"Together we must affirm that domestic terrorism has no place in our society." -President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism (June 2021) National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism (June 2021) conveys the Biden Administration's view of domestic terrorism and strategy on how to deal with it. What is domestic terrorism? As defined by this report, it is based on a range of violent ideological motivations, including racial bigotry and anti-government feeling, and it can take several forms, from lone actors and small groups to violent militias.
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but almost all communities, regardless of ethnicity, religion, social status or location, are now increasingly facing the challenge of terrorist threat. What makes a terrorist organization attractive to some citizens? A better understanding of the reasons why individuals choose to join terror groups may well enhance efforts to disrupt the recruitment process of terrorist organizations and thereby support current and future counter-terrorism initiatives. This book presents the proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop, 'Countering Terrorist Recruitment in the Context of Armed Counter-Terrorism Operations', held in Antalya, Turkey, in May 2015. The goal of the workshop was to share existing ideas and develop new ones to tackle terrorist recruitment. The book contains 18 articles covering topics which include: the role of NATO and other international entities in counter-terrorism; understanding recruitment methods and socialization techniques of terror networks by comparing them to gangs; social media in terrorist recruitment; drug money links with terrorist financing; and counter-terrorism and human rights. The book will be of interest to all those involved in developing, planning and executing prevention programs and policies in relation to both armed and non-armed counter-terrorism operations.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush drew a line in the sand, saying, “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” Since 9/11, many counterterrorism partners have been both “with” and “against” the United States, helping it in some areas and hindering it in others. This has been especially true in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, where the terrorist groups that threaten America are most concentrated. Because so many aspects of U.S. counterterrorism strategy are dependent on international cooperation, the United States has little choice but to work with other countries. Making the most of these partnerships is fundamental to the success of the War on Terror. Yet what the United States can reasonably expect from its counterterrorism partners—and how to get more out of them—remain too little understood. In With Us and Against Us, Stephen Tankel analyzes the factors that shape counterterrorism cooperation, examining the ways partner nations aid international efforts, as well as the ways they encumber and impede effective action. He considers the changing nature of counterterrorism, exploring how counterterrorism efforts after 9/11 critically differ both from those that existed beforehand and from traditional alliances. Focusing on U.S. partnerships with Algeria, Egypt, Mali, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen against al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist organizations, Tankel offers nuanced propositions about what the U.S. can expect from its counterterrorism partners depending on their political and security interests, threat perceptions, and their relationships with the United States and with the terrorists in question. With Us and Against Us offers a theoretically rich and policy-relevant toolkit for assessing and improving counterterrorism cooperation, devising strategies for mitigating risks, and getting the most out of difficult partnerships.
Although violent extremism is not a new phenomenon, it is increasingly recognized as a major challenge of our times. The recruitment of foreign fighters by extremist organizations, and its potential impact on public safety in the countries from which they come, is also emerging as a complex issue at the forefront of international preoccupations. This book presents the proceedings of the three day NATO Advanced Research Workshop, "Countering Violent Extremism Among Youth to Prevent Terrorism", held in Milan, Italy, in June 2014. The best way to respond to violent extremism in general, and the radicalization of disaffected youth in particular, is far from clear, but the stakes are so high and the potential threat to countries worldwide so great that inaction is not an option. The goal of the workshop was to enhance the capacity of policymakers and practitioners to design strategies that will achieve verifiable human-rights based outcomes to counter violent extremism. Subjects covered in the 19 papers which go to make up this book include: the causes or drivers of violent extremism; the factors which facilitate the recruitment of youth by violent extremist groups; the risk of growing Islamophobia in some Western and Central European countries; and proactive measures to counter the radicalization of youth. The book will be of interest to all those involved in policy development, prevention programs, de-radicalization programs or research aimed at countering violent extremism and the radicalization of young people.
In this paper, Michael Schmitt explores the legality of the attacks against Al Qaeda and the Taliban under the "jus ad bellum," that component of international law that governs when a State may resort to force as an instrument of national policy. Although States have conducted military counterterrorist operations in the past, the scale and scope of Operation Enduring Freedom may signal a sea change in strategies to defend against terrorism. This paper explores the normative limit on counterterrorist operations. Specifically, under what circumstances can a victim State react forcibly to an act of terrorism? Against whom? When? With what degree of severity? And for how long? The author contends that the attacks against Al Qaeda were legitimate exercises of the rights of individual and collective defense. They were necessary and proportional, and once the Taliban refused to comply with U.S. and United Nations demands to turn over the terrorists located in Afghanistan, it was legally appropriate for coalition forces to enter the country for the purpose of ending the ongoing Al Qaeda terrorist campaign. However, the attacks on the Taliban were less well grounded in traditional understandings of international law. Although the Taliban were clearly in violation of their legal obligation not to allow their territory to be used as a terrorist sanctuary, the author suggests that the degree and nature of the relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda may not have been such that the September 11 attacks could be attributed to the Taliban, thereby disallowing strikes against them in self-defense under traditional understandings of international law. Were the attacks, therefore, illegal? Not necessarily. Over the past half-century the international community's understanding of the international law governing the use of force by States has been continuously evolving. The author presents criteria likely to drive future assessments of the legality of counterterrorist operatio7.
This volume presents the papers and summarizes the discussions of a workshop held in Goa, India, in January 2004, organized by the Indian National Institute of Advanced Science (NIAS) and the U.S. Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC). During the workshop, Indian and U.S. experts examined the terrorist threat faced in both countries and elsewhere in the world, and explored opportunities for the U.S. and India to work together. Bringing together scientists and experts with common scientific and technical backgrounds from different cultures provided a unique opportunity to explore possible means of preventing or mitigating future terrorist attacks.
Since its creation in 1963, United States Southern Command has been led by 30 senior officers representing all four of the armed forces. None has undertaken his leadership responsibilities with the cultural sensitivity and creativity demonstrated by Admiral Jim Stavridis during his tenure in command. Breaking with tradition, Admiral Stavridis discarded the customary military model as he organized the Southern Command Headquarters. In its place he created an organization designed not to subdue adversaries, but instead to build durable and enduring partnerships with friends. His observation that it is the business of Southern Command to launch "ideas not missiles" into the command's area of responsibility gained strategic resonance throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America, and at the highest levels in Washington, DC.
This book offers insights into the building of trust in Muslim communities through community engagement in a climate of counter-terrorism. Police engagement with Muslim communities is complex with a history of distrust. This book first attempts to understand the role and implications of uncertainty on community engagement in Muslim communities, and then explores the cultural nuances associated with the demonstration of trustworthiness, and decisions to bestow trust. It further highlights the complexities and implications for Muslim leaders when trying to simultaneously engage police and appease their own communities; the book exposes community perceptions of an over-reaction by authorities that has moved suspicion from a handful of terrorists to the entire Muslim community, resulting in problematic community perceptions that Muslim communities are being targeted by police. The findings suggest that the intentionality of police is a highly significant consideration in trust negotiations, and reveals a number of cultural preferences considered critical to trust negotiations. The book further highlights opportunities to enhance the development of trust and avoid pitfalls that can be problematic to community engagement. The lessons learned seek to enhance the existing body of literature regarding strategies and resources to improve counter-terrorism community engagement with Muslim communities. This book will be of much interest to students of counter-terrorism, preventing violent extremism, deradicalization, and security studies.