the banking industry. With its global perspective, Essays in Financial Economics is a valuable addition to the bookshelf of any researcher in finance.


Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

Author: Günter Bamberg

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 538

ISBN-13: 3642750605

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Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.


Who Gets What--and why

Who Gets What--and why

Author: Alvin E. Roth

Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt

Published: 2015

Total Pages: 275

ISBN-13: 0544291131

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A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role. If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what. Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.